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ABSTRACT
Bower, Matthew Eugene. PhD. The University of Memphis. May, 2013. The
Birth of the World: An Exploration of Husserl’s Genetic Phenomenology. Major
Professor: Dr. Thomas Nenon.
In this dissertation I provide an extensive interpretation of Husserl’s genetic
phenomenology of the “world-horizon,” the sui generis form of intentionality that gives
us a schematic awareness of what lies beyond our momentary present experience.
Chapter 2 begins with an account of Husserl’s static analyses, taking advantage of
recently published manuscripts in which Husserl uses the tools of his eidetic method to
ground his concept of the world-horizon. What we find is a minimal conception of the
world-horizon as a spatiotemporal form for experience. The chapter ends with a look at
how this minimal conception is related to practical and intersubjective forms of the
world-horizon.
In Chapter 3 I provide motivation for a genetic analysis. It is spurred by the puzzle
that intentional acts depend on extant horizons and horizons depend on previous
intentional acts, generating an infinite regress. A genetic analysis of the world-horizon
would resolve this paradox. Chapter 4 addresses some problems facing the project. First,
I explain Husserl’s need to overcome the infinite regress because the subject is a being
that is born and dies. Second, I confront the problem of genesis within the
phenomenological reduction and I outline Husserl’s view of reconstruction of the
immemorial past as latent in experience.
Chapter 5 embarks on the genetic analysis. I emphasize Husserl’s integration of
affection and association in the theory of instincts out of which our practical abilities
enabling perceptual contact with reality arise, resolving the regress described in Chapter
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3. In the Conclusion I show how this theory demands a reconsideration of Husserl’s
early discussion of the “annihilation of the world,” leading to a reversal of criticisms of
his understanding of subjectivity made by Heidegger. I also consider some difficulties
with Husserl’s theory and suggest where improvements and clarifications need to be
made, indicating some possibilities for extending Husserl’s theory that are in step with
contemporary developments.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction: The World as a Philosophical and Phenomenological Theme

The task of this dissertation is to provide an interpretation of Husserl’s genetic
analyses of the world-horizon. In the following introductory remarks I will set the stage
for this work by remarking on the importance of notion of “world” within the
phenomenological tradition, its uniqueness in comparison to alternative philosophical
conceptions, and the context in which the notion became philosophically important for
Husserl. Arriving at a unique phenomenological concept of the world is one of Husserl’s
great achievements, which is evident in the way that the phenomenological movement is
unified in its interest in building on and reworking that concept. At the same time as the
phenomenological concept of world brings together a quite diverse group of thinkers, it
also sets them apart from other ways of thinking about the concept. After considering
some examples that I take to be typical alternative philosophical concepts of world, I will
introduce the phenomenological concept and sketch the motives for its emergence in
Husserl’s early work. In closing, I will give a summary description of the contents of the
chapters of this dissertation.
Over the last century or so phenomenology has come to mean many different things
to many different people, giving the impression that there is no univocal sense to the
term. Those familiar with the movement know of the controversial differences between
Husserl and Heidegger on the task of phenomenology, for instance. It even seems that
for the founder of the movement himself, Husserl, phenomenology had dramatically
different meanings at various points in his philosophical career. It began as the relatively
modest enterprise of descriptive psychology, morphed into a curious new form of

1

transcendental philosophy taking inspiration in equal parts from Descartes and Kant, and
in Husserl’s later work gradually sloughed off its Cartesianism (although never entirely)
in favor of a more biologically, socially, and historically oriented transcendentalism.
Indeed, over time the differences have only compounded. It is even typical of 20th
century phenomenologists to mark their entry onto the philosophical scene with dramatic
confrontations with their predecessors, as we see Levinas and Henry doing with their
criticism of Husserl, Heidegger, and even the entirety of the Western philosophical
tradition. Although in less dramatic modes, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty do the same –
Husserl is a major target in Sartre’s Transcendence of the Ego, and although MerleauPonty was one of the post-Husserlian phenomenologists most friendly to Husserl, it is
hard not to see Husserl as the object of many of the criticisms of “intellectualism” in the
Phenomenology of Perception.
This picture might lead one not just to doubt whether there is a univocal meaning to
the term “phenomenology,” but to wonder whether there is any unity at all to the variety
of ideas gathered under that name. I do not want to suggest an answer to the former, but I
believe there are some relatively generic family resemblances within phenomenology that
might relieve the latter issue. The descriptive, experiential method is one commonality.
The first person perspective and the theme of intentionality are some others. I think a
less obvious, but no less plausible candidate is the non-trivial employment of the concept
“world” to pose and resolve philosophical problems.
Around the time of his transcendental turn, Husserl puts a concept of world front
and center in his phenomenology. Shortly after that turn, at the time of the writing of the
draft for Ideas II, which was never completed for publication in Husserl’s lifetime,
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Husserl picks up the term Umwelt (“surrounding world”) as a major theme of
phenomenology. That term was surely the precursor to the more familiar Lebenswelt
(“life-world”) that we know from the Crisis. The concept world and its variants are
inseparable from Husserl’s philosophy, as the most superficial overview shows.
World is a major concern in Heidegger’s phenomenological work from around the
time of Being and Time as well, a text in which his innovative approach and desire to
distance his own phenomenology from Husserl’s is palpable. One easily recognizes
Husserl’s phenomenology in Heidegger’s critique of a Cartesian “worldless subject.” It
is just as much, if not more, under the influence of Heidegger’s attempt to demonstrate
the inseparability of the subject and the world by defending a concept of the subject,
Dasein, as being-in-the-world, that phenomenologists continued to factor some concept
of world in their work as it is under the influence of Husserl’s phenomenology.
Heidegger’s influence is apparent, for instance, in the work of Maurice MerleauPonty, Eugen Fink, and Jan Patoþka, although certainly without diminishing the
originality of these thinkers. Emmanuel Levinas and Michel Henry might seem to be
exceptions to this trend even to the point of lacking this family resemblance altogether in
their strong reactions to Heidegger presented in their critiques of intentionality and, by
implication, the phenomenological concept of world. As I see it, however, Levinas and
Henry do not so much abandon the concept of world or the classic phenomenological
views of intentionality as they show its limits and subordination to other phenomena.
This is also true, more recently, of Jean-Luc Marion’s critique in Being Given of the
“impoverished phenomenon” in classical phenomenology. The demoted concept lives on
for these thinkers and does much of the work that other phenomenologists originally gave
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it. Claude Romano, more recently, has even managed to forge an intriguing synthesis of
Heideggerian and Levinasian phenomenology in his work Event and World.
These remarks go to show why it would be reasonable to take the notion of world to
be a unifying theme for phenomenology. While this theme pervades the
phenomenological movement, it is notably absent from other philosophical discourses.
Of course, the word is used, and it even has special philosophical uses outside of
phenomenology. We have, for instance, the “problem of the external world” that
developed out of Descartes’ methodological doubt. While the now stock phrase “the
problem of the external world” is not Descartes’ own, he nevertheless was interested in
his Meditations on First Philosophy in establishing “that there really is a world”
(Descartes 1984 16/11),1 which means to “inquire whether any such things [as material
objects] exist outside me” (63/44).
To think about the world in this way is to search for some reason to believe that
one’s perceptual or cognitive faculties veridically inform one about the presence of
physical objects (at least, perhaps among other things) distinct from and independent of
oneself (qua mind or cognitive subject). The concept of world employed in this
problematic denotes a group of entities, specified as physical things insofar as they are
possible objects of legitimate cognitive acts or processes.
Besides that, there is also the topic of “possible worlds” that originates in Leibniz’s
metaphysical inquiries and, more specifically, in the context of his theodicy,2 i.e., of his
explanation of how a maximally benevolent and powerful God could create a world like

1

The first page number refers to the pagination of the Adam and Tannery edition of Descartes’
works, the second to the pagination of the Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch translation in English.
2
World is also an important concept necessary for the metaphysics of Leibniz’s Monadology above
and beyond the issue of theodicy, but I leave this complication aside for the sake of simplicity.
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ours that seems to involve so much misery and suffering. His theodicy is an attempt to
show that this world is the best of all possible worlds. Thus, it is not enough to consider
the actual world, which Leibniz prosaically describes as “the collection of finite things”
(Leibniz 1991 41). We must consider the actual world as one among an infinite variety
of worlds that God had in mind before creation, because in discerning God’s principle of
selection among the possible worlds, we can discover why he would have chosen the one
we live in (75).
A possible world, according to Leibniz, is more than an arbitrary finite collection of
things. It is a collection with some degree of “fitness”, “interconnection”, or
“accommodation”, and the greater the fitness, the greater the perfection of the world
(Leibniz 1991 76). Fitness or perfection is, for Leibniz, explained in terms of features
that always belong to some particular individual substance within the larger collection
that comprises the world (76). Thus Leibniz develops a more sophisticated way of
talking about the world as a collection of things, but the development remains entirely
within that framework.
These two instances of philosophical uses of the concept world have a deep affinity,
both drawing on something like a common folk concept of the world. We use the word
“world” sometimes to indicate the planet earth, sometimes more or less as a synonym for
“universe”, i.e., as a blanket term to encompass everything that exists, or perhaps to refer
to the human inhabitants of the world or a specific subset thereof (in religious or political
contexts). This is not an exhaustive list of usages, but I think it is a fair sampling that
exemplifies something typical. Although the just-sampled usages are by no means
equivalent, they have in common that they all refer to entities – whether physical objects,
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organisms, animate beings, persons, etc. – or groups of entities. While speaking of and
investigating such entities and their groupings is necessary in everyday life and can be
philosophically interesting, it is not phenomenology’s concern when it comes to the topic
of world.
The starting point for understanding the phenomenological concept of the world is
that it refers to something other than entities or groups of entities. We can get a grip of
what is unique to the phenomenological understanding of the concept world by
considering the initial philosophical impetus for Husserl’s novel formulation of it within
the methodological and substantive framework of his early phenomenology. It is his
Cartesian approach to the phenomenological reduction3 – the first way of performing the
reduction he formulated, and one he continued to see as a valid introduction to
phenomenology in his later work – coupled with his analyses of perceptual experience
that shape his early thought on the matter. The upshot of these considerations is that the
concept of world designates a form of phenomenally conscious intentionality.
The aim of the reduction is to gain access to and ground our certainty in the source
of all knowledge. Husserl calls the first step in carrying out the reduction epochƝ,
parenthesizing, or bracketing. The epochƝ roughly fulfills the function that Descartes’
methodical doubt had in the first Meditation, except rather than negating all of our
beliefs, Husserl has us rather disengage them. We leave all our beliefs intact, but do not
“live in them,” to borrow a favorite phrase of Husserl’s. To do this, we have to specify
that feature common to all of our knowledge that gives it a kind of unity so that it can be

3

Cf. Rudolf Bernet (1990, 3-5) on the relation between the phenomenon world and the reduction.
David Carr (1974, 28) has also noted, without putting any special emphasis on the connection to the
reduction, Husserl’s shift by the time of Ideas I to a consideration of the phenomenon world, which was
absent in the Logical Investigations.
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bracketed, cutting to the root of all knowledge. Husserl, like Descartes, does not believe
it is necessary to examine every single item of putative knowledge individually. Rather,
one must find some sort of common domain and examine that domain as such. This
leads Husserl to introduce what he calls “the natural attitude” and its epistemic correlate,
the world.4
What is common to all knowledge is the characteristic of belief or positing.
Whenever I claim to know something, I believe that it is the case, I posit that it is so.
But, interestingly, there is more to belief or positing than just this common trait found in
every individual act. Apart from belief manifested in particular knowing acts, there is a
“general positing.” Because even when I do not make a knowledge claim thematic, even
when I do not bring it to explicit awareness, there is a more fundamental kind of belief or
certainty that carries us along. We have a constant tacit belief in the existence of
transcendent reality, its presence for us, its being “on hand” (vorhanden) even prior to
and as the basis for forming explicit epistemic judgments. The world is precisely the
correlate of this believing, first as constantly, pre-reflectively posited and then, on that
basis, as thematized in particular acts of positing. In this way the reduction, the goal of
discovering and securing absolute certainty regarding the ground of all knowledge,
requires Husserl to formulate a concept of world.
Based on these considerations, one might not suspect that a concept of world
formulated in such a similar spirit to Descartes’ philosophy with its problem of the
external world would end up being any different than the one resulting from Descartes’
4

It should be kept in mind, as Ludwig Landgrebe has argued, that the concept of world developed in
the context of the reduction is preliminary, a way of getting phenomenology under way, and that the deeper
analyses of the phenomenon world can only take place after the reduction. Nevertheless, the preliminary
character of his discussion of world in Ideas I does not invalidate these initial results. Cf. Landgrebe
(1940), 42-43.
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problematic. Indeed, certain emphases in Husserl’s description of the world of the
natural attitude in Ideas I, §§27-29 seem to support that suspicion. In these sections
much of Husserl’s attention is given to listing the sorts of things that fill up that world:
Physical things, animate beings, things nearby or far off, things valued, possessed, things
to be done, other people, etc. But is the world just this multifaceted collection? No. Just
as we distinguished particular acts of positing from the general positing, so we must also
distinguish their correlates, namely, particular objects that are the subject matter of
particular positings and the world as such as the correlate of the general positing.
The description of the world’s contents is accompanied by less prominent, scattered
remarks that signal a way of thinking of the world as distinct from things, whatever sort
they may be, but as nevertheless necessarily intimately interrelated with them. For
instance, besides things intuitively perceived, there is a field of perception not reducible
to what is intuitively perceived, but by virtue of which one can perceive such things and
do so in connection with the entirety of what is co-presented, what is not presently
perceived but possibly perceived. This field is an aspect of the “predelineated” “‘form’
of the world, precisely as ‘the world’” (Hua III 49/52). The predelineated form is a style
or generality that is always familiar to us along with any particular experience. What is
predelineated in the simplest instance of perceptual experience is the spatiotemporal form
of things. Likewise, corresponding to other types of objects we can expect to find
suitable predelineated forms, e.g., forms corresponding to animate beings, things valued,
things to be done, etc. Although there are many different predelineated domains, they are
all integrated insofar as they are the correlate of the general positing. My tacit positing of
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the world is my pre-reflective expectation that whatever I encounter in experience will fit
into such predelineated schemata as the spatiotemporal form of the perceived world.
What we have gathered so far about Husserl’s thinking on world derives solely
from the initial step of the reduction, the epochƝ. The reduction proper leads Husserl to
further refine his concept of world. The epochƝ sets the stage for the reduction by giving
us the concept of world. Now the business of the reduction proper is to locate our source
of certainty and what will serve to legitimate all knowledge. The candidates are the
world and consciousness through which the world is given to us. Husserl’s strategy is to
argue that the world could never be the ultimate guarantor of knowledge, and that only
consciousness could play that role. In making these claims, he engages in a more
thorough discussion of the nature of world such that it could not be an ultimate ground of
knowledge. When Husserl considers the dubitability of the world, he mentions two
features main features that lead to its possible “annihilation.” One of these is the “one in
many structure” that it has.
Husserl takes our experience of the world to be similar to our perceptual experience
of individual objects in that it is always a presenting of an object or state of affairs in a
manifold of experiences, none of which adequately present the thing. The world is like
that perceptual structure consisting of various lived-experiences through which we intend
some particular object. But it is a characteristic possibility of this sort of manifold that
we may learn at some point that what was presented in it earlier is not really as it seemed
to be; perhaps it is different, perhaps it does not exist at all. This leads to the second
feature, namely, concordance (Einstimmigkeit). The validity of the presentation that the
experiential manifold constitutes requires that it continues to confirm the initial
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presentation, and if it does, it is concordant. Not just any combination or sequence of
lived-experiences will add up to an experience of an object. They must harmonize, in the
way that my momentary experience of the front side of a three-dimensional object blends
into another presenting a different side. The world itself is supposed to consist of such a
harmony. Without that harmony, we would not experience a world.
This brief look at how Husserl’s concept of world arises in Ideas I clearly displays
what is unique about the phenomenological concept of world. I am not presently offering
a precise definition of what Husserl’s concept of world is – which is the primary concern
of Chapter 2 – but I am trying to suggest positively how for Husserl the world is not a
thing or group of things. The world is something unique that one experiences over and
above this or that entity or group of entities. Moreover, Husserl’s concept of world is
bound up in a story about intentionality, as the remarks about predelineation and the
similarity of our experience of the world with our perceptual experience of objects
indicate. Even as Husserl’s specifically epistemological interest in the concept of the
world fades in his later years, he continues to expound a phenomenology of the
experience of the world as a special form of intentionality.
Indeed, it is one of Husserl’s enduring insights that we not only experience what we
are presented with in our immediate environment, but that we also have a sense of our
broader surroundings and, over and above that, the “world” itself. We are capable of
having a sui generis experience of the world by virtue of what Husserl calls the “worldhorizon.” For the sake of clarity, in what follows I will speak of a “world-horizon” when
referring to this form of intentionality, and reserve the terms “world” and “reality” to
refer to the entities distinct from the subject that the subject encounters in experience.
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“World-horizon” is thus the name for a complex form of intentionality that does not
so much give us an awareness of everything all at once as it does provide us a schematic
awareness of that which lies beyond what we experience at any given moment. While
there has been much discussion of the world-horizon as Husserl describes it using his
“static” techniques, in this dissertation I argue that Husserl is not confined to these
techniques. I take the first steps here in accounting for Husserl’s use of genetic
techniques in his later work to analyze the world-horizon, which I do by offering an
interpretation of his theory of the genesis of the world-horizon.
Husserl, however, consistently maintains that genetic phenomenology is not a
freestanding enterprise. It is blind without static phenomenology, which gives it
guidance by first categorizing the domain of lived-experience. Chapter 2 accordingly
gives an account of Husserl’s static analyses of the world-horizon. In doing this, I take
advantage of recently published manuscripts in which Husserl uses the tools of his eidetic
method to ground his concept of the world-horizon, something he neglects to do in his
published work. What we find Husserl advancing in such analysis is a minimal
conception of the world-horizon as the spatiotemporal form of experience that any
experience must have if it is to put us in touch with transcendent reality. Although the
remainder of this dissertation will keep the same narrow focus on just the minimal
conception of the world-horizon, I follow up this analysis by spelling out the main
contours of how, according to Husserl, this minimal conception of the world-horizon
statically links up with the more concrete forms of the world-horizon, e.g., such that it
puts us in touch with other people and with items of practical or cultural significance.
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In Chapter 3 I provide motivation for a genetic analysis of the world-horizon,
rooted in a puzzle having to do with Husserl’s view of the relation between the two basic
forms of worldly intentionality: The intentional acts that make up our thematic, focal
awareness of the world and the horizonal intentionality by means of which we are
marginally aware of our typical possibilities for such intentional acts. The puzzle
concerns the dependence relations that hold between these two forms of intentionality.
Husserl maintains both that intentional acts always depend on extant horizons, and that
horizons always depend on previous intentional acts. As Husserl recognizes, this
generates an infinite regress, where intentional acts presuppose horizons, which
presuppose intentional acts, and so on ad infinitum. In this chapter I try to clarify what
these dependence relations consist in and how they generate the regress. The desire to
avoid this regress spurs the call for a more nuanced analysis clarifying how these two
forms of intentionality arise in the first place.
I move in Chapter 4 to address some problems one might have with the project of a
genetic analysis of worldly intentionality and the world-horizon itself. The first problem
I deal with is why Husserl needs to avoid the regress described in the previous chapter,
which is important since an infinite regress is not inherently objectionable, as the
philosophy of Spinoza, for instance, shows. Husserl needs to overcome the problem
posed by the infinite regress of worldly intentionality because, as he claims in a number
of late manuscripts, the life of the transcendental subject includes the events of birth and
death. It would be contradictory to claim that the subject comes into being or begins
having worldly experience at some point and that there is an infinite regress of worldly
intentionality. The second problem I treat in this chapter is the methodological problem
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of what kind of access we have to pre-worldly experience, given that we have no
recollection of any experience prior to that of the world. I explain how the problem of
the pre-world relates to the phenomenological reduction and outline a method of
reconstruction that I put together from various of Husserl’s late manuscripts on the topic,
suggesting that such reconstruction already begins in ordinary experience and that
phenomenology can refine that sort of experience through self-aware, methodically
analyzed experiences of empathy (e.g., with very young infants) and analysis of the
developmental dynamics of one’s own life.
I lay out Husserl’s analysis of the genesis of the world-horizon In Chapter 5. This
analysis proceeds by isolating the simplest forms of experience and setting out their
relations to more complex forms of experience in terms of Husserl’s theory of affection
and association. Affection and association, which Husserl later redescribes in terms of
instinctive drives and desires, are the dynamic connective tissue of experience. The
simplest experience of noticing some facet within a given field of sensory data, leaves an
affective trace such that in subsequent experience another facet may associatively recall
the former in a new kind of experience, one of recognition, which in turn leaves an
affective trace that serves as the associative basis for some more complex kind of
experience.

In sketching this development, I emphasize the decisive role the instinct of

curiosity and the instincts pertaining to the lived-body play in Husserl’s account. It is the
cultivation of these instincts into practical abilities that makes possible the experience of
a constantly available transcendent object in worldly forms of intentionality. This
process advances ultimately up to the development of the experience of transcendent
reality in intentional acts and horizonal intentionality such that the two are generated
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together, without one having genetic priority, which is the definitive resolution of the
regress described in Chapter 3.
In the Conclusion, I will return again to the account of the reduction in Ideas I to
reexamine the claim about the possible “annihilation of the world.” Husserl’s push to
subject even the world-horizon itself to genetic analysis not only gives new meaning to
the subject’s relation to the world-horizon, but also, by implication, leads to a rejoinder to
Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s view of the subject in Being and Time, suggesting that
it is Heidegger and not Husserl who suffers from a prejudice obscuring the nature of
subjectivity. Finally, I raise some concerns that arise from an attempt to synthesize
Husserl’s various manuscripts on the genesis of the world-horizon. First, who the genetic
analysis is meant to be a description of needs clarification. Second, the empirical fact
that certain non-human animals develop much differently from the way humans do poses
a problem for Husserl’s account, which is supposed to describe a necessary and universal
genesis. These problems point the way for further developments of Husserl’s genetic
problematic that fit well with more recent philosophical forays into cognitive
development.
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CHAPTER 2
Husserl’s Minimal Conception of the World-Horizon: An Eidetic Analysis

Introduction
It is a remarkable fact that the concept “world” plays such a crucial role in Husserl’s
published works, whether one thinks of how important the phenomenon is to the
transcendental phenomenological reduction of Ideas I or of the twist Husserl gives the
concept in his enigmatic phenomenology of the life-world in the Crisis, and yet the
notion does not receive thorough treatment in its own right. It is for the most part an
“operative concept,” the meaning of which Husserl occasionally remarks upon and
clarifies, but does not give the penetrating treatment deserved by a central philosophical
notion. Saulius Geniusas (2012 58) expresses this well when he notes that “it is highly
curious that, while being motivated by the lack of sense of the world’s pregivenness, the
performance of the epochƝ and the reduction in Ideas I does not lead to a
phenomenological description of the world-horizon.” Husserl himself also comes to see
this deficiency in Ideas I, and specifically with respect to an eidetic analysis of the worldhorizon.1 This lacuna is characteristic of Husserl’s other published works as well.2

1

See Hua III, 390 (cited in Carr 1974, 153): “Also, the great error that [the chapter] [i.e., Part II,
Chapter 1 of Ideas I – MB] takes its point of departure from the natural world (without characterizing it as
world) and then goes immediately to the eidos – as if one already arrived directly at the exact [eidetic –
MB] sciences.”
2

In David Carr’s (1974, 138) words: “[N]one of these earlier investigations [i.e., works published
before the Crisis – MB] is carried to the point of requiring such a thorough reconstruction of the worldconcept.” He also makes a similar remark about the Cartesian Meditations (Hua I, 154). And I would add
that even though the “life-world” factors so importantly in the Crisis, it is not given sustained treatment in
its own right. It is rather discussed in relation to other matters, like scientific theory and the history of
scientific theory. That brings out certain features of the world-horizon, but hardly suffices as a theory of
the world-horizon itself. That, of course, is not necessarily a defect of the Crisis, which did not have such
an aim.
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That is not to say, of course, that we learn nothing significant about the notion from
Husserl’s published works. Certainly, we learn much that is essential to understanding
the phenomenon. Perhaps the most crucial feature, the one Husserl puts the greatest
emphasis on, is its horizonal character. The world, as a phenomenon, as something
experienced, is a horizon.

My intention here, however, is not to stitch together an

account of the world-horizon from the fragmentary statements and passages of familiar
texts, something that has been done very well by other interpreters of Husserl.3 While I
will rely on these, my main sources will be the manuscripts not published in Husserl’s
lifetime. These are much more forthcoming and precise on the topic of the worldhorizon, even if they too require some stitching together.
When one explores the impressive number of manuscripts written by Husserl
expressly dealing with the world-horizon, it becomes clear that the world-horizon is a
multi-faceted phenomenon. The phrase “horizon of all horizons” is only the tip of the
iceberg. The bulk of this chapter will be a discussion of Husserl’s attempts to give an
eidetic analysis of the world-horizon. Genetic phenomenology is completely blind
without such an investigation, one giving a rigorous grounding of the concept, revealing
the phenomenon’s “essence” (Hua XXXIX 119-120).4 The essence, we will see, captures
something similar to what was of interest to Kant in his transcendental aesthetic, namely,
the spatiotemporal form of perceptual experience. And like Kant, this essence is
phenomenologically quite “thin,” in that it highlights minimal formal or abstract features
3

Very thorough and helpful works on this issue include David Carr’s Phenomenology and the
Problem of History, Anthony Steinbock’s (1995) Home and Beyond, and now Saulius Geniusas’ (2012)
The Origins of the Horizon in Husserl’s Phenomenology. Ludwig Landgrebe’s 1940 article “The World as
a Phenomenological Problem” is also an excellent survey of Husserl’s thought on the matter, which retains
relevance despite its age.
4

On the relation between static and genetic phenomenology, see Anthony Steinbock (1998),
especially 132-134.
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of experience. This thin conception of the world-horizon, I will suggest, presents a
“core” concept of the world. The world as actually experienced is in fact always much
richer.
The challenge this thin conception of the world-horizon naturally leads to is how to
understand the relation of the core conception to more concrete ways of experiencing the
world. There are, in fact, a variety of (relatively) “thick” surrounding worlds (Umwelten)
that all exemplify the core world-horizon in their own way. The thin conception, we will
see, is something inherently capable of being fleshed out, thanks to the structures it shares
with all concrete forms of the surrounding world. The world-horizon is thus a variable
or, as Husserl says, “mobile” concept. This is evident in the looseness of his usage of
world-talk, speaking of an individual-subjective (einzelzubjektive) world, an
intersubjective world, a practical world, an ethical world, various surrounding worlds
(Umwelt) or life-worlds, home worlds and alien worlds, etc.

Eidetic method in general
The eidetic method is so central to Husserl’s phenomenology that Husserl
sometimes refers to the use of this method in phenomenology as the employment of an
“eidetic reduction.” He does not hesitate to claim in the Cartesian Meditations that it
“pervades the whole phenomenological method” (Hua I 103/69). What eidetic method
achieves is a “scientific” basis for claims about experience (Hua I 106/72).5 That does
not mean that Husserl wants phenomenology to adopt the methods of the natural
sciences, to adopt a methodological naturalism or scientism. To be scientific, in the sense
5

See also Bernet, Kern, and Marbach (1993), 77-78.
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Husserl takes to be the most important, is to make generally or universally valid claims,
and eidetic method is just a way of grounding such universal claims. With the eidetic
method, one is not limited to observations about this or that particular entity, but can
arrive at “laws” concerning these entities, results whose value transcends the individual
observations.
This method, also simply called “eidetics,” differs in at least two important ways
from what is usually understood by the phrase “the scientific method,” a contrast that is
instructive for introducing what is distinctive about the eidetic method. First, the
generality produced by using the eidetic method is not an inductive generalization (Hua
IX 78-81/58-60). Second, the practitioner of the eidetic method and the scientist are
confronted with different subject matters.
To begin with the latter, whereas the scientist is interested in the world as it
factually exists,6 eidetics concerns what is possible, with no special regard to its reality or
actuality, whether it corresponds to anything existing in fact (Husserl 1973 349-352).7
For eidetics, it is just as well to start from actual experience or imagination (Hua III 1213/11-12). Accordingly, the results of properly scientific inquiry are generalizations
about the world, and the results of eidetics are generalizations about what is merely
possible. The possible, however, does not comprise a realm separate from the actual
(Wirklichkeit, in Husserl’s technical vocabulary). There is perhaps not a parallel between
the actual and the possible, but the actual is a “point of departure” for considering the

6

Not only does Husserl claim that the “experiential sciences” (i.e., the natural sciences) are
interested in contingent particulars, but that the generalizations they arrive at are contingent as well. Cf.
Hua III, 8-9/7.
7

See also Bernet, Kern, and Marbach (1993), 80-81.
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possible.8 The possible begins as an alternative point of view on actuality. Anything
actual can be viewed in its mere possibility. This is done by taking it as an example
(Husserl 1973 340-341, 185-188/217-221, Hua IX 71/53). That is to re-contextualize it in
the realm of the possible, since to be an example is to be one exemplification among
many equally possible instances. That is what makes eidetics a “pure” or a priori
discipline rather than an empirical science (Husserl 1973 350).
The kind of possibility that eidetics is concerned with is also closely related to
actuality insofar as it differs from idealized possibilities, whether those of mathematics or
of the natural sciences. Husserl famously brings our attention to the idealizing nature of
science in the Crisis, where he characterizes the natural sciences as dealing with laws that
experience can only approximate (Hua VI 28-37), and in “On the Origin of Geometry,”
where he contrasts the exactness of the theoretical objects of geometry with the
inexactness of experienced reality (Hua VI Appendix VI). Eidetics differs from these
disciplines by being “descriptive,” by being amenable to intuitive demonstration, either in
actual experience (taken as exemplary) or imagination.9 Whether it be a possibility of
formal logic or ontology, whether it be exceedingly abstract or very concrete, the
possibility that matters for eidetics is one that is capable of being exhibited in experience
(broadly construed). This is what Husserl means when he speaks of eidetics involving
the “intuition” (Anschauung) of essences (Hua III 10-12/8-11).10

8

Cf. Husserl (1973), 340: “[F]or the acquisition of pure concepts or concepts of essences, an
empirical comparison cannot suffice but… the universal which first comes to prominence in the empirically
given must from the outset be freed from its character of contingency” (emphasis mine). Or again, on the
following page: “Initially, this givenness [of the eidos] was conceived as a givenness of [factual]
experience.” See also Hua I, 104/70.
9

On this point, see Rochus Sowa (2011), 255-257.

10

It is important to note that eidetics or eidetic method does not explain how the intuition of essence
works, but rather takes for granted that one can intuit essences. From there, what eidetics does is purify or
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Returning to the first difference between eidetics and the natural sciences, the
notion of universality is indicated by the language of “eidetics” itself. The term hearkens
back to ancient philosophy, most notably to Plato and Aristotle in their accounts of İ۞įȘ
or “forms.” An İ۞įȠȢ in that context, roughly, is a “universal” (țĮșȠȜȠȣ) that is either
imitated or participated in by particular entities in the world, while itself remaining
separate in some sense from these entities, as Plato has it, or that is actually present in
these entities, “informing” them, as Aristotle and certain scholastics after him would have
it.11 In either case, the universal functions much the same way, revealing the way things
are in their generality, e.g., by telling us what a human being is generally, that is, the
essential, necessary features that any individual human being must have to count as such.
Husserl has something very similar in mind. An İ۞įȠȢ, for him, is an “essence,” it is
a necessary set of features delimiting a certain kind of entity (“entity” in the broadest
sense) (Hua III 8-9/7-8).12 Without getting any further into the details of what an essence
per se is, let us consider what eidetics reveals about such essences and through what
procedure it does so. As a method, eidetics is a procedure of what Husserl calls “free
variation.” To lift the universal out of experience, where it is already “passively
preconstituted” (Husserl 1973 341), as an exemplary possibility requires varying it in

formalize such intuitions. Cf. Rochus Sowa (2011), 258-259, 264; David Kasimier (2010), 28-30, 35-38;
and Rochus Sowa (2010), 546-550. The latter is especially convincing in recasting eidetic variation as a
practice of conceptual clarification, and Kasimier’s article importantly emphasizes the courigability of
eidetics.
11

For a critical discussion of the relation of Husserl’s eidetics to the traditional notion of
universality, see Rochus Sowa (2010).
12

Cf. Husserl (1973), 341: “The essence proves to be that without which an object of a particular
kind cannot be thought, i.e., without which the object cannot be intuitively imagined as such.”

20

imagination, a process “purifying” the essence, provided it truly breaks from viewing
what is essential as actual and instead views it exclusively as possible (351).13
One takes the example as a guide for considering numerous other possibilities, other
variants of the same essence. This does not generate or create the universal, but
generates a clear consciousness of the universal, since it brings out the universal qua
universal, i.e., as the same over several possible instantiations. Further, this technique is
a kind of test14 that will either confirm that the arbitrarily conceived possibilities do all
share the essence, and that a variation lacking an essential component is no longer a
variant of that essence, or will disconfirm by revealing a variation that truly exhibits the
essence and yet does not coincide with the initial putative example.
Eidetic method has an exceedingly broad scope. It can be used in disciplines as
diverse as formal ontology (e.g., mereology, the theory of an “object as such,” etc.),
formal logic, geometry, “material” ontology (e.g., of material nature, sentient beings,
etc.), and so on.15 The eidetic method, however, is not the exclusive province of
phenomenology, as the case of geometry makes plain. Phenomenology employs eidetics
(as “the fundamental form of all particular transcendental methods” (Hua I 106/72)) for
its descriptions of conscious life,16 and any eidetic analysis is only relevant for
phenomenology if it furthers that end. Hence, typical examples of eidetic analyses that
Husserl provides include those concerning the essence of a physical object, a “thing”
13

Husserl is emphatic about this in order to clearly differentiate his eidetics from other theories of
abstraction that try to “abstract” essences from actual individuals, thus not achieving the kind of
universality gained by including everything logically possible in its sampling and giving the latter equal
dignity.
14

See Rochus Sowa (2011), 258-260.

15

See Husserl’s programmatic discussion in Hua III, §9-16.
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In Husserl’s words: “[I]f we think of a phenomenology developed as an intuitively a priori science
purely according to its eidetic method, all its eidetic researches are nothing else but uncovering of the allembracing eidos, transcendental ego as such.”
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(Ding) (Hua III 10/8-9) or some aspect thereof (e.g., its color) insofar as this is a correlate
of conscious life or the essence of perceptual experience (Hua I 104/70), as it is a
(relatively) basic aspect of conscious life and one that one is almost constantly engaged
in, with all sorts of repercussions for higher order forms of intentionality. It is not hard to
see how important an eidetic analysis of the world-horizon would be, given its ubiquitous
function in the experience of transcendent reality.

The path to an eidetic analysis of the world-horizon
With this summary treatment of eidetic method, we can now turn to Husserl’s overt
attempts to formulate the essence of the world-horizon. In a manuscript directly
confronting this topic from around 1925 (Hua XLI, Supplement XXV), Husserl
recognizes that obtaining the pure essence of the world-horizon is not as straightforward
as, say, obtaining the pure essence of a color or a “material” essence like that of a
physical object. In the latter cases, there are obvious candidates for a factual starting
point. One already knows quite clearly about the subject matter of interest, and isolating
an example is a simple matter. But it is not evident what answers to the term “world,”
and so one rightly wonders what would count as an appropriate example. Husserl
observes an important difference separating these cases (colors and things, on the one
hand, the world-horizon, on the other), pointing out that a color or a thing is readily
grasped or “given as identifiable, something completely identical in its own right,”
whereas the world is “given/pregiven.”
What this given/pregiven distinction draws our attention to is a remove from the
core of sensory experience that characterizes our experience of the world-horizon.
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Colors are easily grasped as given in the sensory data of particular experiences in which
they are exemplified as dependent moments of things. The possibilities of the color
pertain to this sensory core and must originate there even if we can subsequently reflect
on their modifications in memory and imagination. Things, physical objects, are
somewhat more complex, not being given completely in the core of sensory data, but they
are still originally constituted therein and constituted as something appresented directly in
relation to the core of sensory data. That is, one does not see the whole of a physical
object, one only sees it in conjunction with the side that is presently given. So the
possibilities of a thing directly relate to this sensory core. They consist of various sets of
“disjunctive possibilities,” all the possible courses of experience in which the same thing
is experienced, e.g., now this side is present with that side appresented, now the latter is
presented and the former appresented, and so on.
The world-horizon, on the other hand, has only an indirect tie to this core. If the
sensory core serves as a kind of anchoring point in the experience of a thing, then the
thing, and things generally, perform the same function in the experience of the worldhorizon (Hua XLI 361). This removal from or indirect relation to the core of sensory
givenness is what makes the world-horizon so peculiar. The consciousness does not put
one in contact with a readily identifiable property, characteristic, or entity. Rather, as a
form of pregivenness, it consists of an anticipatory certainty17 of the coherence of the
experiential context in which individual things and their properties, features, etc., appear.
This coherence not only pertains to individual things and their possibilities, but to all that
17

It must be emphasized that this anticipatory characteristic is not exclusively or even primarily
future-oriented. Indeed, anticipation does ordinarily have such a temporal reference, and it even seems to
have that significance for Husserl, but here the sense is broader. Anticipation means roughly the
consciousness beyond the impressional present. That includes not only the future, but also the past and the
co-present. Anticipatory intentionality is intentionality that constitutes beyond the core of sensory data.

23

is given in experience, including, for instance, its “constellations and configurations,
forms of connection, forms of relation, etc.” The world-horizon, further, gives my
present experience – even with all of these relations and the like – the sense of direct
contact with only a “segment” (Abschnitt) of the world (Hua XLI 362).
The world-horizon is thus an extraordinarily complex “relativity,” leading Husserl
to exclaim that “I have therefore no ready-made fact that I could vary in [its] possibilities
and view as one of these possibilities.” This remark does not signal resignation on
Husserl’s part. The conclusion to be drawn is that one cannot move as easily from the
fact to the realm of eidetic possibility as one can with other phenomena. One has to
remain in the factual realm a little longer in order to “construct” the “possibility of the
world” along the lines just described. In a marginal note to a manuscript on this theme
from 1932, Husserl again claims that in an eidetics of the world-horizon, “an initial
description of the fact will have to take place without any establishment of essence being
included” (Hua XLI 361).
In yet another manuscript from 1926 (Hua XLI No. 29), Husserl begins an eidetic
exploration of the world-horizon by stipulating that the “researcher” “clarifies the idea of
the factual world as a world of experience,” with the result that what is thus constructed
“is now his fundamental example… for the eidetic variation in which this fact is raised
into mere pure possibility.” What this procedure – the “construction” – requires is a
reflection on what, over and above things and their properties, features, etc., remains
identical when one considers various actual experiences. This is precisely the
anticipatory certainty already mentioned, but above all “anticipation according to its still
unfamiliar aspects [nach dem Unbekannten]” (Hua XLI 342). The world-horizon then
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not only contains possibilities for what I have come to expect in experience, but also for
what I have no reason in particular to expect, and even what is “completely unfamiliar”
(Hua XLI 361).

Modalization as the entryway into an eidetics of the world-horizon
Although Husserl does not elaborate on this – i.e., he states what the construction
consists of without actually carrying it out – in the manuscripts from 1925 and 1926, we
can find him working out such a construction in other places. The most exemplary texts18
analyzing the factual world-horizon are the manuscripts dealing with modalization and
applying this theory to the world-horizon itself. The resources of the theory of
modalization are necessary for the development of the eidetics we are ultimately after.
As Husserl explains in Experience and Judgment, when eidetics reflects on possible
phenomena, it takes them out of their context of horizonal certainty.19 That is simply a
matter of consistently following out the procedure of purification in order to only take
pure possibilities into account.
The theory of modalization, on the other hand, analyzes phenomena only in relation
to the certainty we have of them and, in fact, is the analysis of the certainty of our
experience in its many guises. This difference is captured well in Husserl’s distinction
18

Of course, these are not the only texts with such analyses. But they are exemplary because of the
way they place this factual construction in relation to the more general problematic of the reduction, so that
our project here has a clear relationship to the broader aims of phenomenology as a whole. Thus, Hua IX
also contains an extended reflection on the factual experience of the world-horizon (§6), which he
subsequently describes thus (70/52, translation modified): “All our considerations began with the fact of
our experience and of the world experienced in it and wanted also to refer only to this fact. How does our
experiential world look most generally? … [W]e grasped the typical universal in each case as required by
the factual style of anticipation of the experience of the world.”
19

Husserl (1973), 344: “[I]n the free production of the multiplicity of variations… we are not bound
by the conditions of unanimity in the same way as in the progress of experience from one individual object
to another on the ground of the unity of experience.”
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between real or motivated possibilities and pure possibilities.20 Real or motivated
possibilities are possibilities within the world as it actually is and might reasonably be
expected to turn out in future. Pure possibilities lack this constraint. The former are the
concern of the theory of modalization, whereas the latter are the concern of eidetics.
The matter is complicated by the fact that even the theory of modalization, if it is to
be theoretically rigorous, has to be formulated eidetically. That is, its deliverances should
ultimately not be (exclusively) about the varieties of certainty as they actually occur or
typically occur in actuality, but about certainty in its pure possibilities, corresponding to
any conceivable actuality. This may seem problematic, since our construction is not yet
supposed to be eidetic, but rather to pave the way to an eidetic analysis of the worldhorizon. But that requirement needs to be qualified. The construction can be eidetic up
to a point. It should make liberal use of intraworldly eidetics as long as it does not leap
ahead and presuppose a clear eidetic grasp of the world-horizon itself. After all, Husserl
often emphasizes that non-phenomenologists, like geometers and mathematicians, use
eidetics and yet do not require an eidetically purified concept of the world-horizon.
The aforementioned analyses of modalization in relation to the reduction are just
what we need because they bring out the character of the world-horizon while not
requiring the kind of purity (with the qualification just made) of an eidetic analysis, a
purity that, when it comes to the world-horizon, could only be achieved after the
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Hua XXXV, 135-136: “In contrast to that possibility that originally offers itself to us of an arbitrary
intuitive phantasy-variation of something experienced, we have also another possibility, that is usually
called ‘real possibility’; and in contrast to that ontic certainty that gives us perception and apodictically
gives adequate perception, we already have to distinguish a certainty of expectation motivated originally in
perception or clear memory.” Husserl also makes this distinction in Hua XVI, §84.

26

reduction had already been carried out.21 The reflection on the modalization of the
world-horizon that makes the phenomenological reduction possible can also serve as the
initial factual reflection on our consciousness of the world-horizon that leads up to a
properly eidetic reflection on the world-horizon. Husserl recognizes this connection
between the eidetic analysis of the world and the epochƝ, as the following quotation
makes clear: “Natural life lives in the certainty of the world arising continuously through
anticipation; and to the eidetic construction of every possible world belongs the
corresponding anticipatory certainty… as a possible constituting quasi-experience. But
natural life does not know of the ontic sense of the world as world in such certainty,
which precisely phenomenology first discloses in its peculiar character and its structure”
(Hua XXXIX 214). In other words, the eidetic analysis of the world-horizon presupposes
the reduction, the event that takes one beyond the certainty of the world-horizon by
bringing it into plain sight for the first time.
This is, furthermore, perfectly in keeping with the train of thought of the
manuscripts that propose a construction of the factual world-horizon prior to its eidetic
transformation. In the manuscript from 1932, Husserl asserts that the result of the eidetic
analysis of the world-horizon is an “artificial product” (Kunstprodukt). That is because it
is something “[w]e produce… only in the ‘philosophical,’ universal-scientific aim of a
universal cognition of the world that is genuinely ultimately justified.” On the other
hand, “[i]n life, we do not need this universal and complete evidence” (Hua XLI 364).
Getting along in life does not require of us an eidetics of the world-horizon because we
need only an approximate understanding of things, knowledge tailored to our practical
21

Thus, Landgrebe (1940, 43): “For Husserl, a real understanding of the world can mean only an
understanding of it in its origination as a product of conscious processes, and such an understanding can be
attained only after the reduction has been performed.” See also Landgrebe (1981), 159.
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purposes within the world-horizon (Hua VI 143). When Husserl attributes an interest in
the eidetic analysis of the world-horizon to the philosopher, he surely has in mind
specifically the philosopher as a practitioner of the reduction, since we know
unambiguously from texts like Ideas I and the Cartesian Meditations that it is the
reduction that is supposed to achieve the goals of universal and complete evidence and of
ultimate justification, even if these goals are foreshadowed in scientific discourse, for
instance (Hua III 85-87/100-104, 91-95/109-112-114, Hua I 57-58/17-18, 66-67/2729).22,23

Initial construction of the factual world-horizon within the theory of modalization
Husserl’s theory of modalization is an attempt to understand the various kinds of
certainty characteristic of experience and how they typically come to be altered. A
“modalization” occurs when an experience that is certain is modified in that respect,
whether into another sort of certainty, into doubt or perhaps a state of perplexing
equipollence. In his later work, Husserl finds it increasingly important to discuss the
reduction itself in terms of modalization. This is a natural move for Husserl to make, as
he first formulates the reduction along the lines of Descartes’ methodological doubt, as a
modification of certainty, although Husserl himself never maintains that the reduction
modifies the certainty we have of the world-horizon into doubt. (Rather, he always
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Cf. Husserl’s remark about the epochƝ in Hua XXXIV, 369: “That is the attitude of an… absolutely
universal critique with the aim of absolutely universal truth, or the attitude of absolutely universal
theoretical interest – philosophy in the original and genuine sense.”
23

This has the important implication that the world-horizon that we will uncover in what follows is a
transcendental concept, despite how it resembles in many respects what Anthony Steinbock (1995, 88-96)
has taken to be a sub-transcendental conception of the world.
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affirms that we “switch off” or “abstain” from that certainty.)24 Nevertheless, Husserl’s
classical formulation of the reduction in Ideas I is clear about how the reduction
presupposes a peculiar form of certainty we have that it subsequently alters.
The certainty is, in fact, precisely the certainty we have in “the world.” In its
classic Cartesian formulation, the reduction modifies this certainty when it reveals the
superior grade of certainty belonging to self-consciousness. We need not get into the
details of how this modalization of sorts occurs or the alleged superior form of certainty
peculiar to consciousness.25 What matters for us is what we can learn about the certainty
of factual experience of the world-horizon from the analyses that comprise this key task
for phenomenology leading up to the reduction, and that this will give us our desired
springboard into an eidetic analysis of the world-horizon.
On the one hand, in ordinary experience in the form of perception, one is
immediately certain of whatever is presently “properly” (eigentlich) perceived,
immediately presented in the sensory core of experience. One is certain of what this
sensory core presents, e.g., the “side” of an object facing one (Hua XXXIV 327). The
certainty of what is properly perceived is thus embedded within one’s consciousness of
the horizon of the object one is perceiving insofar as perceiving the one side presents one
perspective on the object among others that one is also conscious of. On the other hand,
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Cf. Saulius Geniusas (2012), 60: “[I]n contrast to Descartes’ strategy of subjecting the world to the
modalities of doubt and negation, Husserl places the world-thesis within the neutrality modification.”
25

The details we are interested in are the same however matters stand with the kind of certainty one
can have of one’s own consciousness versus the certainty one can have of the world. In fact, Husserl in
some later manuscripts claims that evidential critique (à la Ideas I) is not necessary for gaining clarity about
the world-horizon. In fact, where he once tended to denigrate our certainty of the world-horizon, he
subsequently comes to stress the unique and even apodictic certainty of it. Cf. Hua XXXIV, Beilage XXIII
(“Two ways of performing the universal epochƝ”), text No. 28. (esp. 16-18), text No. 29 (especially 427ff),
No. 30 (especially 438); Hua XXXIX, text group IV.
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to this consciousness of alternative aspects there corresponds another kind of certainty
peculiar to them, which Husserl refers to as “pre-certainty” (Vorgewissheit).
Certainty, in the simpler sense, is the quality typical of perceptual experience when
all goes well, whereby what is perceived is perceived as actually existing. It is the firm
belief in the presented object in the midst of an episode of perceptual experience. Such
certainty is certainty in medias res. Pre-certainty, however, is not the certainty of
something actually present, there “in the flesh,” as Husserl likes to say. It is rather the
anticipatory certainty of a determinate range of types of experience associated with what
is presently being experienced. As such, it is a “presumptive” form of certainty, a
certainty that is “in suspense.” That is, “it still leaves open [the possibility of]
disconfirmation, modalization and ultimately the resolution that it is an illusion” (Hua
XXXIV 328, 431; Hua XXXIX 74).26 This disappointment can be of two different levels.
It can either be that just a particular experience, a particular aspect, that is expected turns
out to be other than as expected, or it can be that the entire experience of the object (or
state of affairs) is illusory. And this disappointment applies not only to the pre-certainty
one have of what is presently perceived, but of any object whatsoever one is aware of
“horizonally” as objects of secondary attention (Hua XXXIV 329).27
One would justifiably suppose that the world itself, as a horizon, is also correctly
described as a form of experience with the intentional quality of pre-certainty, and that it
is therefore also “in suspense.” This suspicion is not only plausible based on a general
reflection of the nature of certainty belonging to horizonal consciousness, but based on
26

See also Hua XXXIV, 423: “[E]xperience has its normal manner of passing. … But normality also
means that possible breaks are left open; all rules have their exceptions.” Although he refines the point
significantly in his later work, it is already present in Hua III (§46).
27

In Husserl’s terse words: “Thus every component certainty of the world is in suspense.”
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Husserl’s thought experiment from Ideas I, where he deems world-horizon epistemically
suspect analogously to the experience of particular objects. But Husserl differentiates the
kind of certainty one has of the world-horizon from the pre-certainty of other horizons.
Accordingly, we find him in one manuscript making the bold proclamation that “it
nevertheless constantly remains indubitable without question [fraglos zweifellose] that
the world exists.” That is because, in short, “a change of ontic certainty… could indeed
encompass each individual existent [jede Einzelne], but it cannot encompass everything
together and at once” (Hua XXXIV 329; 411, 438).28
It is on this claim that Husserl stakes his account of the peculiar character of the
intentionality that comprises the world-horizon. The initial feature that distinguishes the
world-horizon from any other form of experience, from every other horizon, is its form of
certainty. It is the certainty that experience will continue “concordantly” (einstimmig).
This kind of certainty is like pre-certainty in that it concerns anticipated experience, but it
is significantly different because it exclusively anticipates the continuance of certainty,
whereas pre-certainty characteristically includes the awareness of its possible
disappointment. The certainty of the world-horizon has an added level of complexity. It
is the not simply certainty assured of its own permanent continuation, but certainty that
even if there is a modalization of any particular certainty (as pre-certainty leaves open),
there will be subsequent resolution. This is an extraordinary property that the factual
world-horizon has “without our assistance,” with the result that “we must say that the one
world appears in one experience… which combines all perceptions and memories” (Hua
IX 59/43-44).
28

In Hua XXXIV, 428, Husserl puts it this way: “The universal evidence of the modalizability of
every real existent [Realen] given for me in the evidence of experience is not equivalent to the
modalizability of the experience of the world.”

31

This new conception of certainty expresses the certainty that, come what may,
experience will go on despite particular disappointments. It does not concern any
particular experience, but the ongoing connection of subsequent certainties with one
another (Hua XXXIV 409). Accordingly, in one manuscript about modalization and the
world-horizon, Husserl renders the point thus: “[T]he universal course of experiential life
in the world [Weltlebens] is a universal course of correction” (Hua XXXXIV 430,
Husserl’s emphasis).29 That is, it is inherent to the idea that experience will go on that
whatever disruptions come about in experience will be corrected and overcome. While
we may not ordinarily formulate for ourselves what is distinct about our certainty of the
world-horizon, it nevertheless seems fair to say that the peculiar force of this certainty is
felt. It is a part of experience in fact that we anticipate its continuous course, and that this
anticipation will not and cannot be frustrated even if in some instances our anticipations
are not fulfilled as expected. In such cases, our special certainty in the world-horizon
tacitly assures us things will be resolved. The possibility of global modalization does not
arise thanks to this overarching certainty. Husserl distills the point into a pithy slogan:
“So much illusion, so much reference to being” (Hua XXXIX 235).
This higher order form of certainty, which Husserl occasionally refers to as worldcertainty (Weltgewissheit), stitching together the course of experience despite minor
interruptions, is not a naively optimistic picture of experience that could, although so far
this has not occurred, perhaps turn out to be mistaken. Rather, it is a necessary feature of
experience. Put briefly, Husserl argues that one’s certainty of the world-horizon cannot
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In this passage Husserl is especially clear that this feature of the world-horizon is one that
characterizes our awareness of the world prior to the development of “the ontological formal idea of the
‘world in itself’ as the form of every possible world.” See also XXXIX, 216 and Hua VI, 163.

32

be modalized because it is itself the condition for modalization.30 For a break in certainty
to take place, there has to be another level of certainty contextualizing that break and
remaining constant throughout. Modalization “presupposes” this second order certainty
insofar as it is comprised of competing putative certainties. Whatever the “conflict”
(Streit) between these certainties results in will be a new certainty, and the experience of
the two conflicting certainties with one triumphing will, in retrospect (Hua XI 28-33/6672, Hua XXXIX 217), either take on the sense of a correction of an old certainty by a new
certainty or an upholding of the old certainty (Hua XXXIV 411, Hua XXXIX 255). Since
the certainty of the world – the presumption of correction – is the condition for conflict to
occur, it is not possible in principle for the world to be modalized in the ordinary sense,
i.e., for something to conflict with it (Hua XI 127/96-97).31
So far, we have only considered the world-horizon from a “noetic” perspective.
That is, we have examined it in terms of the subjective side of the intentionality in
question, focusing on what the subject is doing in such an experience. More specifically,
we have had in view the “thetic” or “doxic” character (in the language of Ideas I) of the
experience. Such features highlight the element of belief, broadly construed, that go into
any given intentional act. But the noetic always correlates to the noematic, namely, to the
object (in the broadest sense) itself as experienced. In looking at the noematic, we are
interested in what the intentional act is aimed at, that of which it is conscious. On the
noematic side, then, Husserl suggests that our certainty of the world-horizon is a certainty
30

Hua XXXIV, 416: “[E]very modalization and likewise every negation presupposes a ground
[Boden] of positive, unaffected, unmodalized validities.” Or, as he puts it in XXXIV, 421: “[A]nother real
existent [Reale]… and ultimately the undisputed certainty of the world is always already required for every
modalization of a real existent, [of something] ontically certain [Seinsgewissem].” Cf. Hua XXXIX, 246.
31

Hua XXXIX, 236: “What could world-experience be in conflict with? Nothing ‘can’ cancel
[aufheben] it. … Admittedly, it is presumptive, but there is… no empirically familiar deceptive occurrence
with respect to its object ‘world.’”
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in the endurance of the “abiding spatiotemporal form [Gestalt],” which ultimately means
“universal spatiotemporality,” “the most fundamental” form of objectivity (Hua XXXIV
438). This is what he calls the “ontic sense” (Seinsinn) of the world, in contrast to its
correlative “ontic validity” (Seinsgeltung), our certainty.
The certainty we have in the world is not the certainty of any particular object or set
of objects, but rather in the spatiotemporal context in which objects appear. Any
particular object can be modalized, as is implied in our pre-certainty of it. But despite
such happenings, it is certain that the spatiotemporal framework that makes such
occurrences possible remains constant. Whether we are mistaken about this or that
particular fact does not seem to bear on the framework of possibilities for such facts to
arise. Thus, to this higher level of certainty peculiar to the world there corresponds a
higher level objectivity. This higher level objectivity is a “unitary field,” in Husserl’s
words, “of coexistence and succession, thus a concrete spatiotemporal normal field
[Normalfeld]” (Hua XXXIX 217). When it turns out that something “over there” is
illusory, the “over there” does not itself become doubtful, but remains a space for
possible experience: “[W]hen what falsely appears does not exist, something else exists,
at least ‘empty space’” (Hua XXXIX 232). And even if it turns out one is quite mistaken
about the layout of things, as long as one continues to enjoy (perceptual) experience at all
there will be a “here” and a “there,” that is, a field of coexistence.
Another way Husserl often expresses this point is to say that the experience of
objects always has a layer of references to other possible experiences, of the same object
or of other objects. The latter references Husserl calls the object’s real relations or its
outer horizon. All objects are necessarily bearers of such relations or references:
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“[Objects] are only relative concreta. An object is only experienceable in its own right,
is only conceivable, in an objective surrounding [Umgebung]” (Hua XXXIV 414). Or, in
a turn of phrase surprisingly reminiscent of Heidegger, “its being is being-in-the-world”
(Hua XXXIV 437). While it is sometimes unclear what the real references or relations are
that the term “outer horizon” is supposed to pick out and why an object must have them,
these matters are easier to grasp on the basis of Husserl’s detailed discussion of the
experience of a “mere” physical thing in Thing and Space and Ideas II. These real
relations are best understood as causal relations as construed by Husserl.32
There are many strata to the phenomenal make up of a simple physical object. The
causal stratum we are now interested in presupposes the more basic strata comprising the
quasi-object of sensory properties filling the perceptual field in temporal duration, which
make up the “sensory schema” of the object (Hua IV 37/40). Nevertheless, “the mere
phantom,” as Husserl often calls this sensory schema, “is not yet a thing.” Rather, a
physical object is “a substance exclusively insofar as it is the bearer of a causality” (Hua
XVI 345/301). Causality is necessary for an object to be a full-fledged substance because
a substance is the sort of thing that endures through change, and the process of change
consists of dependency relations between an object and its surroundings. To use
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I believe the concept of the outer or external horizon is often either misunderstood or dangerously
ambiguous. No doubt, this is more than a little bit the fault of Husserl’s often imprecise descriptions of the
phenomenon. The following statement by Adam Konopka (2010, 123) is illustrative: “The relation
between the thematic object and objects in its external horizon presents further possibilities that contribute
to the apprehension of the thematic object… For instance, the apprehension of the flower might occur with
the backdrop of a garden with other flowers that are more or less similar to it. The garden, in turn, is
situated on a city street with various buildings that form parts of the garden’s external horizon.” Whether it
is the intent or not, this statement makes it sound as if the objects actually make up the horizon, although it
does also speak of the objects as being in the horizon. But a horizon is always a typical consciousness, a
consciousness of types, not of objects per se. Moreover, the external horizon is an awareness of types of
relations between objects rather than types of objects. As I said, though, the fault is no doubt Husserl’s,
since he often speaks as if we were horizonally conscious of objects per se rather than possessing a
determinate motivational schema for such consciousness.
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Husserl’s illustration, the change that occurs when, for instance, a cloud conceals the
sunlight and the color of things dims somewhat is a change by virtue of dependence
relations obtaining between the color of certain objects, the position of clouds, the
position of the sun, etc. If these dependence relations were not discernible in experience,
one would not see the object persisting, but would see a succession of sensory schemata
replacing one another.
Hence, Husserl remarks, “It is precisely in this way” – namely, in causal
interrelations with its surroundings – “that every ‘Objective,’ ‘real’ property of the
phenomenal thing is constituted.”33 This is why he can say that every physical object
must have reference to other objects, and why the very being of a physical object is for it
to be in the world, or, as in the terminology of Ideas II, to be dependent on the
circumstances of its surroundings in various ways: “To know a thing therefore means to
know… how it behaves under pressure and impact, in being bent and being broken, when
heated and when cooled, etc.” (Hua IV 45/48). Further, it is not the case that an object
takes on the sense of something substantial in particular causal events alone. Things have
causal “dispositions” or “powers” (Hua XVI 343/299), and these can be understood quite
generally in statements of the form: “similar circumstances – similar consequences” (Hua
IV 47/50).
Now, the possession of such general causal types is integral to the ontic sense of the
world-horizon. Husserl makes this point in one manuscript when he states that in
causality “I encounter the interconnectedness [Verflochtenheiten] of things. The
external-worldly horizons of every thing lead to the totality of the world [Weltall].” And
33

Hua IV, 43/46. Husserl works out the concepts of sensory schema and substance at some length in
Hua IV, §15. Cf. Hua XXXIX, 292-3, 606; Hua Mat VIII, 147.
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Husserl is clear that this “totality of the world” is not a reference to a particular thing or
collection of things, but to an “integrated [verflochtene] unity” in contradistinction to a
simple sum of objects (Hua XXXIX 210). (The awareness of other things or groups of
things besides what is presently given is called “secondary attention” and is related to but
distinct from horizonal consciousness.34) On the one hand, such causal generalities lead
us to the real relations typical of particular regions, i.e., the material categories for
classifying types of entities as broadly as possible, such as physical things, animate
beings, persons, etc. But the generalities go even further, as he indicates when he asks
rhetorically: “Is universal ontic causality not the correlate of the constant open
horizonality and constant modalizability of ontic apperception?” (Hua XXXIX 458).35 In
other words, the reflection on real relations implied in the substantiality of physical
objects ultimately leads us to the noematic side of the world-horizon, the most generic
form of spatiotemporality informing the experience of reality. And it is just this aspect of
our factual experience of the world-horizon that seems to have a peculiar “felt necessity,”
a fact Husserl draws our attention to in a poignant comment: “Empirically we expect that
the dog will snap at the bone tossed to him. But it does not have to be; it is not a strict
necessity. However, that the world can never be non-spatial… – this seems necessary to
34

Hua XXXIX, 15: “We must distinguish what belongs to the theme ‘attention’ [Aufmerksamkeit]:
[1)] what is in view as that wherein the regard rests, on which it opens in the normal sense, and [2)] that
which is in view, but in such a way that the view passes through it as something ‘functioning,’ entering into
an apprehension, a significance interwoven with the relevant data. We thus have from the ego transitiondirections [Durchgangsrichtungen] and end-directions [Endrichtungen]. The latter: what terminates in the
‘object’ as objective sense. This fundamental distinction is not to be mixed up with that between what is
primarily noticed [Bemerken] (heeded [Aufgemerktem]) and [what is] secondarily noticed, to which
distinctions arise that bring with them [the difference between] the specifically thematic and the extrathematic.” See also Hua XXXIX, 359-360, where the terminology is clearer, but the passage is too long to
produce here. There he states that we have to distinguish the horizon from attention, but he calls horizonal
consciousness a mode of attention, which helps make sense of the confusion that often arises on this topic.
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Cf. Hua XXXIX, 576; Hua Mat VIII, 271.
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us. Every felt necessity is an indicative sign of something a priori” (Hua IX 70/52,
translation modified).
Just as the analysis of certainty leads to a peculiar certainty in the world-horizon, so
here the analysis of real relations leads us to a noematic structure peculiar to the worldhorizon. And just as the certainty of the world-horizon is the guarantor of particular
certainties, likewise particular objects as substantial entities are dependent on their
relations to other objects and ultimately the general nexus of spatiotemporal causality.
Husserl’s reflections on modalization and the reduction require both of these correlative
lines of thought, which together provide us a rough sketch of the world-horizon. The
world-horizon, as it shows up in factual experience, is, noetically, the certainty sustained
in the ongoing, harmonious course of experience, and, noematically, the spatiotemporal
nexus maintained throughout experience. With that, our initial construction comes to an
end. There is much more to the world-horizon that eidetics can make clear for us, which
we can now turn to.

The eidetic analysis of the world-horizon
Lest one think the foregoing analysis might suffice to produce the eidetic notion of
the world-horizon, let me draw attention to a feature of eidetics that sets it apart from the
sort of analysis just undertaken, and that points to what is positively gained by an
eidetics. In the description of the factual world-horizon, we arrive at a distinct idea of
that phenomena by “altering” it. To alter, in Husserl’s technical sense, is to stick to one
entity (broadly construed) and study its identity as maintained in its alterations. Thus, in
the possible alterations of the actual world-horizon we find a peculiar certainty and
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spatiotemporal form belonging to it. This is tantamount to studying the color red by
taking a particular actually existing red object, considering past changes and possible
future changes to that object qua red object. This is a helpful first step, but its results are
limited because the only identity they highlight is that of the individual, whether it is an
individual instance of color or an individual physical object.
Such an analysis does not result in a genuine universal, which Husserl, taking his
cue from Aristotle, conceives of as a İȞ İʌȚ ʌȠȜȜȦȞ (“one over many”). For that, we need
a procedure different from alteration – what is needed is variation.36 There is a kind of
coincidence in both alteration and variation, but they are fundamentally different.
Alteration gives a bounded coincidence, a coincidence on the condition of the identity of
a particular object (in the broadest sense). Variation gets past that limitation and
considers coincidence across various particulars. That is the only way to bring out the
universal in its own right. Even if it is entirely present in the description of an individual
case, it is present there as an individual and not as a universal. Applying this general
claim to the case in hand, our description of the factual world-horizon only provides
information about a particular existent, namely, the actual world-horizon. At present,
then, we must take this as a starting point for variation in order for the essence of a
world-horizon to come into view as such.
The analysis of the factual world-horizon provides initial clarity about what the
world-horizon is at all, dispelling its enigmatic character and giving a first glimpse at
experience of world-horizon as a distinct phenomenon from other sorts of experiences.
Nevertheless, one cannot help but notice that even in discussing the world-horizon in its
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On the distinction between variation and alteration, see Hua IX, 75-78/55-58.
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own right, one constantly has to make reference to particular existents, and above all to
particular physical objects and experiences thereof. The eidetic analysis of the worldhorizon latches on to this object/world-horizon relation and takes that as the point of
departure. That may seem counter-intuitive, since what we are interested in is the worldhorizon and not particular things. And since we have a fairly clear idea of what this
distinct subject matter is, it is natural to think that the next step is to embark on a pure
analysis of the world-horizon by itself.
But that is not the next step. Rather, we begin by isolating the object/world-horizon
relation and we proceed by reflecting on that. This must be the case because we are
discussing the world-horizon, and the notion of horizon is an essentially relative one,
similar to the concept background. There is no ground without its correlative figure.
Similarly, a horizon is only comprehensible in relation to what appears in a horizon. In
fact, not only is world-horizon a relative notion, it is heuristically derivative,37 which is
evident from the enigmatic character that first makes it necessary to pass through the
detour of a factual construction. This relativity is ineliminable; there is no sheer
experience of the world-horizon. That is why, when framing his eidetic analysis of the
world-horizon, Husserl remarks that “if the world is grasped, singulars must be grasped…
The grasping of singulars must come first and must already possess in advance its
ungrasped but already given horizon” (Hua IX 96/72). To deal with the world-horizon is
necessarily to do so in terms of its relation to objects.38,39
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It is important to emphasize this point. For the practitioner of eidetics, for the one reflecting on
experience, what comes into view first are things, then horizons, and eventually perhaps the world-horizon.
But in experience, the world-horizon has priority (Hua XXXIX, 68): “Its [i.e., the world’s] givenness comes
before the givenness of individual real existents.”
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This is obvious, for instance, in Husserl’s analyses in Hua XXXIX, 120-125 and 137-142, where a
reflection on the experience of particular objects leads to conclusions about the “eidos ‘world.’”
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If this is true, then we must begin by determining what kind of horizon is necessary
for there to be an experience of objects at all. Unsurprisingly, Husserl’s answer is that
the experience of transcendent reality, the “external world,” necessarily includes a
horizon with an overarching noetic certainty and noematic form or spatiotemporal or
causal order.40 Thus, the eidetic analysis points to precisely the same features that we
saw to be characteristic of the factual world.41 Only these features are now placed in a
different light, since we have established very specific conditions under which these
features are to be considered, namely, as variants in the technical sense. By examining
the factual world-horizon as well as any conceivable world-horizon (to be specific, in
each case relative to given objects), we clarify what is identical, what “coincides” in the
variation. So now as we reconsider these features in a properly eidetic context, we are
taking up Husserl’s imperative to “[D]rop the fact” (Hua IX 71/52), which we achieve by
39

This way of thinking about Husserl’s understanding of the world-horizon runs against the grain
and in fact challenges the tendency in Husserl scholarship to not only distinguish but oppose the notion of
the world as a collection of objects and the world-horizon as an intentional structure of experience. For
instance, David Carr does this in his article “Husserl’s World and Ours,” 155-156, and so does Anthony
Steinbock (1995), 97-102. More recently, Saulius Geniusas (2012, 61-63) exploits this distinction and
turns it into an opposition in his discussion of Ideas I. The upshot of such an opposition, to oversimplify, is
to say that Husserl had a “good concept” and a “bad concept” of the world. But matters are much more
complex, as I am trying to describe them. Roberto Walton (2010b, 143) resists this temptation when he
notes that the “world-form,” i.e., “time, space, and causality,” “must be associated with the worldhood of
the world and… with the worldly character of objects.”
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On the noematic side, see Hua XXXIX, 123: “If we now view the given world as a merely possible
world…, then we gain the eidos ‘world’ as the invariant essence that belongs to every possible world… It
is now obvious… that the spatiotemporal form, the form of configuration of the world and of everything
imaginable, must also belong to the eidos ‘world.’” On the noetic side, see Hua XXXIX, 140: “It is
important that perception in the primal mode of ontic certainty… as inductive horizon always has precisely
the ontic correlate of certainty… Even the external horizon has to be grasped in this way. The universal
horizon is the world-horizon – or the horizon of the particular core of perception, of the thematic and the
unthematic, in constant ongoing perceiving, bringing the world to perceptual [perzeptiv] experience.” In
the remainder of this section, I will restrict myself mainly to the noematic side, since it is more informative
about what the world-horizon is, which is my guiding question. Certainly the noetic side is interesting in
its own right, but I am putting it to the side for the sake of focus.
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These results appear identical to those Husserl demands of a basic “ontology of the life-world” in
the Crisis. See Hua VI, 139-140, where the features Husserl deems to be invariant features of the lifeworld are space, time, and causality. Again at Hua VI, 142, he describes “the task of a life-world
ontology… as a concretely general doctrine of essence for these onta,” these “spatiotemporal onta.”

41

asking about the conditions of the experience of any transcendent reality at all, something
we do just as much in “pure phantasy” as in describing the world-horizon as it happens to
be in fact, and subsequently the insights we gain are “essential” truths about any
conceivable world-horizon.
Beginning, then, with an individual object, let us try to discern the minimum
requirements for it to be a possible object of experience, which will lead up to the
minimum requirements for the world-horizon itself. We observe, as Husserl does from
quite early on in his work, that it is in principle not “adequately” given. This is the
familiar observation that my immediate sensory experience at any given moment is only
of a “profile” of an object. This is a first necessary condition for the experience of
transcendent reality. For any being, even God, as Husserl notoriously argues, things
would have to be given this way (Hua III 80-83/94-98; Hua XVI 132-134/110-111; Hua
XI 11/48). An immediate intuition of a whole object “in one stroke” is inconceivable.
The corollary to this condition is that objects are presented in horizons. Despite the fact
that only a profile is immediately given, it is given with the sense of a profile of the
object in question, and not as a freestanding existent in its own right.
This shows that the profile is necessarily integrated into a more complex intentional
act, namely, an intentional act that includes the profile as a “core” embedded in a horizon.
The horizon is a “signitive” or “empty” intention, presenting (“appresenting” in Husserl’s
technical terminology) what is not immediately given of the object. This horizonal
intentionality, to be clear, does not present other profiles. What it presents is different in
kind from what is immediately given of necessity, since, if it were the same, then what is
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horizonally presented would require its own horizonal intention, and so on ad infinitum.42
As a signitive or empty presentation, horizonal consciousness is of the object according
to its determinable type, a type that is determinately exemplified by what is immediately
given and which other possible experiences of the object in question would likewise
exemplify. That is the noematic side of the horizonal intention. On its noetic side, it is a
certainty of that indeterminate type. It is not given as imagined, as expected (in the
future-oriented sense), but as believed in, as something that further experience would
confirm.43
This indeterminate horizonal intentionality itself splits in two directions. On the
one hand, the so-called inner horizon is the indeterminate consciousness of the character
of the object itself as determinable in other possible experiences of the same object. The
inner horizon not only includes the awareness of the determinable type of the reverse side
of the object, but also of the types within which the immediately given profile might be
further determinable, e.g., if one were to take a closer look at it (Hua XI 43/7). What is of
greater interest is the outer horizon, the determinable types of relations that the presently
experienced object has and can have with other objects (Hua XI 106/150-151). As we
learned while analyzing the factual world-horizon, this is the link between any particular
object and the world-horizon itself.
The outer horizon of an object is no extrinsic addition to it. It is not as if there is
first an object with all of its properties that subsequently can be understood in its relations
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On this issue, see Kevin Mulligan (1995), 193-194.
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Cf. Hua XI, 39/79 (translation modified): “The non-visible side prefigured for me, which is given
in the perception of a thing from the front side, is as we know an indeterminately general prefiguring. This
generality is a noetic trait of consciousness emptily pointing ahead, and correlatively is a [noematic] trait of
sense for what is prefigured. Thus, for example, the color of the thing’s back side is not prefigured as an
entirely determinate color… ‘A color’ is indeed prefigured. But potentially still more than that.”
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to other objects and its surroundings in general. There can be no experience of an object
without it having an outer horizon. As we already saw, for a thing to be identical is for it
to persist despite its changes in relation to everything else and the causal dependencerelations it has with them, so that “the sense of experience as the experience of things
even includes from the start this attunement of things with one another in their changes”
(Hua IX 134/102). On the one hand, such real relations include quite specific relations,
e.g., the breakability of a glass upon impact from another object.44 On the other hand,
they include quite broad relations as well, such as spatiotemporal position with respect to
other objects. The horizon of the spatiotemporal form of experience is the basic
determination of the world-horizon, and a necessary horizon if objects are to be
experienced.
Considering this more closely, let us first reflect on the alleged necessity of the
spatiotemporal form. In the simplest scenario, the spatiotemporal form is necessary for
the object’s identity when it is experienced from different perspectives, whether that
means viewing it from a different side or getting closer or further away from it. It is in
virtue of the spatiotemporal form of experience that the varying appearances are
understood as appearances of the same thing. Thus, an object is the same even though it
appears smaller at a distance and larger up close. This is simply another way of talking
about the profile/horizon relation. The spatiotemporal form is also necessary for being
able to perceive spatial relations of various objects. For instance, in the familiar case of
motion parallax, as I walk down the street, the objects nearest me appear to move faster
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Hua IX, 102/77: “But it belongs to the sense of experience itself that what is experienced… has its
causal style and horizon. For to know a thing means to foresee how it will behave causally, e.g., to have
experienced, to know, a glass plate as such means always to regard and know it as something which will
shatter if it is struck hard or thrown down.”
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than those at a distance. The whole ensemble of objects retains its identity throughout the
changing appearance. The spatiotemporal horizon is what makes it possible to
experience identical objects in such varying appearances, so that ultimately even “every
completely unfamiliar object is also familiar due to the fact that it exists at every
temporal point of its duration in infinite space” (Hua XXXIX 120).
But we need to be precise about what this spatiotemporal horizon is. Negatively
put, it is not the possession of knowledge about a system of coordinates mapping reality.
This is a point Husserl often stresses.45 The spatiotemporal form of experience is not
identical to the exactly determinate spatiotemporal structure of reality. It is rather a form
or schema for experience, “a rule of configuration and change of configuration, a
generally and necessarily binding form-style that encompasses all finite possibilities”
(Hua XXXIX 124). As a horizon, it is an indeterminate form of consciousness that can be
determined in numerous, indeed, infinitely many ways. In Thing and Space Husserl puts
the point thus: “We have movement only when the quasi-moving content [of the
presentational appearances]… is not itself the thing but is a presentation of the thing, and
the thing is what is identical in the continuous change of the presentations. And so the
field is not itself space but is the presentational field for everything spatial and thus for all
things” (Hua XVI 118/99).
The spatiotemporal form of experience is exceedingly complex, as indicated by the
fact that Husserl’s lectures contained in Thing and Space go on for roughly 250 pages
45

Hua VI, 309: “The perceived, the experienced as such, is thoroughly ‘vague’… Accordingly, I
can have the same characteristic given more or less ‘clearly’; and, no matter how clear it is, yet another
gradation is still thinkable.” In Hua XXXIX, 82, 122, 141, Husserl refers to horizonal consciousness
generally as “vague.” See also Hua VI, 139-140. Summarizing Husserl’s view in the crisis, David Carr
(1974, 136) writes: “Above all, the life-world is a world of objects having both primary and secondary
qualities, a world whose spatial features fall into vague and approximate types, not a world of geometrical
idealities.”
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without yet getting to the point of describing the experience of objects as causally
interrelated, substantial entities. There are many abstract components that go into
spatiotemporal experience that are not especially helpful for our purposes. So we will
consider the matter here in very broad strokes, only in order to capture those features that
are peculiar to the world-horizon as spatiotemporal.
The structural feature that is especially illuminating for us arises in the context of
Husserl’s reflections on the components that make up our experience of depth, that carve
up reality in terms of what is near and what is far. So far we have focused on how
objects are given and interrelated within the perceptual field, even if that field requires
appresentations of the things given within it. Husserl identifies the perceptual field as the
“nearest, most original surrounding world,” but maintains that “this horizon is not yet
fully constituted as ‘world’” (Hua XXXIX 175).46 To understand the world-horizon, we
need to have a grasp on how a spatiotemporal form is constituted that links together
experience beyond the perceptual field, but which nevertheless always relates to the
perceptual field as it is given at any moment as its core.
The world-horizon is not directly related to particular objects. The world-horizon is
a second-order horizon. It relates to the perceptual field itself. Just as a particular object
occurs within a horizon that puts us in touch with the remainder of the object in an
indeterminate way, so also the perceptual field occurs within its own horizon that puts us
in touch with the remainder of transcendent reality in an indeterminate way. Whenever
one experiences a perceptual field, that field has the sense of a “non-independent”
moment, a “segment” (Abschnitt) as Husserl sometimes calls it (Hua XXXIX 78), which is
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Husserl seems to be making the same point when he says (Hua XXXIX, 78): “World as horizon of
thingly experience and its [horizon] as in a thingly perceptual field, a thingly constellation, etc., is not yet
world-experience, to which belongs precisely a peculiar objectivation, identification, recognizing, etc.”
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like the profile of an object. One is directly in contact with one side of the world (a
“world-aspect” (Hua XXXIX 130)), the perceptual field. The horizon given along with
the perceptual field comprises the basic structure of the world-horizon.47
The horizon of a physical object is a consciousness of typical features of that object,
e.g., having other sides and the like. To really grasp the world-horizon, we have to
inquire about what typical features it in particular presents us with. Here Husserl paints a
quite general picture. The horizon of the perceptual field is a consciousness of the typical
traits of possible perceptual fields beyond the one presently given. Hence, the perceptual
field is “a ‘core’ whose external horizon consists in a potentiality for being able to
continue… to a new surrounding world of experience” (Hua XXXIX 96).48,49 The sort of
awareness one has by virtue of this horizon is of relatively distant perceptual fields.50
The plural here is important. The perceptual field’s horizon does not simply
emptily present an undifferentiated beyond. Rather, it emptily presents a graduated
structure: “The nearest and next-nearest [perceptual fields] exist in a graduality of
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Cf. Hua XXXIX, 362: “From moment to moment we have an act-direction to the world, but while
specific world-objects, groups, nexuses are explicitly intuitively, … ‘world’ is an inexplicit universal
horizon, through which these individualities are not meant as the world, but as the ‘sides’ in which it
presents itself to a certain extent, while the meaning exceeds them in the horizon.”
48

Cf. Hua XVI, 209-210/177: “[J]ust as the back side of the Object is not properly seen and yet is coapprehended and co-posited, so likewise is the unseen environment of the Object as well. The presented
field of Objects is a field of Objects in a ‘world,’ in a nearer and farther environment, whether determinate
or ever so indeterminate, and ultimately in infinite space.”
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Adam Konopka (2010, 120) is thus correct to say that the “environing horizon” of the world “is
distinguishable from the external horizon of the noematic object.” But it nevertheless remains an external
or outer horizon in a different sense. As he goes on to argue (124), there is a special relation of the worldhorizon to the lived-body. While I have left the lived-body out of consideration, the tangents I am
sketching do trace the outline of that phenomenal structure. That is, all the horizonal references with
respect to the given object and the given perceptual field are only realizable in bodily movement. One has
to use one’s body to get closer, to see the other side of an object, to traverse a perceptual field, etc., as
Landgrebe has observed (1940, 46). The interest guiding me here, though, is the noematic side of the
horizon, and so I have left out many details about the noetic side, including the function of the lived-body.
50

See also Hua XXXIX, 138-141 and 185-186. In the former, Husserl describes this structure in the
experience of individual objects and the perceptual field alike.
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vivacity, of actual awakenedness [Geweckheit]. This has a limit, a null of awakenedness”
(Hua XXXIX 96).51 This complex horizonal structure interwoven with the core of the
perceptual field gives the latter the sense of a traversable space, with an integrated series
of relatively near and relatively far perceptual fields that have a “graduality of vivacity”
because of their varying degrees of relevance and, correspondingly, varying degrees of
determinacy. The nearest possible perceptual field is of the most immediate relevance
and greatest determinacy (while nevertheless remaining “empty”), and the empty “null”
is that vague borderline point where further perceptual fields are no longer relevant and
are the least determinate.
This structural form necessarily comes along with the experience, in the simplest
case, of a particular object.52 An alteration in the experience of a physical object is at the
same time an alteration in how the perceptual field itself is taken in. The horizons that
invite one to get closer to an object, to see its other side, are inconceivable without being
integrated into a horizonal structure belonging to the field as a traversable space, and
these are precisely the two phenomena, “expansion” and “rotation,” that Husserl takes to
be the basic phenomenal criteria for the experience of three-dimensional objects,
providing an experience of depth (Hua XVI 204-255/173-217). This is, then, a constant
feature, a “standing form” of the experience of transcendent reality, which, Husserl says,
“is therefore a fundamental part of the intentional analysis of the external horizon” (Hua
XXXIX 97). The form of the world-horizon, its eidos, then, is minimally this graduated
horizon of the perceptual field that makes possible the experience of an individual object
51

In Hua XXXIX, 360, Husserl says more generally: “The horizon has in itself horizons, in a certain
gradation [Abstufung] of relative immediacies and mediacies.” See also Hua XXXIX, 194.
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As A.D. Smith (2003, 75) puts it: “This reference beyond a given perceived thing to its spatial
environment is essential to that object appearing as the kind of object that it is: namely, as a material body.”

48

and a space traversable beyond the immediately given perceptual field. That is why
Husserl can claim that “in its peculiar multidimensional structure, space is the abstract
general form-determinacy [Formbestimmtheit] of the world,” or, more simply, “the form
of the world in its actuality” (Hua XXXIX 180; Hua XV 362).

The minimal world-horizon and the concrete world
The preceding eidetic analysis of the world-horizon will doubtless leave many
unsatisfied. Other eminent phenomenologists and expositors of phenomenology have
pointed to much richer and more concrete phenomena as comprising the world.

The

Heidegger of Being and Time famously understands the world as the meaningful context
of references in terms of which things show up as useful and integrate into one’s practical
goals. This way of conceiving the world has had a great impact on subsequent
philosophers working on this theme. Jan Patoþka, who was inspired by both Husserl and
Heidegger, in some of his work heavily integrates Heidegerian elements into his analyses
of the world.53 Apart from Heidegger and those influenced by his work, Husserl’s
understanding of the world-horizon has received a great deal of sympathetic but no less
penetrating criticism, and such criticism usually also centers on the problem of the
concreteness of the world-horizon. Indeed, Husserl himself views his minimal
conception of the world-horizon as “abstract” and “non-independent” (unselbständige)
(Hua XXXIX 181), and insists that “one must not remain stuck in abstract
53

See, for instance, Jan Patoþka (1998), Body, Community, Language, World. In the Fifth lecture he
takes on, with important critical qualifications, Heidegger’s view of the world as a network of pragmata.
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spatiotemporality, but must proceed based on the concrete world as world, as the universe
of concrete realities” (Hua XXXIX 184).
Let us consider one important challenge to Husserl’s conception of the worldhorizon (more or less) as I have presented, one coming from within the domain of
Husserl scholarship, namely, that of David Carr (1974). His objection poses a problem to
the way this thin conception of the world-horizon is supposed to relate to the
phenomenon of the concrete world, which is the problem for the Husserlian
phenomenology of the world-horizon. For Carr, the question is whether the thin
conception of the world-horizon can really integrate the world in all its concreteness,
truly generating one unified world as something greater than the sum of its parts and
doing so without reducing the world-horizon to a particular ontological region.54 For
Carr, this problem signals the need to formulate a conception of the world lacking
reference to any particular region.55

Different senses of “nature” in Husserl
Carr’s charge is that letting the regional categories guide the analysis of the worldhorizon will make it impossible to identify the features that make up the world-horizon.
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See Carr (1974, 163): “[T]he concept of reality [in Husserl, from Ideas I to the Crisis – MB] is not
concrete except as correlated to the material a priori of some region. Reality is ‘fragmented,’ and the only
remaining concept of the world-as-such as reality is that of a summation or Inbegriff of the various material
regions.” I am reformulating Carr’s challenge somewhat to fit to my presentation of Husserl. Carr poses
his problem as a problem Husserl has of cashing out the concept of world always in terms of regions with
an eye toward the sciences to be established on the basis of those regional concepts. Carr’s point is that
Husserl needs to relax that goal of grounding science in order to find the genuine concept of the world that
does not lead to a disjointed description of various regions of the world, as is the tendency in Husserl’s preCrisis work. I am leaving aside the problem of science and the “theoretical attitude,” and giving a simpler
version of Carr’s challenge. I am thereby side-stepping an engagement with those problems, but I do think
my response points in the direction of a resolution of those difficulties. Husserl does have a looser
understanding of nature, which I will treat in what follows as a “personalistic” conception of nature.
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See also Anthony Steinbock (1995), 99.
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As I have presented Husserl’s view, his basic conception of the world-horizon correlates
to the features he ascribes to the material region he calls “nature.” These features, i.e.,
those making up the spatiotemporal schema of experience, are the features that form the
essence of what “nature,” which is the most significant regional category besides “spirit”
(Geist). Yet this talk of nature is ambiguous, and I think gaining clarity about the
different senses of nature will point the way toward a resolution of Carr’s challenge. Let
us consider three possible senses of the term “nature” one can find in Husserl.
The most familiar sense of nature is that found in Ideas II. This is nature as the
correlate of the “naturalistic attitude.” This attitude is an overtly reductionist attitude.
This is evident from the first lines of that text, with his remark: “We begin our discussion
with nature – specifically, with nature as the object of natural science” (Hua IV 1/3). In
the naturalistic attitude, all phenomena appear exclusively by virtue of “natural”
phenomenal features, i.e., those features that make possible an experience of physical
objects in space-time. If Husserl understands the noetic/noematic structure of the worldhorizon in terms of the naturalistic attitude, then he has indeed committed a grave error,
because he would then necessarily make it impossible for the concrete world as we know
it to be experienced, since its characteristic features are by definition abstracted out of
experience.
By the same token, it is obvious that this cannot be what Husserl means when he
makes the world-horizon out to be at bottom the form of spatiotemporal experience. And
that is testified to in the many passages where Husserl claims the naturalistic attitude is
an abstractive attitude, where the goal is not to view the world as such, but only the world
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under a certain aspect.56 Accordingly, he states that the “naturalistically considered
world is of course not the world” (Hua IV 208/219).
If the first sense of nature is reductivist, we can think of the second as indifferent.
This is how nature functions from the vantage point of the personalistic attitude. It is the
notion of nature as one among other “strata” of experience, either as integrated into them
and thereby transformed or as occurring alongside those other strata. A case of the
former would be the experience of cultural objects or use objects, which have both
physical substantiality and “spiritual” properties that are significant for people and their
peculiar interests. On the other hand, a case of the latter would be “raw nature,”
exemplified in experiences of entities that do not have any special relation to one’s
personal interests (or anyone else’s).57 The experience of raw nature is certainly not the
norm within the personalistic attitude, but it is a possibility. Although there is a
fundamental change of attitudes from the naturalistic to the personalistic, Husserl warns
that one should not overemphasize such differences in the face of the “essential relations
between the sense of the one and the sense of the other” (Hua IV 210/221).
Nature in the present sense, as indifferent, allows for both of these kinds of
experience. It plainly avoids the reductionist problem. But, for the same reason, this
sense of nature does not speak to the problem of the world-horizon. It does not bring out
the unifying function of nature, since it remains indifferent about the relation of nature to
other strata of experience, merely bringing out their compatibility and factual
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While the precise nature of this abstraction and its (all things considered, relatively) narrow
subject matter is the theme of the whole first Division of Ideas II, Husserl gives a brief summary of what
the naturalistic attitude is attuned to and what it is supposed to ignore in §49. See also Hua VI, §66.
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Husserl touches on both in one passage (Hua IV, 187-188/197): “To be hot is an objective
property, manifesting itself in act in the sensation of warmth… Experience teaches me, further, that an
object starts to glow by being rubbed… This object is ‘combustible’ material (at first without any practical
bearing). Henceforth I can use it as fuel; it has value for me as a possible source of heat.”
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coexistence. Even when Husserl explains that all other regions are founded in nature in
this sense (Hua IV 281/294-295), that claim is not equivalent to the claim that nature is
the basic form of the world-horizon. All it establishes is certain dependence relations
between the different strata of experience – a much more modest claim.
The indifferent sense of nature therefore does succumb to Carr’s criticism. It does
not do the work of showing how nature could be understood as the minimal form of the
world-horizon.

And because it is the most familiar sense of nature, the one we know

from Ideas II, Carr’s charge seems to stick. The theory of various attitudes in Ideas II is
inadequate to the problem of the world-horizon.58 I want to introduce a third sense of
nature that I think gets Husserl past the kind of worry expressed by Carr. That is the
personalistic conception of nature.59 The personalistic concept of nature is nature viewed
specifically with an eye as to how all of experience is to be integrated into its basic form,
whereas the first sense of nature outright excludes that possibility and the second remains
indifferent, alternatively letting some objects appear as simple natural objects or
transforming them into something more than natural objects. With this notion of a
personalistic nature I am following the lead of Ludwig Landgrebe, who also points to the
personalistic sense of nature, even referring to this as the “‘minimum’ world which is
always presupposed wherever human life, as historical life, can begin.”60 Such a nature
is not the correlate of an exclusive attitude (excluding anything personalistic), and it is
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This is not a criticism, since Husserl does not claim to be giving an account of the world-horizon
in Ideas II. The point is just that where one might hope to find such a development, based on my
presentation of the eidetics of the world-horizon above, one finds no such thing.
59

Cf. John Jalbert (1987), 39-41, where a very similar notion is attributed to Husserl. See also
Adam Konopka (2009). Konopka takes issue with readings of Husserl’s Ideas II that sharply separate the
natural and the personal, a critique that supports my attempt to formulate a personalistic conception of
nature here.
60

Landgrebe (1940), 54.
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inherently amenable to what Husserl sometimes calls “humanization,” so that it is not
utter nonsense for him to speak of a “nature with a human face” (XV 666).

Nature as a “personalistic,” in its constituting role
While the phrase “personalistic concept of nature” is my coinage, there are two
important ways in which we find Husserl working toward and developing such a concept.
First, he begins to give a personalistic sense to phenomena he had previously taken to be
sub-personalistic. In fact, Husserl comes to understand all phenomena as linked together
in a personalistic nexus, which requires a minimal personalistic nature as the ground floor
for the experience of transcendent reality, but a ground floor that is nevertheless of a
piece with the rest of the building. Second, and intimately linked with the preceding,
Husserl sketches the form of the rational links of the world-horizon, the rational structure
of its integrative function. This emphasis on the rational signals an overtly personalistic
reinterpretation of the world-horizon, since on Husserl’s view it is for persons and in
personal experience that rationality is manifested.
If all lived-experience fits in an overarching personalistic experiential nexus, then it
must be the case that the lived-experience of nature, the minimum world-horizon with its
spatiotemporal form, is also something inherently personalistic. It is important to stress
at the outset the difference between this understanding of nature and nature viewed
indifferently from a personalistic standpoint. In the latter case nature is either a limit case
(as “raw nature”), or it is personalistic by virtue of being transformed into a bearer of
personalistic properties (as a cultural object). But here we want to try to understand
nature as an inherently personalistic phenomenon.
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The seeds for such an understanding were planted as early as the period of Ideas II
and the work stemming from around 1917. Husserl observes that “in the unity of a lived
experience, or perhaps in the unity of a nexus of lived experiences, I have, under the
heading of ‘motivations,’ ‘intentional’ connections… which are fulfilled or remain open,”
and seems to suggest that it would be wrong to think that “the unity of a stream of
consciousness could be precisely a unity if it is without any motivation” (Hua IV 225226/237). Indeed, following that tentative suggestion, Husserl boldly states: “If we
examine the structure of the consciousness that constitutes a thing, then we see that all of
nature, with space, time, and causality, etc., is completely dissolved into a web of
immanent motivations” (Hua IV 226-227/238). And even more generally, in the
Cartesian Meditations, he attributes to the “universe of lived-experience” a “universal
unity-form,” namely, “the form of a motivation, connecting all and governing within each
single process in particular” (Hua I 109-175, translation modified).
These claims are significant – and warrant a reconsideration of nature as a
personalistic structure – because what Husserl refers to as “motivation” is a
characteristically personalistic phenomenon. Indeed, he calls motivation “the lawfulness
of the life of the spirit,” that is, of the person (Hua IV 220/231). Motivation is peculiar to
the personal realm because it denotes the responsiveness of the subject to reason and the
tendency toward rational patters of thinking, willing, and feeling, according to Husserl’s
expanded sense of rationality (Hua IX 162-165). To give an example, the premises of a
valid deductive argument will motivate a person who sees them as such toward the proper
conclusion. More basically, a person will also be open to the confirmation or
disconfirmation of his or her beliefs by perceptual experience or by communicating with
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other people, experiences that therefore have motivational import.61 Besides such overt
rational behavior, persons are also subject to passive forms of motivation under the rubric
of association, where past experience serves as a quasi- or proto-reason influencing
present and future experience.
Yet in the naturalistic attitude, there are no persons, and so there is no one who is
motivated to think, act or value, to behave as a person. And nature as such, from within
the indifferent viewpoint, has by hypothesis nothing motivational to it. If that is the case,
then one rightly wonders how nature could ever be integrated into a personalistic
framework. This possibility hinges on an important distinction. At this point, there is no
warrant for taking nature to be personalistic as constituted. But with a view to the livedexperiences that constitute nature, the nature as a constituting schema, things are
different. This is evident from the quotations given above about motivation as a
universal form of experience. In those quotations, Husserl is describing lived-experience.
The claim, then, is not that every object experienced has motivational characteristics
(e.g., the characteristics peculiar to experienced persons (including oneself) and use
objects), but only that every experience that presents an object stands in some kind of
motivational relation with other experiences. So, for instance, the links between the
phenomenal moments, the lived-experiences, of a given profile of a spatial object and its
horizonally appresented remainder are motivational connections. The motivational
nature of the link is evident insofar as the profile functions as the motivation, the
“psychical ground,” for a possible intuitive experience of the other side of the object
(Hua IV 224-225/236, Hua XIII 179-181/75-76).
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These are cases of “motivations of reason.” Hua IV, 220-222/231-233.
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Therefore, to view nature personalistically, as I am suggesting, is not to change the
content of experience, to redescribe what is presented therein, but to draw attention to the
homogeneity of the formal links of lived-experiences. This is the basis for taking nature,
the spatiotemporal form of experience, to be the minimal form of the world-horizon. As
different as constituted nature is from constituted spirit (i.e., that which bears
personalistic properties), the constituting lived-experiences of both are embodied in the
same motivational form. That makes possible the synthesis of both constituted spheres in
one stream of constituting experience. This is precisely how Husserl responds to the
challenge (which is just another way of expressing Carr’s objection) that the resources of
his phenomenology of perception are inadequate to the task of providing a
phenomenology of the world-horizon, or, as he puts it, “that the question concerning the
world as a world of actual and possible perception (experience) expresses a restriction…
in contrast to other kinds of consciousness” (Hua XXXIX 132).
One is tempted to think that characteristically personalistic matters like thought,
language, and action cannot be approached in the same way as perceptual experience,
that the latter could not provide the experiential substratum for the former, which must be
the case if nature is to qualify as a minimal world-horizon. In response, Husserl insists
that this minimal world-horizon in fact “encompasses everything: Even thoughts are in
the world as thoughts of people” (Hua XXXIX 133). The same goes for language and
action. In each case, the phenomenon in question must be instantiated in space and time,
in a “spatiotemporally individuating position,” even if their intentional makeup is not
exhausted by being so instantiated.
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Speech, written language, and action all obviously require expression, and so
Husserl’s point is prima facie plausible in such cases. But thought, one might think, is
different. Where is a thought when one keeps it to oneself, and where is the thought of
another person? Husserl acerbically replies that thoughts “nevertheless do not for that
reason float in the air.” That is because, as he goes on to say, “[w]ithout realization they
are… ideal possibilities of their formation that can be projected backwards from their
historical actuality.” In other words, upon realization, when a thought is expressively
embodied in one way or another, then we gain the possibility of “localizing” that thought,
of saying it occurred to some person in some place and at some time. As roundabout as
that may be, it is in keeping with the general framework of motivationally connected
lived-experience. And both our own thoughts and those thoughts “projected” into others
are made up of “subjective manners in which they appear…, modes of continuous
appearing in continuously altered manners of appearance with distinctions of the
‘properly actualized self’ and what is ‘presumptively anticipated,’” and so on (Hua
XXXIX 133-134).

Integrating horizons: Surrounding world, true world, and orientation
So far the basis for conceiving the expansion and enrichment of the minimal worldhorizon of nature into a truly concrete world has been very abstract. Pointing out the
homogeneity of constituting lived-experience is an important step, but we can provide
still more detail without getting caught up in the complicated analyses that would be
necessary to thoroughly grasp how the lived-experience of nature links up with other
domains of experience. Husserl’s theory of the “interpenetration” (Ineinander) of
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horizons and their necessarily perspectival character gives us the theoretical tools for
understanding roughly what is going on in this regard.
Husserl develops this theory in various manuscripts differentiating the notion of the
world from that of a surrounding world, or, as he sometimes puts it, the true world from
relative worlds. Husserl explains what he means by a surrounding world when he says
“every concordant continuity of holistic experience [Gesamterfahrung] forms a
concordant surrounding world” (Hua XXXIX 674).62 Concordance (Einstimmigkeit)
refers to the continuity of experience. Such concordance, however, has to be qualified. It
is a concordance with a history, a future and past horizon. It has had serious breaks in the
past, and perhaps it is something that has come into being, supplanting some other
previous concordant surrounding world. And there is no guarantee that it will not
undergo fundamental revision and replacement by another surrounding world in future
(Hua XXXIX 676).
But this is not a defect in experience. When one surrounding world gives way to
another (in revision or supplementation), it is by virtue of a synthesis of a peculiar sort.
This synthesis has the sense of “a multiplicity of surrounding worlds of the same world,
which makes possible a coincidence with every other [surrounding world] in the sense of
a coincidence of various appearances of the same world” (Hua XXXIX 678).63 The
synthesis is only possible because there is an invariant, identical core running through
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Again (Hua XXXIX, 675): “The surrounding world for a corresponding subjectivity, individually
or collectively human (in various collectivities), is a world [as] a concordantly experienced valid [world]
and [one] continuing in concordant experience henceforth in simple certainty, with its determinate sense
content and with open horizons, to which belongs the presumption of a probably but entirely certain
progress of experience in the sense of concordance and appurtenant closer determination of the ‘existing’
surrounding world.”
63

Cf. Hua XXXIX 692: “[T]hrough all these concrete worlds that we take to be their subject-relative
and community-relative ‘surrounding worlds’ there passes one world, namely, as [one] given directly in
experiences as the same.”
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these appearances.64 This core is the eidos, the minimal structure of spatiotemporal
experience, and the form is such that the appearances, the surrounding worlds, determine
it further (Hua XXXIX 708). Together the invariant form and the appearances make up “a
unity of experience… taken as a whole, a processus, as world-experience, of perfection in
the experience of the world” (Hua XXXIX 705).65
Just as in personal development one learns new skills and takes on new social roles
(e.g., friend, student, sibling, parent, manager, etc.), developments that add new
dimensions enriching one’s life, so the surrounding worlds that sequentially manifest the
world also add new layers to the one world-horizon. Thus, a new surrounding world does
not replace what comes before it, although revision is necessary on occasion (Hua XXXIX
706).66 Every surrounding world has the sense of a “relative truth,” a kind of
approximation. Interestingly, it is a conviction in this “relative truth” that Husserl says
“belongs to the personal realm.” That is because the interplay of surrounding world and
invariant core has a rational motivational structure. The two function together as a
motivational spur toward further determination and enrichment and are in that respect
accompanied by normative “distinctions of correctness and incorrectness and also of
completeness and incompleteness” (Hua XXXIX 679).
One way Husserl interprets this enriching is the further determination of the near/far
structure of experience. The various surrounding worlds are then understood within “the
relativism of the near/distant world, a relativism that is again something multifarious”
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Hua XXXIX, 678-679: “The possibility of the synthesis presupposes a formal structure that
precisely emerges in the synthesis in arbitrary variation.”
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Cf. Hua XXXIX, 192: “[A] universe of being remains as identical through all situation, only given
in each in a different situation-sense and endowed with situation-truth.”
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In the cited text Husserl writes: “What is new at a subsequent stage does not in principle have the
sense of a cancellation of the truth of the previous [stage].”
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(Hua XXXIX 708). These “multifarious” forms of proximity and distance are different
forms of orientation or different forms of situatedness.67 It is in terms of these that we
can understand nature as an “infinitely mobile form” (Hua XXXIX 122). At bottom, the
spatiotemporal minimal world-horizon is composed of a near/far structure: the perceptual
field and the relatively distant perceptual fields beyond it. This is an orientation with
one’s own lived-body simply as a means of sensory perception as the point of orientation.
The other forms of experience, the other stages or surrounding worlds presenting the
same world, should be thought of as higher-order orientations that the world-horizon
takes on.
Husserl accordingly makes the general claim that “[a]ll modes of egoity
[Ichlichkeit] of lower and higher levels, [and] every mode of the We… exist as the egosubjectivity of its world as an oriented world” (Hua XXXIX 151).68 That these
orientations are supposed to be modifications of how one experiences space is attested to
by Husserl’s designation of the “personal orientation” as a form of “personal space” (Hua
XIV 216). The individual’s bodily orientation is enriched within the family orientation,
oriented in large part around the home. Broader forms of community likewise have their
orientations each with its own significance. The orientation of the family is not identical
to that of the extended family, the “tribe,” socioeconomic class, the city, the nation, etc.
(Hua XXXIX 152, 195-199; Hua XV 394-396, 411-414).69 And none of these is identical
with the orientation of a professional or scientific community. Each orientation differs in
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This is just how Husserl uses the term “surrounding world” in Hua XXXIX, 177.
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In a manuscript published in Husserl Studies (Husserl 1997, 206), Husserl similarly writes: “Every
ego-community [is] ‘oriented.’”
69

See also the fragment “Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the
Spatiality of Nature,” 311/120-121, 318/126.
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terms of the way the center of orientation, the individual or group, interacts with the
surroundings.
The difference however comes along with very particular connections, such that the
higher orientations (that is, corresponding to more complex and diffuse social groupings)
carry the lower orientations with them and all orientations fit together in the broadest
individual and social form of life, a connection they enjoy by virtue of the orientational
character they all share, which is ultimately rooted in and continually presupposes each
individual’s particular spatiotemporal orientation in terms of a perceptual field and its
external horizon. This is apparent in the way Husserl describes the higher level
orientations in overtly spatial terms. The various orientations are more or less complex
ways of experiencing the world as spatial, of which the minimal world-horizon is the
most abstract and simple instance. Thus, even what Husserl calls the “home world”
(Heimat) or homeland, the world viewed from the perspective of someone embedded in
familial and other social affiliations, is best understood as a “spatiotemporal wholeness
[Ganzheit]” (Hua XXXIX 155).
In the Cartesian Meditations Husserl claims that the orientational character of
experience is of central importance: “[The] [c]onstitution of ‘worlds’ of any kind
whatever… is subject to the law of oriented constitution” (Hua I 161/133; Hua XXXIX
181, XXXII 224). That means that experience at any level of complexity is necessarily
from a perspective. This is a formal constant on experience. As different as the
orientations are, the relatively more complex presuppose and build on the less complex.
Husserl expresses this point when he says “[w]hat is secondarily constituted as a ‘world’
is necessarily given as a horizon of being that is accessible on the basis of what is
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primordially [constituted]” (Hua I 161/134, translation modified). Again, in more
concrete terms, he states that the world given “as a world of cultures is given orientedly
on the underlying basis of the nature common to all and on the basis of the
spatiotemporal form that gives access to nature” (Hua I 162/134).70
Thus, the experience of another person, like the more basic experience of nature,
necessarily has a kind of orientation centered about one’s lived-body, and likewise the
experience of another culture is from the perspective of one’s own culture (Hua I 161162/134). Both of these more concrete kinds of experience are inconceivable without the
basic form of orientation within space that is made possible by the minimal worldhorizon. In this way Husserl frames his basic, thin conception of the world-horizon
drawing on features that characterize the experience of nature. But this is not
problematic, as Carr claims, for the two reasons I have suggested. First, because nature
viewed personalistically is made up of lived-experiences that as such are linked to other
lived-experiences and ultimately to the whole stream of conscious life due to their
motivational character. Second, Carr’s objection fails because every surrounding world
is an “appearance” of or a perspective on the world, which is always at bottom the
spatiotemporal world-horizon, and the synthesis of such appearances is possible insofar
as all surrounding worlds are necessarily perspectival and require a basic spatiotemporal
orientation, of which they are more complex elaborations.

70

Hua I, 162/134.
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CHAPTER 3
Act and Horizon: The Paradox of Worldly Intentionality

 
The theory of the genesis of the world-horizon emerges in Husserl’s later
manuscripts as the consequence of a paradox. There is a difficulty inherent in the genetic
interrelation of the two basic forms of “worldly intentionality” (i.e., intentionality within
and including the world-horizon), intentional acts and horizonal consciousness. Husserl
develops two strands of thought that attempt to capture the dynamic interrelation of these
forms of worldly intentionality, but which turn out to be at odds with one another. I will
consider each of these in its own right, clearing up their meaning and coming to terms
with Husserl’s reasons for each. Let me begin, first, by giving a brief initial formulation
of the paradox. The body of this chapter will consist in examining the justification for
the two terms of the paradox. Ultimately, we will see that Husserl’s reflection on the
micro-dynamics of conscious life served as a unique form of motivation for turning to the
genetic macro-dynamics of conscious life that will occupy us in Chapters 4 and 5.
On the one hand, the world-horizon seems to fall within the domain of what Husserl
calls “secondary passivity,” the realm of pregivenness derived from prior givenness. If
the world is like other sorts of horizons, it is instituted in an intentional act that originates
it, but with its peculiar sense of being the basic apperceptive structure of transcendent
experience. Further, we must also recall what we discussed in Chapter 2, namely, that
the world is supposed to be the horizon of all horizons, that it brings together all other
horizons into one experiential unity by means of its minimal core, the spatiotemporal
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schema for perceptual experience. The genesis of the world horizon would be the
precondition for the further genesis of any horizon pertaining to transcendent reality. The
thesis that makes up one term of the paradox is that the world-horizon, like any horizon,
points back to an intentional act that instituted it, and that prior to that act there is no
horizon pertaining to transcendent reality at all.
Yet, another train of thought leads to a position that is in tension with this, namely,
the idea that every intentional act presupposes a horizon. This is so because every
intentional act is a process of making explicit and carrying out a schema of sense, and
this schema of sense is contained in (or simply is) a horizon that antedates the intentional
act. This is, for Husserl, an essential feature of intentional acts, of active intentionality.
Thus, the other term of our paradox is that every intentional act, and therefore the
intentional act that institutes the phenomenon world as well, points back to a horizon that
antedates it.
Husserl’s paradoxical situation, then, is that he wants to say both (1) that all
horizons that put us in contact with transcendent reality, and ultimately the world horizon
embracing them all, are the products of intentional acts, and (2) that every intentional act
presupposes a horizon. In short, all horizons depend on intentional acts, and all
intentional acts depend on horizons.1,2 As Dieter Lohmar formulates the difficulty, a

1

Husserl gives a very brief statement of the paradox with less inviting vocabulary at Hua Mat VIII,
349: “But however far we may go back, there are always two aspects [Zweierlei]: 1) The act that is
originally acquiring creates validity, ontic validity, validity of a content; 2) and content is always already
presupposed so that the act can commence [anheben] a doing [Tun] and fullfill its plan [Vorhaben] with it.”
2

László Tengelyi (2007) has come very close to this formulation. In his words: “It can be shown…
how a horizon… can develop from a process of habitualization. The pregiven world, however, cannot be
equated with such a horizon. For, every process of habitualization presupposes an actual experience that it
transforms into an abiding cognitive possession. The pregiven world, however, does not deserve its name
if it is not shown to be pregiven in actual experience" (94-95). The claim I am considering is that if the
world horizon is the product of a habitualization, then it must have been instituted in a prior intentional act.
For Tengelyi, on the other hand, the problem is that if the world horizon is the result of a habitualization,
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“typifying apperception [i.e., horizon] is based on past experience of previously
constituted objects [i.e., intentional acts], but this [past] experience is itself based on the
object-constituting achievement of the type [i.e., horizon].”3 These theses can only be
maintained without compromise if we suppose an infinite regress of horizons instituted
by intentional acts that enact extant horizons that, in turn, are instituted in intentional
acts, and so on. If that is the case, then there can be no genesis of the world-horizon.
Then we are in the position of precariously positing an inexplicable infinite regress and
dogmatically insisting that this phenomenon is just always there. Husserl finds this
conclusion deeply unsatisfying.
It is illuminating to consider what it is about the paradox that disturbs Husserl the
most. What concerns him is that it implies an infinite series of intentional acts.4 He
claims that such a series would be “senseless.” While he concedes that “[t]he being of
the world for us is always already being with an ontic sense [Seinsinn] that is constituted
through acting,” he immediately retorts, “and yet it must, [if] acting is not for that reason
to be founded on acting senselessly to infinity, have originated [from] a constitution that
then it can be made actual again in experience. But if the world is made actual, what is the pregiven basis
of its being made actual? In what horizon would the intentional act that reactivates the world horizon be
given? This is indeed a problem, but it is a problem with the concept of world and not with its genesis.
Thus, Tengelyi’s solution is not a genetic one. Rather, he attempts to recast the phenomenological concept
of world by distinguishing its horizonality from that of things (95-97).
3

Dieter Lohmar (2003), 115. At 115-116, he gives a second formulation: “Each type at work in
experience presupposes previous experience, but since the type is at the same time supposed to be objectconstituting, it must have been operating in that previous experience as a constitutive element as well.”
Thus Lohmar identifies the same basic difficulty I want to explore in this chapter, but without connecting it
with the problem of the experience of transcendent reality, that is, the issue of intentionality, which is the
larger problematic in which I am drawing attention to this difficulty. Lohmar is purely concerned with
types and concepts as such.
4

In his book Phänomenologie des Willens, Julio Vargas Bejarano (2006), without reference to the
manuscripts I am drawing from, has come to the same conclusion, and argues that for Husserl there must be
a “primal apperception” (Urapperzeption) with no preceding apperception, i.e., intentional act, preceding it.
In his words (157): “That then means, however, that before the primal apperception is performed, no
intentional reference has yet taken place, because otherwise we would fall into a regressus in infinitum; for
every apprehension must refer to another earlier apprehension.” It is precisely this line of reasoning that I
want to defend in the present chapter.

66

was not yet [an] acting.” Again, he says clearly that “the world cannot in general
originate from acting” (Hua XXXIX 444; 448).
Husserl’s resolution of the paradox is to appeal to a unique non-worldly
intentionality out of which worldly intentionality arises. This is the sphere of “pure
passivity” or what we will call, following Husserl, a “pre-world.” The paradox is in this
way fully resolved only by means of a genetic analysis of the world-horizon. We will
return to this resolution in Chapters 4 and 5, in order to render intelligible the “irrational
fact” of the world-horizon (Hua XVI 289-290/250). Before we can turn to those matters,
we will first delve into the micro-dynamics of intentionality that call for these
investigations and make them necessary.

 
For Husserl, all horizons, and ultimately the world-horizon, are rooted in intentional
acts. The basic idea is that the world is through and through a realm of secondary
passivity. I will pursue this line of thought through an examination of possibility and its
relation to intentional acts. This may seem indirect, but the path leading through the
phenomenological theory of possibility bears directly on the theory of horizons because
horizons are themselves conscious ensembles of possibilities. Husserl is consistently
clear that horizons have a close relation to the concept of possibility even if he is less
often clear about how this is so.
So, for instance, he states in Ideas I that the horizon of the world as experienced in
the natural attitude is “an empty mist of obscure indeterminateness… populated with
intuited possibilities or likelihoods” (Hua III 49/52). In another very early text on the
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concept of the world, Husserl also explains our consciousness of it in terms of
“possibilities” or, more precisely, “motivated possibilities” (Hua XVI 291-293/252-253).
That this theme is a consistent one in Husserl is evidenced by claims like that of the
Cartesian Meditations that without possibilities instituted in experience “there would be
for us no fixed and abiding being, no real and no ideal world” (Hua I 96/60). The
connection is only strengthened in the abounding associations made in later manuscripts,
such as the general statement Husserl makes that “a horizon signifies a motivated… actpossibility, with possible ‘occurring’ if we now activate the horizon” (Hua XXXIX 3), or
that “the pregivenness of the familiar world is a first level of pregivenness of manifold
possibilities” (Hua XXXIX 56). It will be my task to clarify the relation of the concept
horizon to that of possibility by describing the diverse types of possibility with which
phenomenology deals.
When conceived of at the most general level, possibility breaks down into two
kinds: Constituted and constituting possibilities. I make this distinction following J.N.
Mohanty, who argues that there is a difference between constituted possibilities as real
entities (broadly construed so as to include properties, events, and states of affairs), and
constituting possibilities as “modes of positing and not [of the] objective sense”
(Mohanty 2005 327). At the outset we will put to the side the constituted possibilities,
since these are clearly not the kinds of possibility that makes up horizonal consciousness,
which as typical or general does not itself present objects to us. Horizonal possibilities
are not objective senses (i.e., the presentation of an object or state of affairs with a stable
identity), although they may lead us to a consciousness of such objective senses.
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What we will explore, then, are the varieties of constituting possibility. Within that
category, again, we encounter important distinctions. Constituting possibilities can be
“pure possibilities,” real or motivated possibilities, logical possibilities, or practical
possibilities. Reflecting on these different forms of constituting possibility will shed light
on the relation of horizonal consciousness. We will look first at Husserl’s theory of
modalization which treats possibility as a “mode” or “modification” of straightforward
consciousness. While this is revealing, it does not yield a general account of horizonal
possibility. From there I will turn to Husserl’s account of practical possibility. It is here
that I will suggest we can gain an understanding of the possibility that makes up
horizonal consciousness.
Parallel to this survey of constituting possibility, at each step of the analysis I will
consider not only how the possibility in question relates to horizonal consciousness, but
also how the possibility in question genetically relates to intentional acts. Interestingly,
this analysis will not only ultimately confirm the thesis that horizons and the worldhorizon are essentially the product of intentional acts, but that all possibility for Husserl
is genetically posterior to some particular kind of intentional act.


Husserl takes up the theme of possibility in the lectures on passive synthesis (Hua
XI) in the context of his theory of modalization, of how we originally experience the
“modes” of negation, doubt, and possibility.5 Husserl’s view regarding all these
modalizations is that they are modifications of an original certainty characteristic of
5

Cf. J. N. Mohanty’s (2005) concise summary, 328-329.
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experience. For that reason, he calls the possibility these modalizations engender “real
possibilities”, in contrast to possibilities of pure phantasy that have no connection to
present experience and its likely future course (Hua XXXV 157, 173f.).
Experience, and, at bottom, perceptual experience, is always initially certain. This
certainty consists of “continuous, unitary courses” of experience presenting “an object…
maintained concordantly… by virtue of the unanimity of a coinciding that bestows
fulfillment upon the [pertinent] intentions” (Hua XI 25/63). That means experience is an
unfolding process, where the initial phase sets up certain expectations about what will
follow. As the experience unfolds, each subsequent phase furthers the previous phase
and in a sense “confirms” it. This is the default mode of experience. Modalization
occurs when, in one way or another, such experience is no longer characterized by
unbroken fulfillment.
This loss of certainty is not equivalent to doubt, although it can take that form.6 It
does not take that form in the case of possibility, which is what interests us here. One
kind of possibility is what Husserl calls “open possibility” (Hua XI 39-42/79-81, Husserl
1973 277). This arises when I do not just immerse myself in the continuously fulfilling
experience, but pause and consider what may come next in the course of experience
before it actually happens. We do this in what Husserl calls an “intuitive
presentification,” e.g., an imaginative mental depiction of what may come about.
Because the experience we have is an intuitive presentification, it must depict the object
in its full concreteness even though we only know what it will be like generally (Hua XI
79/122). The excess beyond what I am typically certain of in this presentification is what
6

Yet even in the case of doubt certainty is not entirely lost; the modes precisely “concern the
differences pertaining to the ‘purity’ or ‘completeness’ of certainty.”Hua XI, 44/84. Cf. Hua XXXV, 156157.
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constitutes open possibility. Its openness refers to the lack of motivation for filling in
what exceeds expectation one way versus another.
Things are different in the case of what Husserl calls “enticing possibilities” (Hua
XI 42-43/81-82). This more complex kind of modalization occurs only once another sort
of modalization has occurred, that of doubt. In doubt, my certainty is altered when “one
and the same stock of hyletic data is the common support for two overlapping
apprehensions” (Hua XI 34-73). Husserl’s example is the case of not being able to
discern whether what I see is another person or a wax figure. Here my certainty is
modified because I am not sure how to interpret what I am seeing, I do not simply see
one thing straightforwardly. Once I have become uncertain of how to interpret my
present experience, I do not remain content in wavering between interpretations. I now
entertain the two interpretations as competing possibilities, each with its “[d]ifferent
witnesses [who] speak and present their testimonies, having different weight” (Hua XI
45/85). These are then possibilities, but not mere “open” possibilities, selected arbitrarily
from a range of equally qualified possibilities, and which, at any rate, are possibilities
concerning an experience beyond the immediately occurring one; they are possibilities
each with its own particular appeal, but which are in competition as possible
interpretations of the immediately occurring experience.
This sketch of possibility as Husserl develops it within his theory of modalization of
originally certain experience shows that our experience of possibility in these senses is a
product of previous intentional acts.7 There is first the intentional act of perceptually
7

Although the theory of modalization is given in the lecture course on passive synthesis, that doesn’t
mean Husserl leaves active intentionality entirely out of account. In the discussion of modalization,
Husserl takes as his presupposition and starting point the simple intentional act of certain perceptual
experience. Whatever else may be the case, what matters most for us is that possibility as such, in these
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experiencing some object, and then this experience is modified in one way or another, my
certainty eroded to an extent, to reveal some kind of possibility.
These modes of possibility, however, do not go far enough to secure the thesis that
all possibility that makes up horizonal consciousness is produced in an intentional act.
Open possibility and enticing possibility are relatively restricted conceptions of
possibility. Open possibilities are originally given in fully concrete thematic acts.8 I
become conscious of the open possibility by imaginatively depicting for myself an aspect
of the present beyond what is given and that I am uncertain of. Experienced in this way,
open possibility can be no part of a horizon, a form of experience that is essentially nonintuitive and unthematic.
Nevertheless, a modified form of open possibility could surely play a role in
horizonal consciousness. This suggestion can even be found in an earlier section of the
lectures on passive synthesis, where Husserl speaks of “a horizon of empty possibilities”
and even refers to such possibilities as “open” (Hua XI 21-22/59). A horizon of empty
possibilities is a non-intuitive, unthematic experience that has no “prefiguring intention”,
no advance expectation for what will unfold. This corresponds to the experience of an
open possibility within intuitively depicting consciousness, but in another register, that of
horizonal consciousness. Husserl insists that for the most part experience is guided by
horizons of predelineated or “prefigured” sense with only a degree of indeterminacy, and
horizons of open possibilities are in principle overshadowed by the ideal of perfect

specified senses, only comes about once there is an active ego engaged in a the basic form of intentional
act, perceptual experience.
8

Interestingly, Husserl downplays this in the account of open possibility given in Husserl (1973,
277), where he doesn’t speak of intuitive presentification, and speaks only of a horizonal consciousness of
open possibility.
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determinacy and knowledge (Hua XI 24/62). It follows that open possibility in its
horizonal form is also an exceptional form of horizonal consciousness.
Enticing possibility is likewise limited, and for similar reasons. Here it is not a
matter of stepping beyond the immediately given present, so the manner of consciousness
is not an intentional act of phantasy as with open possibility. It is rather an issue of a
peculiarity of this immediately given perceptual present.

Enticing possibilities always

occur at least in pairs that function as motivations latent in the perceptual present for
apprehending it in different, mutually exclusive ways. Further, Husserl claims these
possibilities show up first (Hua XI 59/100) as passive lived experiences of allure
emanating from the ambiguous appearances or “hyletic stock.” It simply happens,
without my consent, that the appearances no longer lead me to immediately take them as
exhibiting a single sense without ambiguity and that they now appear to also motivate me
to understand them in an alternative, conflicting way.
Although these facts give the superficial appearance of a similarity between
enticing possibility and horizonal consciousness, a close comparison reveals important
distinctions. Consciousness of enticing possibilities is an awareness of different ways of
executing focal awareness in my present perceptual field. To bring up Husserl’s example
again, I can apprehend or thematically attend to my sense data as a person or as a wax
figure. Because they disrupt it, the enticing possibilities still bear immediately upon the
primary intentional act I am performing in the perceptual present. And because the
enticing possibilities are competing interpretations of an object within my focal
awareness, they are fully determinate. Horizonal consciousness, on the other hand, does
not disrupt my present intentional act and suggest an alternative interpretation of it. It

73

does not interrupt and, really, undermine the focal intentional act, but works alongside of
it and points beyond this intentional act, relating it to other possible experiences. And
when it does this, it does not do so in complete determinacy, but always with some
degree of generality.

  
The forms of possibility as modalization that Husserl develops in the lectures on
passive synthesis therefore confirm the thesis that possibility, and therefore horizonal
possibility derives from the performance of intentional acts, but they do not establish a
firm enough relation with horizonal possibility generally. Besides these forms of
possibility as modalized consciousness, Husserl also describes practical possibilities.9
Here we can find further confirmation and the more general support required for the
thesis that all horizons are the products of intentional acts.
A practical possibility or “I can” is my consciousness of what I am able to do in an
intentional act. Husserl is insistent that these possibilities are always the results of
intentional acts. In Ideas II, one of the key texts for Husserl’s view of practical
possibility, he states that “Originally… the ‘I do,’ precedes the ‘I can do’” (Hua IV
261/273). The latter is a “modification” of the former (Hua IV 258/270). Husserl
explains how practical possibility arises as a modification by comparing it with “logical”
possibility, the more basic species of possibility.
Logical possibility, just like the species of possibility treated above, arises in a
modification. First, we have an intuitive presentation. I have an actual perceptual
9

Cf. J. N. Mohanty (2005), 331-333.
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experience, for instance. This experience is preserved in the form of memory. I can then
return to the memory and perform a “neutrality modification” on it, meaning that I
consider the presentation without regard to whether it actually happened or not,
abstracting from my certainty of or belief in it as presenting a past event (Hua III 222223/257-259). Now it is a “mere presentation.” Finally, I can exercise a “positing of
possibility” of this presentation. I consider that this is a presentation of something that
could happen. In the end, then, logical possibility means “possibility on the basis of
intuitive representation” (Hua IV 261/273), so that whatever “can be intuited in clear
presenting is possible” (Hua XXXV 155). A square circle, for instance, would fail to
count as such a possibility, since one cannot in any way have a clear presentation of it,
even if one can in some sense think of it or speak of it.
For any logical possibility, the fact that it actually has been clearly presented before
in some manner is the basis for its possibility.10 If something has never been presented or
cannot be presented, one has no basis for taking it to be a logical possibility. Therefore,
an intentional act, one presenting something, precedes and is the condition for logical
possibility, which is thus several steps removed from any such intentional act. Things are
much the same in the case of practical possibility. Here as well there is first an action, a
memory of the action, a neutrality modification of the memory, and then a positing of the
possibility. The key difference between these modifications is that a practical possibility
stands in a relation to my will, as something I could possibly be motivated to do. Will

10

I say “in some manner” because Husserl will grant that we conceive of possibilities that
themselves have never been presented, e.g., a centaur. But this constructed fiction nevertheless has its basis
in certain presentations or types of presentation that, once remembered and then neutralized, serve as the
material for new imaginative presentations.
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and motivation (to act), on the other hand, play no necessary role in the modification of
logical possibility.
The task remains of connecting practical possibility with horizonal possibility. The
story about practical possibility just told has the same issue that we saw in the case of
open and enticing possibility, namely, it simply does not describe a horizonal form of
intentionality. Practical possibilities are modifications of intentional acts, but they seem
to remain intentional acts nevertheless. Husserl explains how practical possibilities
conceived of as imaginative presentations of conceivable intentional acts arise without
touching on the issue of horizonal consciousness. Horizonal possibilities are given (or
“pregiven”) in a much different way and require special treatment to draw out what is
peculiar to them.
As Ludwig Landgrebe and J.N. Mohanty have observed, Husserl does make a
connection between practical possibility and horizonal consciousness.11 The account of
Ideas II spells out our consciousness of practical possibilities in terms of intentional acts
partly because in that text Husserl bases his theory on the model of logical possibility and
partly because, more generally, he had not yet gained sufficient clarity about nonpresentational types of intentionality to realize their centrality and pervasiveness.
Nevertheless, one finds the basic elements for Husserl’s theory of practical
possibility as horizonal consciousness in early texts like the lecture course from 1907
published as Thing and Space, in which Husserl had not yet even begun to speak of
“horizons”. It is in the context of his introduction of the themes of the experience of the
body and of association that Husserl establishes a connection between his theory of

11

Mohanty (2005), 330 and Landgrebe, (1973), 10.
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practical possibility and horizonal consciousness. The experience of the body Husserl is
interested in is that of our so called “kinaesthetic sensations” accompanying bodily
movement.
To give an example of how these sensations work, we can take Husserl’s simple
example of the experience of altering where I am looking by moving my eyes, i.e.,
saccadic eye movement. In this experience, there is a coordination of visual appearances
and feelings related to the movement of my eyes. What is characteristic of this
experience is that the sequence of kinaesthetic ocular feelings is not arbitrary, but
“motivates” the sequence of visual appearances that takes place in the alteration.
Motivation in this sense means that “the positing of belief in the one [i.e., the kinaesthetic
sensation] motivates belief in the other [i.e., the visual image]” (Hua XVI 178/150). And
it is crucial to realize that what is at stake here is not two separate, presently given sets of
appearances (i.e., immediately present visual and kinaesthetic appearances), but also the
awareness of an ensuing structured series of future experiences pertaining the present
complex of appearances.
Functioning in this way, Husserl observes that the kinaesthetic sensations “are not
themselves apprehended in such a way that they make representable either a proper or an
improper matter… Nothing qualitative corresponds to them in the thing, nor do they
adumbrate bodies or present them by way of a projection’” (Hua XVI 106/136; Hua IV
57/62) With the concept of kinaesthetic sensation, then, we have already stepped outside
of the confines of an account that sees intentions only as presentations or intentional acts
informing us about the world.12 What emerges here is an understanding of horizonal

12

Husserl is well aware that the phenomenology of kinaesthetic sensations requires him to rethink
his notion of presentation, but he maintains in the 1907 lectures that kinaesthetic sensations still fall under
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consciousness as a peculiar consciousness of practical possibilities. I have a focal
awareness anchored in the perceptual present, and this presentation is carried on by my
simultaneous awareness and “belief” in the particular sequence of kinaesthetic sensations
and visual images to come, which Husserl will later refer to as a “system of my free
possibilities” or “a practical, kinaesthetic horizon” (Hua XI 15/52; Hua XXXIX 12).
Now, we have to inquire again concerning the precise relation of this kind of
consciousness to intentional acts. An understanding of the associative nature of the
connection between the kinaesthetic sensations and the visual images will shed light here.
Association is an experiential ingredient needed to make the relation between
kinaesthetic sensations and visual images intelligible as a relation of motivation. It is not
a given that a series kinaesthetic sensations must motivate a series of visual images.
There is no a priori or essential connection between the two. There is, instead, an
associative connection, “an empirical relation.” The fact that the occurrence of the
kinaesthetic sensation (or sensations) motivates belief in imminent elapsing of the visual
appearances is the result of experience. As Husserl phrases it, “Being given together…
creates a sort of unity whose force increases with the number of cases of the givenness
together” (Hua XVI 178/150; Hua XI 107/152). There must first be a presentation, an
intentional act in my visual field coincidentally attended by some kinaesthetic sensation.
This engenders a fledgling connection that is reinforced in subsequent repetition of the
two series elapsing together. This is an instance of what Husserl later calls “institution.”

the umbrella of a broadened concept of presentation, leaving out presenting in terms of proper/improper
presentations, but maintaining, at least, the need for an animating apprehension. This is consistant with
Ideas II as well, where Husserl also holds that the kinaesthetic data are given in experiences that fit the
schema apprehension/content (“Auffasung-Auffasungsinhalt”). See Hua IV, 57/62.
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We see here that the intentional act comes first, and the horizon is a subsequent
development. Husserl states this quite clearly in one later manuscript: “[A]ctual activity
must be studied beforehand, that is, provided possible activity originates from it, and then
practically possible [activity] should also be studied as derivative [Ableitung]” (Hua Mat
VIII 227). This association generates “motivated possibilities,” possibilities that have a
degree of certainty corresponding to the strength of the association (Hua XVI 290293/251-253). As such, we can see why these possibilities are more original than those
arising from modalization and are the presupposition for the latter, since these motivated
possibilities make up our original certain consciousness of which modalization is
precisely an alteration.
It might be thought that, while this consideration of practical possibility has shown
the dependency of practical horizonal consciousness on previous intentional acts, there is
still much more to be said to extend this truth to horizonal consciousness generally, to
horizonal possibility as such. That is not the case because for Husserl every other kind of
possibility and horizon issues from this kind. So, for instance, the presentational practical
possibility of Ideas II has to be understood as a higher-order objectification of horizonal
practical possibility.
Husserl seems to suggest this when he claims that the actions we consider in
phantasy require a previous familiarity of “elementary actions” that must be “familiar in
their type,” and that this familiarity ultimately, insofar as the possibility in question bears
on the real world (or is a “physical action”), boils down to “the familiarity of my livedbody as practical organ” and its “elementary activities” (Hua Mat VIII 226-227). The
objectified possibility, which is not even necessary for action to take place (Hua Mat VIII
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229),13 stems from a more basic kind of possibility, the horizonal consciousness of the
body’s practical possibilities. It is a “conscious possession” that only exists as “a mode
of willing as competent [Gekonntes], an intentional modification of a primal mode as
doing and deed” (Hua XXXIV 355). The imaginative depiction of practical possibilities
arises from a reflective break from this competence or straightforward interest in order to
“survey” it, “to interpret it, to explicate the implicit horizon.” The consciousness of
practical possibility in phantasy is, at any rate, a “modification” or “positional mode” of
the original consciousness (Hua XXXIX 368).14
There remains, however, the whole sphere of non-practical possibility. Instead of
trying to explain the connection of practical possibility to the other sorts of possibility,15 I
think there is another way of arriving at the same result. In Husserl’s later thinking there
is greater and greater emphasis placed on the practical side of experience. In fact, he
comes to maintain that there is a “practical” (in an expanded sense) side to every
intentional act. We can see this in his frequent description of intentional acts generally as
kinds of “doing” (Tun). We can already draw this inference based on the foregoing for
every intentional act that involves the kinaesthetic feeling of the body. But since it is

13

Husserl says the following in this regard: “In the first level [of practical possibility]: The result
[the fulfillment of an action] is my conviction – I have the conviction, I have the intention [Meinung],
[which] doesn’t mean act-performance, rather I can recognize [erkennen] the same thing repeatedly as valid
for me in a repetition that need not be an actual intuitive reactivation.” What he means here is that I can
have an analogizing apperception in the form of a “recognizing” (wiederkennen). Instead of reflecting on
what action is best, I act out of habit. The only practical possibility is transferred apperceptively into the
new situation without an intentional act
14

Cf. Hua XXXIX, 357: “Fiction is fiction of worldly existents – always modi of an I-do in which an
I-can is already resolved, an already correspondingly cultivated ability…”
15

I have nevertheless indicated how such an account would run by suggesting that practical
horizonal consciousness makes up the original certainty we have in experience that sets up the possibility
for modalization and the peculiar possibilities arising therefrom.

80

debatable if and how every intentional act involves kinaesthesis, it is best to find another
way.16
Husserl’s characterization of intentional acts as doing will aid us here. Husserl’s
conception of intentional acts as doing follows from his description of them as goaldirected processes that unfold in complex ways over time. If intentional acts are already
practical in their basic form, then the horizons they engender and the possibilities
conscious therein of such intentional acts will likewise be practical. Husserl certainly
draws this inference, which is why we find him in Formal and Transcendental Logic
affirming that “judging too… is acting” (Husserl 1969 149/167).17 Already in the
Logical Investigations intentional acts generally have something of a teleological
character in that they all involve or point to a possible fulfillment (Hua XIX Investigation
VI, Chapters One and Two). Panos Theodorou (2006 306) has even gone so far as to say
that the theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations, and especially the analyses
of fulfilling intentional acts, “prepares the ground for letting us understand that
intentionality is through and through praxial,” although “he does not in fact develop the
proper consequences.” The idea that intentionality is a “doing” is a deepening of this
insight about fulfillment.
For our purposes, it will suffice to show that a “mere presentation” that is actively
carried out18 is a doing, since all intentional acts are either founded on or modifications of

16

Cf. Panos Theodorou’s (2006, especially 308-312) arguments against the necessity of the body
being involved in intentional acts.
17

The entirety of Husserl (1969) §63 concerns how judgments are a kind of action or doing.

18

This is an important qualification in light of Husserl’s distinction between a purely passive
intention or presentation and an active one as elaborated in Hua XI, §§20-22 and Appendix 7. A purely
passive presentation would lack the aim for confirmation in fulfillment that is characteristic of egoic or
active presentational experience (84-85/128, 364/449). Although this distinction complicates matters, it
need not trouble us, since the passive presentations, because they do not aim for confirmation, do not
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presentations. Indeed, Husserl does assert that “the simple presenting that functions in
any particular aiming as a founding substrate” is a kind of “egoic directedness” or “I-do
[Ich-tue]” (Hua XXXIX 357). And, more generally, “Every act, every intention in the
specific sense… is a modus of the ‘I am actively [tuend] directed, we could even say: a
modus of egoic praxis” (Hua XXXIX 366). This is borne out by an analysis of perception,
the basic form of presentation. In reality, Husserl says, any given perceptual presentation
“is a perceptual whole with well-distinguished parts… And these are all perceptions
conscious of the same [thing]; a unity of intention passes through them and a unity of
intention to one and the same [thing], the unity of consciousness by which a thing shows
itself in each of these partial perceptions (perceptual stretches, perceptual phases) in
various properties” (Hua XXXIX 363).
That this complexity is a practical ensemble of sorts becomes apparent when we
recognize that the phases of the process are progressively ordered to exhibit the object in
its optimum of perceptual givenness. This is an insight about perceptual intentionality
that Husserl recognized already in the 1907 lectures published as Thing and Space:
“[T]he perceptions of things, with respect to the various determinations, refer to
maximum points or maximum regions, thus respectively to an appearance or to a
narrowly delimited region of appearance in which, if it is actualized, the relevant
determination counts as ‘completely’ given” (Hua XVI 126/105). That is, not just any
presentation of a thing gives it as I intend it. If I place a book right against my eye or set
it facing me across the room, these experiences give the object in a way. But the book is

actually present objects, which only arise as identically repeatable, confirmed and confirmable existents
(96-97/141). Passive presentations or intentions do not put us in contact with transcendent reality and
therefore do not reach the level of the problematic of our consciousness of the world horizon is presently
occupying us.
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only “completely given”, for my practical purposes, when I view it at a certain distance,
in a certain light, and set in motion a sequence of experiences that run over the lines of
text on the page, etc. This is why Husserl can justly say that a perceptual presentation “is
a practical intention, and indeed one grasped in practical actualization” (Hua XXXIX
365).
This interpretation of intentionality as doing is motivated by an important fact about
our concrete conscious life. In experience, considered in medias res, the default mode of
consciousness is not that of intentional fulfillment. Rather, I find myself at a remove
from what I am interested in, and so the synthesis of fulfillment can only take place
provided that I intervene to ensure that the fulfillment takes place. Thus Husserl says
that, as such a “purposive actualization,” an intentional act like a perceptual presentation
is the “[p]roduction of an object” (Hua XXXIX 380). Husserl clarifies that there are two
vectors in this producing. One is the constant reference to the same object that is
presented in every phase of the perceptual experience. This is the “objective sense” that
Husserl speaks of in Ideas I, the object as an identical pole of reference to which every
partial experience of it aims (Hua III 270-273/313-316). The other vector is the reference
of each phase to a subsequent phase. Each phase functions as a partial experience, as
non-independent. This is what “animates” (beseelenden) the experience, keeps it in
motion. Each phase is incomplete or non-independent because it is an “intermediate
configuration” that requires another phase, points to it as what ought to be (Gesolltes),
and so on up to the “completing configuration” that presents the object suitably for my
purposes (Hua XXXIX 380-381).19 Husserl sums up the point nicely when he says that

19

The reading of Husserl presented here corroborates Theodorou’s (2006) thesis about Husserl’s
understanding of intentional acts as practical. In his words: “Perception… can be accounted for in terms of
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“[e]very perception which presents the object to me in this orientation leaves open the
practical transition to other appearances of the same object, specifically to certain groups
of appearances. The possibilities of transition are practical possibilities” (Husserl 1973
83).
Given that the world-horizon shares the common traits of horizons in general as I
have just characterized them, it follows that it is itself also a phenomenon inhabiting the
realm of secondary passivity, of pregivenness derived from prior givenness in intentional
acts. It is fairly easy to see how intentional acts institute horizonal possibility on the
basis of the pregiven world, but it is not so clear that the same is true for the horizonal
possibility that makes up the world. It is hard to conceive of the world-horizon as
coming to be from an intentional act, a groundless intentional act presupposing no
horizon whatsoever. Nevertheless, if the world is the form of intentionality that ensures
the harmonious experience of transcendent reality, and transcendent reality is
characteristically given in intentional acts, it must be that an intentional act is necessary
to institute the sense that the world preserves, confirms, and expands continually.20

  
What we have learned in the preceding section is troubling because Husserl also
affirms that every intentional act presupposes a horizon. Husserl does not take the
relation of intentional acts to extant horizons as fortuitous, but very thoroughly explicates

an aiming at evident appearing of intentional objects and at achievement of it by organizing some means
(available contents) according to a plan or rule (sense)” (317).
20

Hua I, 95-96: “Every evidence “sets up” or “institutes” for me an abiding possession. I can
‘always return’ to the itself-beheld actuality, in a series of restitutions of the first evidence. Without such
‘possibilities’ there would be no fixed and abiding being, no real and no ideal world.”
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the dependence of the former on the latter. This idea, moreover, is no secret to the
attentive reader of Husserl’s published works. He says categorically, for instance, that
“there is no experience, in the simple and primary sense of an experience of things,
which, grasping a thing for the first time and bringing cognition to bear on it, does not
already ‘know’ more about the thing than is in this cognition alone” (Husserl 1973 33-34;
Hua VI, 158).21 That is, every intentional act presupposes a familiarity with the world, a
familiarity of horizonal sense. In the Crisis, Husserl is even clearer about the matter
when he claims that our experience includes a pregiven horizon “not occasionally, but
always and necessarily” (Hua VI 142).22 Or, appealing this time to a relatively familiar
manuscript, he claims that “all particular syntheses through which things in perception, in
memory, etc., are given, are surrounded by a general milieu of empty intentions,” i.e.,
horizons (Hua XI 101/146).23
There are two ways of understanding why Husserl affirms that all intentional acts
presuppose horizons. Both ways reveal the immense depth and complexity that lies
behind the surface of his apparently simple theory of intentionality. When we study
intentional acts in light of their interaction with time consciousness (i.e., retention and
protention) and association, their necessary connections with horizonal consciousness
become manifest. The first path I will follow appeals to the structural details of
intentional acts, showing that an intentional act is essentially a dependent moment of a
greater experiential process called “apperception” in which the intentional act receives its

21

The same follows from Husserl’s assertions such as that “all activity essentially presupposes a
foundation of passivity” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, 13/286).
22

Cf. Hua I, 82/44: “Every subjective process has a ‘horizon.’”

23

Husserl explicitly defines horizons generally as empty intentions just a few paragraphs prior to the
passage cited, at 99/144.
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bearings from a horizon specific to that process. This rests on what I will call the
“forward pointing” character of the intentional act, its relation to protentional
consciousness. The second path is based on Husserl’s observation of the character of
familiarity that he believes is essential to all intentional acts as an appurtenant context of
sense in which they appear. This rests on what I will call the “backward pointing”
character of the intentional act, its relation to retentional consciousness by way of
association. In both cases, we learn that, generally, “[n]o concrete object can be
constituted for consciousness [i.e., in an intentional act] without the co-functioning of
empty horizons; what is required is a constant intertwining of fullness and emptiness”
(Hua XI 242/367).

 Ǧ 
It is, for Husserl, a structural requirement for an intentional act to have a
determinate relation to some horizon. The discussion above concerning intentional acts
as “doing” already points to this. Because an intentional act is something that unfolds
teleologically, the intentional act always takes place within a horizonal consciousness of
the steps actualizing the telos of the intentional act. No intentional act could be initiated
without a horizonal consciousness of the process of actualization and of the end-result,
the fulfillment. This is what Husserl means when he says that “[e]very act, primarily
every action, but also already every experiencing act, is an ‘intention’ containing a
prepossession [Vorhabe],” which is “a practical construction of the possibility of that to
which the entire active striving is directed, the plan ‘itself’” (Hua XXXIX 438).
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The protentional component of perceptual experience makes possible the
teleological structure of intentional acts. As Husserl said in the Logical Investigations,
all intentional acts insofar as they are objectifying are characterized by their manner of
fulfillment, even intentional acts that are not intuitive presentations. In the lectures on
passive synthesis he adds an important detail: Such “presentations… contain anticipatory
intentions, namely, protentional intentions that become fulfilled in the continual
progression of self-giving,” and these intentional acts are only possible in this way (Hua
XI 91/135; Husserl 1973 87).
What we want to understand now is how the fundamental form of intentional act,
the mere presentation, is dependent on a horizon, and how the link is supposed to be
provided by protentional consciousness. In the simplest scenario, we must distinguish
two sides to every experience involving fulfillment, every intentional act. On the one
hand, there are the particular intentional “rays”, as Husserl calls them, occurring either in
the form of an empty intention at one end of the spectrum or of a fulfilled intention at the
other end. Although the process is in fact continuous, we can abstractively isolate in
reflection these discrete, momentary points of contact with reality. The full experience is
a transition from the former (empty intention) to the latter (fulfillment).
But the two moments of the experience taken together do not yet make up the full
experience in its entirety. Husserl says there is, further, an intentio or striving that runs
through the momentary intentional rays and that must be distinguished from them (Hua
XI 91/135, 93/137). Only this intentio or striving accounts for the unity of the full
experience and its synthesis of fulfillment taken as a process (Hua XI 92/136, Hua XXXIX
375-376). The striving consists of a consciousness of the goal that is present throughout
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and that guides the experience as it runs its course. Husserl holds that these two sides,
the momentary ray and the constant striving, are essential to every intention (Hua XI
86/130).
While Husserl believes the striving can be merely passive (a simple “receptive”
experience) or actively initiated to achieve some goal, we are only interested in the latter
at present. Let’s consider an example. Suppose I am going to meet a friend at the park. I
arrive early, and I am waiting for my friend to arrive. In the distance, I see someone
approaching who somewhat resembles my friend. This catches my interest and I resolve
to determine whether it is or not. Now I have a sequence of intentional rays, beginning
with the unclear experience of the person in the distance and ending, let’s suppose, in a
confirmatory fulfilling experience that it is in fact my friend.
My intentional act is this resolve to determine who the person in the distance is.
This intentional act is not, however, a mere initiating act that would set the series in
motion while itself remaining separate. There is such an initiating, which Husserl often
speaks of as a fiat, together with the first ray, but it is not enough to make the full
experience intelligible (Hua XXXIV 355-357). The fiat initiating the act is carried along
through the series of rays by a protentional, tacit expectation of a confirmation, and of the
typical sequence of rays that would lead up to such a confirmation. What we now have is
“an enduring will, but not an enduring act of willing in the pregnant sense” (Hua XXXIV
355). Or, again, “I thus have in original, genuine acting a continued ability as the
continual ‘It goes,’ as the continual willing being fulfilled in the modus of doing, acting”
(Hua Mat VIII 221).
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Another example, one of Husserl’s, will help. Husserl considers the case where I
resolve some action the next day. I decide to catch a train somewhere the following day.
Again, we have the fiat and the intentional rays corresponding to all the particular
moments of the experience from start to finish. What we want to clarify further is how
the act is sustained by a protentional consciousness. Husserl illustrates the matter thus:
Practical possibility contains in itself a practical relation to my actual present, as
an action external to my lived-body and my bodily near-world [leiblichen
Nahwelt], such as it is given for me; even when the action has, e.g., travel as its
beginning, tomorrow from the station, it is then pertinent to the now for the
morning, for existence [Dasein] and life until tomorrow in the familiar manner of
what is obvious for me and what is going to happen for me, the abiding being of
my home as here, for the station as over there, the trip there, etc. (Hua Mat VIII
220)24
When I initiate this intentional act, the fiat and intentional rays are obviously insufficient
because it leaves out the ongoing awareness I have at each moment of the coherence of
all the rays with respect to the fulfillment I am seeking. Before I even embark on my trip,
while I am biding my time the day before, I already have a sense of being involved in a
process that is already underway. The fiat immediately excites a tacit awareness of all of
these connections, and this is a protentional awareness, that is, an unthematic expectation.
Once I have made the decision to take the train, my present is full of references to how
this action will play out, although at any given moment my explicit awareness is only
directed to what is going on at that moment.
This analysis shows how an intentional act, beginning with the simplest and most
basic case of perceptual presentation, can have a relation to horizonal consciousness.
Because every intentional act has a very specific way of being carried out in a series of
24

Cf. Hua XXXIX, 195: “For instance: I just woke up, and already ‘it is’ [Steht] day, my day lies
‘before me’, without me intuitively presentifying it.”
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steps, a protentional striving must be present at each step to contextualize the step and
maintain an awareness of where the intentional act is going in the back of one’s mind, as
it were, while this particular step occupies one. This “striving” holds together and creates
a unity among my fiat and the various momentary intentional rays, none of which are
sufficient to account for the concrete whole of the intentional act.

  Ǧ
We have just seen how every intentional act has a sort of forward-pointing character
thanks to the way that the protentional horizon carries forward the fiat that initiates any
intentional act and sustains it in a series of intentional rays leading step by step to the
ultimate fulfillment of the intentional act. But this is not the only way in which
intentional acts are inherently horizon-bound. Husserl says, for instance, that “familiarity
is a mode, and indeed an entirely general mode of consciousness in which anything is
conscious” (Hua Mat VIII 249).

This familiarity, though, is not a “what-content” (i.e.,

an extra property or feature belonging to the intentional object), Husserl says, but a
horizon. This becomes apparent from the observation that “[i]f I am perceptually
directed to something, then this something is familiar, but I am not directed to its-beingfamiliar [Bekanntsein]” (Hua Mat VIII 250). If the familiarity of an existent is not a
matter of its “what”, i.e., its real being, properties, relations, etc., then as a horizonal
consciousness, it is rather “a subjective how of possession” of the intentional object (Hua
Mat VIII 249). As a how of possession, we immediately recognize that while familiarity
is not any real feature of an entity, it is still essentially related to the intentional acts in
which such entities are given.
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Now we must make clear what familiarity is positively, at least clarifying what kind
of horizon it is supposed to be and in what sense it is a “how,” let alone a “subjective
how,” i.e., manner or mode of experience. Familiarity is an associative connection.
When I have an experience of something as familiar, the familiarity is a relation between
my present experience and some past experience or experiences. The connection is one
of “coincidence” (Deckung) due to similarity (ٍhnlichkeit). This association of
coincidence based on similarity is, moreover, an experience underwritten by retentional
horizons (Hua XXIX 10-11, 414, 442-443, 447-448).25 It is these horizons that intentional
acts must have a relation to if they are to present transcendent reality as familiar. This is
why Husserl says quite generally that “‘experiencing’ (perceiving, intuitively
recollecting) means to bring something to self-givenness, something pregiven as already
existing, it means to already be acquainted with the existent [Daseiendes]” (Hua XXXIX
358).
In a manuscript outlining his theory of apperception, Husserl gives a couple of
examples to illustrate how this works. In one case, I see a deer track (Hua XXXIX 413417).26 This experience exceeds the sensory appearances, the real properties and
relations actually given in the experience. To be meaningful as the experience of a deer
track, I have to have a familiarity with this sort of existent, and in this case, insofar as the
deer track “gets sense as previously having come to be” (Hua XXXIX 414). For the deer
track to be intelligible to me, I have to have some experience or information about deer
being present in the area, what their hooves are like, etc. These experiences are preserved

25

See also Husserl’s summary laying out these essential components of the experience of familiarity
in Hua VIII, 250-251.
26

Both examples are borrowed from this text.
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for me in the depths of my retentional consciousness. The present experience of the deer
track “awakens” the retained experiences.
But it does not awaken them as particular past experiences brought to focal
awareness in their own right (in so-called “episodic memories”). I do not need to think of
the exact past situations where I learned about deer tracks. The coincidence of the
present experience with the retentional consciousness gives rise to a typical awareness of
these kinds of experiences (what is sometimes called “semantic memory”). It is clear,
though, that the coincidence would not occur at all if what was required was an exact
repetition. If such coincidence were to occur at all, it would be very rare. But Husserl
thinks about the associative awakening we are interested in at present as a coincidence
grounded in similarity, not sameness. What happens is that a cluster of salient traits of
the present experience coincides with a cluster of salient traits of the past experience or
experiences, and that overlap comprises a type. The horizon thus required for such
intentional acts is one of my retentional consciousness of other past experiences with the
same typical features. The tacit awareness of typical coincidence accounts for the feeling
of familiarity that attends my present experience of the track.
Husserl’s other example of an iced over river emphasizes this. In that case, I
experience the icy surface of the river as something that has come into being, and that is
an important feature of my familiarity with it. But, although I may have seen many iced
over rivers, I have probably never seen the formative process, the actual icing over of the
river. Nevertheless, I have a lot of familiarity with water turning into ice generally (e.g.,
as often as I fill the ice tray in my freezer). These very different experiences provide me
with a cluster of salient features for having an experience of the iced over river as
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something having come into being in a certain way. This is precisely what distinguishes
familiarity from memory, and makes it a form of what Husserl calls “recognizing”
(Wiederkennen), which is the “assimilation” (Verähnlichung) into the present of traits of
past experience rather than a presentifying recollection of a past experience (Hua Mat
VIII 282-283).27 The assimilation adds no content, but brings out the type, insofar is it
coincides with salient features of retained past experiences.
These examples give us an idea of how familiarity works in some experiences, but
not yet why familiarity might be deemed necessary for all intentional acts. Husserl
secures this more general thesis by linking the notion of familiarity to that of the worldhorizon. It is one of the functions of the world horizon to act as the context of familiarity
for any intentional act aimed at transcendent reality. This is what Husserl means when he
says that “the structure of the known and of the unknown is a fundamental structure of
world-consciousness, correlatively, a structure of the world as horizon of all individual
real things capable of being experienced” (Husserl 1973 37). The familiarity that the
world-horizon gives us is the familiarity required for us to experience transcendent reality
at all.
Husserl suggests that the most basic form of familiarity required and always
presupposed in experiencing something transcendent is familiarity with the form of an
object in general, which is a feature embedded within the world-horizon. Whatever
appears for me within the world-horizon as something transcendent appears as an object,
which means that it has “the empty form of determinability,” as something “explicable in
general” (Husserl 1973 38). This, according to Husserl, is the type of all types, the
27

In Hua XXXIX, 21, Husserl calls this experience an “analogical memory [Gedächtnis]” and an
“analogical anamnesis.”
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“totality of typification” (Totalitätstypik). Every transcendent thing is, at bottom,
something I can experience more of, which is what it means to be determinable,
explicable. Husserl puts the point vividly when he says, “a putatively ‘obvious’ ontic
meaning [Seinsmeinen] with the title ‘world,’ exceeding what is actually momentarily
perceived, lies in every pulse of our life” (Hua XXXII 149). Given that experience is
overlaid with this horizon of familiarity, whatever shows up for one will have the salient
feature of allowing or even demanding further determination. Thus, for instance, the first
time I saw a deer track, it was unfamiliar as a deer track, but it was familiar as something
to be more precisely determined, e.g., as a deer track.
The second track we have followed concerning a “backward pointing” horizon of
familiarity thus secures the general validity of Husserl’s claim that intentional acts
depend on horizons. If transcendent reality is to appear at all in its characteristic form, it
must be intelligible in the form of “the empty form of determinability.” The worldhorizon makes possible the experience of reality, of something with a stable identity
distinct from oneself, in large part because it includes the form of determinability, of
identity in changing appearances. The intentional schema of determinability is
universally applicable, being a familiarity preparing one for whatever one may come into
contact with. Familiarity in this way makes up the necessary context in which any
intentional act takes place, since the function of intentional acts, whatever their type, is
precisely to put us in touch with transcendent reality. In sum, “objects are only objects in
object-horizons [Objekthorizonten] or rather in a universal horizon of familiarity and
unfamiliarity” (Hua XXXIX 335).
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Ǧ Ǧ
The two kinds of horizonality just considered – forward-pointing and backward
pointing – are sometimes difficult to distinguish in Husserl’s work because he often
describes them at work in a total process, without distinguishing sharply the particular
moments within the process. What this shows, however, is that the two forms of
horizonality are intimately interrelated. And, of course, if each is essential to every
intentional act, then we should only expect to find that any really concrete description of
an intentional act would exhibit the two moments at work together in particular
intentional acts.
This total process is captured in what Husserl calls “induction,” which he claims
“belongs to every experience and is inseparable from it, being in the experience itself”
(Husserl 1973 32). Induction is a process that begins with an experience of familiarity
that at once engenders an expectation, thus encompassing a backward-pointing
horizonality and a forward-pointing horizonality. Although there is a genetic relation
between this experience of induction and the induction employed in scientific method,
they are not the same. Induction in the relevant sense here is not a logical inference from
accumulated past observations formulated into a proposition asserting some correlation to
a propositional declaration about a general causal connection between the correlated
terms. Induction is a form of intentionality at work in perceptual experience, first of all,
one lacking focal awareness and therefore not requiring expression in propositional form.
The horizonal components of this form of induction clearly mark it off from the
deliberate, self-aware, thematic scientific method of induction.
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Let’s consider how the two kinds of horizonality work together in a single
intentional act. Husserl clearly puts all the elements together in one of the few passages
dealing at length with the notion of induction, the final chapter of his 1927 lecture course
published as Natur und Geist. Husserl begins with the backward-pointing horizon: “The
empty horizonal consciousness of the past would be misunderstood… if it were never
awakened in the course of life” (Hua XXXXII 149). Husserl explains that the “past” he
has in mind here is that of retention, initially “the consciousness in which something is
‘still’ alive [lebendig] as having just been,” but also retention in the sense of “the distant
and most distant, entirely submerged past” (Hua XXXII 150). The function of the past in
this sense is more than to preserve my past experiences and the contents presented
therein, as important as that may be. The past is also something that is constantly related
in various ways with the present to the extent that a stock of types emerges within it over
time. The similarity of the immediately present experience recalls something past in tacit
memory or “recognizing,” but possibly also in a thematic recollection.28 This ongoing
relevance of the past is the basis of the feeling of familiarity one always has in the
present.
But what makes this experience of induction more than just a relation to the horizon
of the past is “how such awakening of the present can appropriate a new determination of
sense.” This happens because the “associative induction goes from the present to the past
and then from the awakened past [back] to the present” (Hua XXXII 152). That occurs
when what is presently experienced is not merely familiar, due to its coincidence in terms
28

Husserl makes this distinction (Hua XXXII, 151) in an unwieldy but typical way when he
differentiates the experience of something “coming to mind” (in his words, “ich erinnere mich” or “da fällt
mich ein”) and the “clear recollection in which ‘I view it again before me.’” Again he makes the
distinction when he speaks of something “recalling [something] for us… even if not in explicit intuitive
awakening” (Hua XXXII, 153).
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of salient traits with past experience, but thanks to that familiarity also comes with certain
expectations. This is where protentional consciousness comes into play. The type that is
brought to bear on the present experience is complex. It is not something fulfilled in an
instant. Often recognition takes place before the type has been fully actualized, so that
the present is only a partial fulfillment of the type, stirring up the expectation of its
completion. This is the phenomenon Husserl is describing when he states that “[t]o the
particular retentional total chain [Kettenganzen],” i.e., the complex type brought out in
recognizing, “corresponds a protentional total chain” (Hua XXXII 153).
Herein lies the connection of the two directions. We can distinguish the familiarity
of the object and the expectations pertaining to it, the reference to the retentional
consciousness of the type and how this type at the same time awakens a protentional
awareness of the typical characteristics not yet fulfilled in the immediate present. Husserl
relies on his favorite example of the experience of a melody to illustrate the point. When
I hear a certain sequence of tones making up a melody, I already have a sense of the
whole thing although I have only heard a portion of it. When a partial, incomplete
melody is recognized, “a new tone is expected, and in unity with the one already
conscious” and I realize “a continuous protentional stretch belongs to this same present”
(Hua XXXII 155). In this way Husserl explains how intentional acts are always
embedded in particular apperceptive contexts of retention and protention.


Now that we have gained insight into the opposing terms of the paradox, we can
state the paradox in clearer form. We began, first, by considering why horizons
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presuppose intentional acts. This required clarifying in what sense a horizon is made up
of possibilities and how various forms of possibility are all produced by intentional acts.
We learned that horizons are most basically networks of practical possibilities, of
possible intentional acts and possible chains of intentional acts. Further, it became
evident that such possibilities, because they are possibilities of motivationally structured
courses of experience, are not given a priori, but are established in experience as
associative connections instituted in intentional acts and reinforced by the repetition of
such acts. In this sense, all horizons are acquired in intentional acts.
On the other hand, we went on to look at the dependence of intentional acts on
horizons. We find in Husserl two ways in which intentional acts presuppose horizons.
First, they presuppose a protentional horizon. Because an intentional act is a complex
process, the intentional act has to have some sort of temporal coherence and unity, and
Husserl identifies this with our protentional consciousness. Second, intentional acts
always present something familiar. They do this when present experience reminds one of
a past experience held onto in retention and its salient typical features coinciding with
those of the present one. All intentional acts present something as familiar at least in the
minimum sense that it has the general form of an object, i.e., that it is determinable. This
minimum horizon of familiarity is necessary because without it my intentional acts could
not present transcendent objects that have a stable identity and experiential consistency,
which is precisely their job.
We therefore see that, considered each by itself, the two terms of the paradox are
phenomenologically well-founded. But when taken together, an infinite regress is
revealed. We saw that all horizonal possibilities refer to some intentional act that
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instituted them. But it is equally necessary to conceive of this instituting intentional act
in its relation to a particular retentional and protentional horizon. It must be capable of
being executed as a process, which means it must have a protentional horizon. And it
must have at least the minimum of familiarity. It must present something as
determinable, as identical and experientially consistent. But if these are horizonal
possibilities, they too, if they are like horizonal possibilities generally, must have been
instituted in an intentional act. We are now stuck in this regress, and there is no obvious
solution within the framework of worldly intentionality. In the next chapters we will
discover Husserl’s way out by taking recourse to a phenomenology of the “pre-world.”
Worldly intentionality is not sufficient for making the world intelligible genetically, but
we find a wealth of motivation “anterior” to the world, in the realm of pure passivity.
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CHAPTER 4
The Problem of the Pre-World

 
The intent of the previous chapter, in laying out a fundamental paradox inherent in
the genetic interrelations of the two basic forms of worldly intentionality, i.e., intentional
acts and horizonal consciousness, was to argue that the dynamics of intra-worldly forms
of intentionality push one in the direction of a deeper analysis ultimately taking us
beyond worldly intentionality, provided one is, as Husserl was, unsatisfied with an
infinite regress of mutually dependant intentional acts and horizons. And the point of
that would not be to lose sight of the world-horizon, but to understand its genesis.
One could still, perhaps, bite the bullet and embrace the paradox. Stranger things
have happened in the history of philosophy. Spinoza, for instance, did not view infinite
regresses as to be avoided in all cases.1 Further explanation is necessary, then, to put a
definitive stop to the regress. But even if one is persuaded by the argument of Chapter 3
along with its further buttressing in this chapter, one may yet be hesitant to accept
Husserl’s suggested remedy of tracing the genesis of worldly intentionality in some sense
“outside of” the world itself, and into a “pre-world.”
One is justly reminded at this point of Husserl’s thought of a possible “annihilation”
of the world in Ideas I and Heidegger’s subsequent thinly veiled critique of Husserl’s
transcendental ego as a “worldless subject” in Being and Time. Then, just when one
hopes to find Husserl in his later phenomenological analyses of world and the life-world

1

See, for instance, Spinoza’s (1992, 271) comments on a version of the cosmological argument for
the existence of God in which he flatly denies the “impossibility… of an infinite series of causes.”
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correcting himself on that point or at least leaving behind the extreme expression of it, it
might seem as though he is in this way rather giving it a new lease on life in the context
of his genetic phenomenology.2
I believe that is not how we should understand Husserl’s talk of a “pre-world.” In
fact, the pre-world is precisely a way of concretizing his phenomenology, even if it
requires delimiting a sphere of experience that is in a very technical sense “non-worldly”
or, better, “pre-worldly.” To allay these fears, I will need to clarify what it means to talk
about a “pre-world.” That means, first, defining what Husserl means by the term “preworld,” and, second, making some methodological remarks. The latter will concern both
the relation of the phenomenology of the pre-world to the phenomenological reduction
and our mode of access to such a sphere of experience, given that as “developed” subjects
of experience, we are faced with a world and are not a pre-world. With that we touch on
the problem of phenomenological construction or reconstruction, i.e., what
phenomenology can say about experiential domains to which one in principle has no
direct experiential access.


Chapter 3 attempted to show a paradox endemic to worldly intentionality, inasmuch
as it leads to an infinite regress of intentional acts occurring within extant horizons
produced by previous intentional acts occurring within extant horizons, etc. There I
2

While I think it is unquestionable that Husserl’s talk of the annihilation of the world is unfortunate
and easily suggests an untenable view of the mind and the world, it has been plausibly argued that the main
point of that passage and others like it is valid – the transcendental idealism advocated therein does not
really entail any kind of philosophically vicious separation of mind and world. For a condensed
presentation of a couple strategies for a charitable reading of the passages in question, see Dan Zahavi,
(2008), 361-362.
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mentioned Husserl’s dissatisfaction with this situation and its implication that there is an
infinite history of intentional acts belonging to every subject. While I do think the
regress is prima facie unacceptable, I also believe a philosophical account ought to give
very clear reasons for this beyond the immediately apparent absurdity of the paradox. In
fact, given Husserl’s well known claim from 1922/23 that the transcendental ego is
immortal despite the empirical, embodied ego’s mortality, one justly wonders what
reason Husserl could have for rejecting the regress (Hua XI 377-381/466-471, Hua XIV
Beilage XX, also from 1922). It appears as though for him the subject is an eternally
existing entity, not subjected to events like birth and death.
As commentators have come to recognize, Husserl later introduces birth and death
as events punctuating the life of the transcendental subject and not only the empirical
subject.3 This change provides a powerful reason for rejecting the regress. Husserl’s
incorporation of the events of birth and death into transcendental life make it necessary to
reject the thesis of an infinite regress of intentional acts generating horizons that engender
intentional acts, etc. I will not be able to treat this point as fully as it deserves, but I will
outline the main contours at least enough to show that Husserl has a principled reason
that coheres with his general philosophical outlook for not resting content with an infinite
regress of worldly intentionality.
There are two basic problems with the notion of transcendental birth (and death as
well, but that need not concern us here). First, my birth is inaccessible to me (Hua
XXXIX 500). That is no problem in ordinary life (people ordinarily have an
unproblematic belief in their birth), but phenomenology is an exploration of my
3

Cf. Lee (1993), 163ff; Steinbock (1995), 189-190; Zahavi (2003), 108; and Geniusas (2010), 72.
Husserl is especially clear that he takes birth and death to be events with a transcendental significance in
Hua Mat VIII, text No. 96.
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experience, the ways I am experientially related to things and events. Given that, there is
an obvious phenomenological difficulty in explaining my experiential relation to my
birth, since no one has a clear (or even obscure) memory of birth (Hua XXXIX 467).
Second, and perhaps comprising a more fundamental problem than the first one, is
the fact that the nature of time-consciousness seems to be such that it cannot begin or
end. We thus apparently discover behind our first regress a second one. Husserl, in the
passage just mentioned from 1922/23, argues that it is impossible to conceive of
experience beginning absolutely, since experience always has a transitional character due
to retentional and protentional consciousness. Husserl boldly claims that “we cannot
conceive of a Now that does not already have retentions” (Hua XI 378/467). Further, any
memory, as a modification of a present or “Now” that once was, also shares this
transitional quality, and is embedded in the broader retentional horizon exceeding the
particular memory (Hua XI 379/468). To the extent that it can be isolated, it is lifted out
of a temporal series of which it was only a passing moment.
Husserl’s solution to both these problems is to appeal to intersubjective experience
(Hua XV 609). While he does believe that from the “egological” perspective, i.e., on the
basis of the experience of a single transcendental subject in abstraction from the
experience of other subjects and what can be learned in that experience, some progress
can be made in resolving the problems, this perspective is deficient in important
respects.4 Nevertheless, Husserl earnestly attempts to go as far as he can with the limited
resources of the solitary subject.

4

I therefore have to disagree with Geniusas (2010) that the idea of birth as a limit comes primarily
from the individual perspective of the solitary subject. On Geniusas’ reading of Husserl, intersubjectivity is
not needed to motivate the sense of birth as a limit for conscious experience. He does maintain that the
topic of intersubjectivity is relevant to that of birth, but not with respect to the subject’s finitude.
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In such attempts, it becomes apparent that Husserl markedly alters his view of the
infinitude of the past from the “egological,” merely individual perspective. This is
evident in Hua XXXIX, text No. 44, §§1 and 4. There he argues that the past of the
individual transcendental subject is finite essentially in terms of motivated memories of
the past. Although one can iterate the empty possibility of memory, which is the basis of
the assertion in the 1922 texts of the infinitude of the egological past, there is a necessary
finitude to the past as a motivated experience. That is, at least in part, due to the fact that
I can only call up voluntarily and my present can only “call to mind” or motivate
determinate memories up to a point. The idea seems to be that the empty possibility is
something artificial or fabricated in my present, and that the real, concrete past existence
of the transcendental subject is revealed as finite due to the limited web of motivated
memories of it.
Nevertheless, this development does not resolve the problem of the “birth” of the
transcendental subject, due to its confinement to possibilities motivated in the
transcendental subject’s own consciousness. Nothing merely within my own experience
can call up or motivate a memory of the experience of what we might call
“transcendental birth,” that is, the beginning of experience. The appeal to the finitude of
our ability to remember our past as indicating the finitude of our conscious life is
insufficient, further, because it does not yield a boundary so much as it draws our
attention to an ambiguous zone, since, in truth, when we go as far as we can into the past
of memory, we do not encounter a first memory, but rather a loose collection of
memories with no precise chronological order.
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Husserl presents a second line of thought from the perspective of the solitary
subject attempting to demonstrate the finitude of the subject in the C-Manuskripte (No.
43). There he tries to show what the developmental course of past experience beyond the
scope of recollection must have been like by analogy with the way it passes at present
and in the past that is accessible to memory. If one reflects on one’s past experience, one
discovers a constant but gradual enrichment of that experience, through the cultivation of
new abilities and the acquisition of new ways of looking at the world. That entails that at
every earlier stage of the process, the subject had a “poorer” kind of experience. It is
only natural to assume that the impoverishment of the subject as one traces the course of
its experience back in memory would continue beyond that memory as well, up to the
limit of being an utterly “paltry [armselige] ego” (Hua Mat VIII 155).
Again, this attempt to arrive at the finitude of conscious life comes up short,
although because of its clear indication of an ultimate limit to experience it is more
promising than the preceding attempt. The problem with this, however, is its lack of
motivation. Yes, one could entertain this line of thought. But that would require prior
motivation. One would already need to have encountered the idea that perhaps conscious
life is not infinitely extended in time, but temporally bounded in some way. This line of
thought does not measure up to the way that birth factors into concrete experience. By
comparison, it is contrived and artificial.
The reason one takes one’s finitude for granted in everyday life is not due to a
reflection on the course of one’s development, resulting in a “transference of sense” of
the character of what can be remembered to what can no longer be remembered. It is not
one’s own development that one first observes, but that of others, and this sense is
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transferred to one’s own life. Thus, the question of one’s own development is already
motivated within an intersubjective or even generative perspective. The individual route
is valid, but only with the recognition that it is parasitic upon this more concrete
perspective.
The phenomenological “evidence” of my birth, my experiential connection with
that event, is one mediated by others.5 My parents, first of all, tell me about it when I am
very young, e.g., perhaps in preparing me for the arrival of a new sibling. This is an
intersubjective link of a very peculiar sort, which Husserl calls “generative.” Information
regarding that event is produced above all from parents, family, etc., who witnessed the
event, or at least who were around at the time of my coming into being. This generative
intersubjectivity is unique because it provides an experiential horizon that spans
generations.6
While it may seem rather obvious that this is how we learn about our birth,
Husserl’s appeal to generativity is more significant than this trite observation. He gives
this obvious fact a transcendental significance. That is, the connection to my birth
through the testimony of those whose existence stretches back beyond my own is
interpreted to be necessary for making sense of my existence and has an impact on how I
understand my experience as a whole. Without the generative connection, the inherent
feature of my past existence as a finite stretch of time could not be given to me (Hua Mat
VIII 168). It is primarily “from the outside” that one can find out that one’s birth took
place and consider “reconstructively” what its phenomenal features might be, its

5

Cf. Janet Donahoe (2004), 101.

6

For an extensive treatment of the notion of generative intersubjectivity, of which birth is just one
feature, see Steinbock (1995), Part 2.
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character as a subjective event, and likewise for early childhood more generally (Hua
XXXIX 467-468). But, to be clear, while this happens implicitly for everyone, it is
something only the phenomenologist explicitly works out in its transcendental meaning.7
The possibility is there for anyone to follow up and gain an awareness of, but it is rarely
in one’s interest to reflect on the transcendental implications of one’s interactions with
others.
The second problem of the apparently necessary infinitude of the temporal
existence of the transcendental subject is likewise resolved by appealing to generative
intersubjectivity. What Husserl claims in this regard is that temporality exceeds
egological or primordial time, the time of the individual transcendental subject. As he
says, “The time of the primordially reduced world… is by virtue of its essence not
infinite, since this [infinite] time coincides with this [primordial time] as a temporal
aspect [Aspekt-Zeit] of intersubjective world-time.” Husserl concludes on that basis that
“I, as a human, have a birth in the intersubjective world” (Hua XXXIX 467). Although he
calls this intersubjective time “worldly,” that should not be understood as implying a lack
of transcendental significance. “Worldy” here does not mean “within the world,” but
“world-constituting.”
Nam-In Lee, in his important work Edmund Husserls Phänomenologie der Instinkte
has given an interpretation of the “birth” of the transcendental subject that complements
this theory of the embededness of individual temporality within intersubjective
temporality while at the same time stressing the generative nature of the intersubjectivity
involved. Lee draws our attention to Husserl’s phenomenological transformation of

7

Cf. Lee (1993), 73.
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certain biological concepts to express this point in the texts on birth and early childhood
in manuscripts contained in the third volume on intersubjectivity (Husserliana XV).
There Husserl argues that we are born, we come into being as transcendental subjects,
within a horizon of sorts, which he refers to as an Erbmasse, conceiving of this as “an
empty horizon in the primal sense” (Hua XV 604). Although this term should be
rendered as “genotype,” in keeping with Husserl’s overt intent to make use of the
biological concept for phenomenological ends, he also intends us to see the notions of
heritage or inheritance in the word, whose close kin Erbe has exactly those connotations.
The idea is that the literal biological genotype serves as a clue for reconstructing the
beginning of the life of the transcendental subject (Lee 1993 164-165). Just as our
biological life begins when the genotype is produced by the fertilization of the ovum,
creating a unique combination of traits that are “passed on” from the parents, our
transcendental also life begins with an empty horizon that contains certain “primal
practical possibilities,” as Lee calls them, that we did not produce ourselves, but which
are inherited from our parents (Lee 1993 167-168). (We will discuss these in Chapter 5
under the rubric of “instinct.”) For our purposes, we can, as Lee does not explicitly do,
emphasize the temporal nature of this event, in which the transcendental subject is
relieved of the need to stretch back retentionally in infinitum. Instead, it links up
immediately, in the event of transcendental birth, to the temporal horizon of my parents
and what they have acquired in their experience, and mediately to others who in turn have
shaped my parents’ experience in various ways, including their own transcendental
beginnings (Hua XV 609-610). In this sense, the temporal nature of the individual
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transcendental subject does not imply an infinite past, since its life turns out to be a
“temporal aspect” of a greater generative temporal expanse.8

ǲǳǦ
Now that we understand why the paradox of worldly intentionality forces Husserl in
the direction of a phenomenology of a pre-world, we are set to directly address that
phenomenon itself. The pre-world differs from the lack of a world or the non-existence
of the world. Whereas the latter refers to the negation of the world, the former designates
certain very specific phenomena that have a positive relation to the world. This is often
the case when Husserl uses the prefix “Vor-.” He means to point out a precondition with
the specific sense of standing in a kind of teleological ordering. The world, ultimately, is
the “purpose” of the pre-world. That is why we have to emphasize that the problem of
the pre-world is really the problem of transcendental beginnings, which is just a moment
in the teleologically ordered whole of transcendental subjectivity, and therefore nothing
abstract at all.9
The entire experiential realm of the pre-world, which we can also simply call, as
Husserl often does, the realm of “pure passivity,” should be understood as the set of
experiences that one must undergo in order to motivate the experience of the world.
Anna Pugliese captures this well when she says that the instincts, a key ingredient to the
pre-world, “function as the genetic bridge between the lower and the higher dimensions
8

Although this settles our problem, it only shifts the problem of the finitude of temporality to the
generative level. Here as well there must be some way of comprehending the finitude of generative
temporality. Perhaps Husserl’s reflections in various late manuscripts on the sense of nature prior to human
consciousness are meant to address this problem. Husserl is aware of this problem and discusses it in Hua
XXXIX, text No. 44, §§2-3.
9

Cf. Sebastian Luft (2002), 192-193. Husserl makes this clear also in Hua Mat VIII, 223-224.
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of the ego.”10 Along with this development of the subject, there is a correlative
development of the world itself, which is the side that is of most interest for us. Husserl
says in this regard that “[t]he world itself therefore has a childhood and grows into the
mature world” (Hua Mat VIII 74).
As always, we have to keep clearly in mind what “world” means for Husserl. It
means specifically that horizon that consistently orders, preserves, and points ahead to
my experience of transcendent reality. The pre-world, then, refers to something distinct
from this order. It is the order of experience that does not yet put one in contact with
transcendent reality as a constant spatiotemporal schema within which objects are
presented in spatiotemporally schematized adumbrations.11 The pre-world is more
fundamental, as the realm wherein the organization of the raw elements of consciousness
first takes place so that it can have the higher order experiences of worldly intentionality.
The pre-world of pure passivity is, like the world horizon itself, a multifaceted,
well-ordered experiential whole, as we shall see in Chapter 5. It is basic, but not for that
reason either simplistic or chaotic. This is evident from the broad array of experiences
that qualify as purely passive (e.g., time-consciousness, sensory data, affection,
association, instincts, kinaesthesis, etc.) and the many senses that “passivity” itself has.
To give a rough, primarily negative indication of what counts as passive in the relevant
sense here, Husserl deems an experience to be passive when its occurrence and whatever
organization it may have happens without being a process deliberately produced by the
subject aiming to achieve some goal therein.

10

Anna Pugliese (2009), 142.

11

Of course, in the transfigured form of secondary passivity, much that is at work in pure passivity
carries over into worldly intentionality.
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The moment the one becomes actively involved in making sense of, evaluating, or
perhaps desiring to alter one’s experience, a complex set of interests and normative
standards (epistemic (Hua XI 83-87/126-130), practical (Hua XV 599-600), or ethical
(Hua XXXVII 248ff, Hua XV 404-405)) comes to bear on that experience. Given that
fact, the non-involvement of the subject in passive experience has the very important
consequence that it operates entirely beneath these higher-order normative standards that
Husserl gathers under the title “reason.” The pre-world requires a different set of
phenomenological tools revealing its own peculiar form of intelligibility, a quasi- or
proto-rational form that “mimics” reason, as Leibniz would say.
For Husserl, the lowermost level of consciousness, the most basic form of
experience, is that of original time-consciousness or “absolute” time-consciousness.
Time consciousness is one side of the pre-world. In fact, it is quite exemplary. Husserl
realized around 1909 that the experience of time goes deeper than the intentional acts in
which transcendent reality is experientially given. 12 For that reason, Husserl in some
places unhesitatingly refers to absolute time-consciousness as “pre-being” (Hua XXXIV
55-65). The deepest level of time-consciousness, absolute time-consciousness, is what
accounts for the temporal character of experience itself, in contrast to “clock-time.” It
“constitutes” intentional acts in their original form (i.e., as perceptual experiences) as
temporal, unfolding in a present instant continuous with a retained past and a protended
future.13

12

On the different levels of time-consciousness, see Hua X, especially §§34-36.

13

On the relation between absolute consciousness and the immanent experience it constitutes, see
Hua X, §§37 and 40.
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This is, however, a “mere form” or “abstraction” (Hua XI 128/173) making up “a
universal, formal framework, in a synthetically constituted form in which all other
possible syntheses must participate.” With this alone, the mere temporal form of
experience, we could never understand the genesis of intentional acts presenting
transcendent reality.14 Thus Husserl immediately follows the remark just quoted by
saying that “Still many other types of syntheses are transcendental in the special sense, as
apodictically necessary for the genesis of a subjectivity” (Hua XI 125/170-171). And,
confirming that he is in fact speaking of pre-worldly experience, Husserl criticizes Kant
immediately for the way his theory of experiential syntheses includes only experiences of
“an object that transcends consciousness.” What must be addressed first is “the problem
of the inner, the purely immanent objectlike formation and the constitution, as it were, of
the inner-world” (Hua XI 126/171).
The deficiency or abstraction of the formal analysis of consciousness is remedied
when we consider in addition the syntheses that work within the framework of timeconsciousness to create unities of “content” (Hua XI 128/174). This observation is what
will guide our study of the pre-world. What we will look at is the pre-world as a peculiar
way of organizing or synthesizing experiential content without yet putting us in contact
with transcendent reality in the way the world-horizon does. The organizational
principles Husserl discovers in this regard are those of affection and association, which,
as Chapter 5 will show, are refined and made more concrete when Husserl integrates
them into a theory of instincts to better explain the genesis of the world-horizon.

14

On the difference between passive temporalization (i.e., time-consciousness) and the other sides of
passivity, see Victor Biceaga (2010), 1-8.
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These general considerations should make clear that Husserl’s talk of a pre-world is
nothing philosophically vicious. It does not negate the world or give us a substantial
existence apart from the world. In a certain sense, although not in Husserl’s technical
sense, there is something very worldly about the experiences that make up the preworld.15 They are the very concrete experiences of the flow of time, the affective feel of
experience and instinctive impulse.16 This point can help us understand how Husserl
overcomes an exceedingly vexing problem.
Critics of Husserl frequently argue that Husserl’s is in error when he talks of
“immanent data” or immanent lived-experience as opposed to the things experienced,
which are in the world and, hence, “transcendent.”17 The critical backlash against
Cartesianism has led many to balk at any talk of an interior mental life divorced from
transcendent reality, which is apparently just what Husserl does when he talks about
sensory data and immanent lived-experiences. His view is taken by critics to be that the
mind begins turned completely inward, absorbed in its own immaterial mental life, and
subsequently finds the means to transcend this interior realm and reach transcendent
reality. And apart from that metaphysical difficulty, there is the problem of whether there
are phenomenological grounds for granting the existence of immanent lived-experiences
at all, given the apparently “transparent” character of intentional experience, as both
15

Pugliese (2009, 144-145) emphasizes this when she writes the following: “The primal child
[Urkind] appears to be a subject of its immediate relation to the surrounding world, a subject that lives prior
to every objectivation, prior to the polarization of subject and object. The subject in its childhood form
does not yet have objectivated experience, neither of things nor of itself. Its instincts grant it access to the
world without it recognizing these instincts themselves. As an unexperienced and completely directlyrelated ego, the primal child ‘has’ at bottom no instincts but those holding sway in it as its individual,
immediate world-possession [Welthabe].”
16

As Julio Vargas Bejarano (2006) explains, this bottommost level of experience is one “in which
the world and objects have not yet been constituted as independent objects. It is a primal sphere in which
kinaestheses, sensations, drives, instincts and original habitualities are involved” (158-159).
17

For a discussion of this problem and review of the literature, see Shaun Gallagher (2012), 82-89.
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Sartre and Merleau-Ponty forcefully argue. So it might seem that what Husserl
undertakes to do with his genetic analysis of the world-horizon is based on a
metaphysically and phenomenologically dubious premise, i.e., that the subject at one time
does not occupy reality, yet has the resources in its own mind to find a way there.
I will not try to defend Husserl’s view of sensory data and immanent livedexperience as it is found at every point in his extensive corpus, a task that in any case
may not be possible. What I want to suggest is that Husserl’s view of lived-experience
by the time he thoroughly integrates affection and then instinct into the picture avoids this
problem. In classic early texts like the Logical Investigations and Ideas I, Husserl
advances the view that the raw materials of consciousness, such as sensations and
feelings, are inherently meaningless (they are non-intentional, they are not per se
experiences “of” anything) and receive their meaning from interpretive acts performed by
the subject (Hua XIX 102-112; Hua III 171-175/203-207). Husserl’s phenomenology is
suspect to the extent that it relies on that tenet.
Yet Husserl alters his view on this point. Although the revision hangs specifically
on a refinement in his theory of affection (feeling), it has direct implications for his entire
theory of so-called immanent contents of experience. Whereas in the Logical
Investigations “feeling” is the archetypical instance of a non-intentional, meaningless
lived-experience, as affection it becomes the lynchpin for understanding all livedexperience as inherently meaningful. Affection is not something that is ever simply lying
before consciousness, there to be interpreted or “appraised,” as some contemporary
theories of emotion put it. It becomes the very condition of any conscious experience. In
any experience, one must first have some kind of affective interest in something in order
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to engage with it in a meaningful way. Even the simplest “turning toward” or
“advertence” (Zuwendung) of attention presupposes a preceding affective allure that
gives direction to the subsequently enacted advertence.18 This is but one instance of a
special class of intentional experiences, a truly “blind” intentionality that has directedness
due to affection and not due to the interpretive work of the subject (Hua XXXIX 317-318,
Hua XIV 333-335). Affection is not something there for consciousness to interpret or
make sense of, since it is now an integral part – always functioning or at work – within
any constituting experience.
If it is true that any experience whatsoever involves an affective component giving
the experience direction, then any occurrence of sensory data will likewise already be a
meaningful experience. No sensory datum can occur without having a meaning by virtue
of the affection that puts us in touch with it in the first place. Something similar is true of
kinaesthetic sensation as well, which Husserl at one point also characterizes as inherently
meaningless (Hua IV 57/62).19 But that cannot necessarily be the case if, as Husserl later
claims, the first experiences of bodily movement are driven by blind instincts that lack
“the presentation of a goal” (Hua Mat VIII 225-226, 326-327; Hua XV 329-330). Such
occurrences of kinaesthetic sensation surely do not need an interpretive act to have
meaning. Rather, they function straightaway as meaningful, even if in a very
rudimentary way.

18

See Hua XI, 162/210: “What is constituted for consciousness exists for the ego only insofar as it
affects me”; and also 163/211: “[W]e will hesitate in interpreting something unnoticeable as something that
does not exercise an affection at all… [T]hat something which was not there at all for the ego – a pure
affective nothing – should become an active something for the first time, precisely that is
incomprehensible.” I will explain this point at greater length in Chapter 4.
19

This is just what it means for Husserl to say that kinaesthetic sensations require corresponding
“apprehensions,” even if these differ from the apprehensions related to sensory data (e.g., visual, tactile,
etc.).
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More work is needed to adequately explain this novel understanding of intentional
experience advanced by Husserl in his later work. I will follow through on that in
Chapter 5. But this quick discussion should suffice to make intelligible how Husserl can
avoid the problem of drastically separating the pre-world of pure passivity from
experience endowed with the world-horizon granting it a certain kind of access to
transcendent reality. It is never the case that consciousness is presented with meaningless
sensations that fail to refer to anything. Feelings and sensory data (exteroceptive and
interceptive) are meaningful from the start. Exteroceptive (e.g., visual, tactile, etc.) data
always appear in the light of affection and interoceptive or proprioceptive (e.g.,
kinaesthetic) data by virtue of which the subject is meaningfully engaged with the former
(cf. Lotz 2007 43-48).
Now, admittedly, in the genesis of consciousness prior to the advent of the worldhorizon, this meaningful experience does not have the character of experiences of an
environing traversable space with stable objects encountered therein, as was mentioned at
the outset of this section. The subject at that point is therefore not in touch with
transcendent reality by means of the world-horizon, imbued with the precise sense of a
traversable space filled with spatiotemporally determinable entities. But in a more
primitive sense, these meaningful experiences do nonetheless confront the subject with
reality. The subject faces an environment, and certain things become prominent therein.
The environment is suffused with affective potential, e.g., to be comforting (a “feeling of
motherly security [mütterlichen Lebensgeborgenehit]” (Hua XXXIX 474-475)) or
distressing, an affective tonality that refers to the potential satisfaction of various needs
and desires and also includes the impetus for various action-like behaviors.
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A newborn may not have a world presented to it as a well-defined space for
deliberate action with recognizable entities, but it is nevertheless presented with, perhaps,
a warm, welcoming environment conducive for the satisfaction of its needs (e.g., nursing)
and desires (e.g., its curious exploration of that environment). This is the realm of
experience the pre-world is meant to capture. It surely deserves the title “reality” as
much as what one experiences once one is in possession of the world-horizon. Even if
Husserl persists in speaking of “immanence” and “immanent” data or lived-experiences
in this context, these expressions that easily lend themselves to misunderstandings should
not be taken to refer to a metaphysical no man’s land within the subject. The story of the
genesis of the world-horizon is not a tale about how we escape confinement within our
own minds, since, as I have just tried to show, we are never trapped there in the first
place.

 Ǧ
There is one final hurdle to be overcome before we begin the analysis of the preworld, namely, the problem of our access to the pre-world. One is legitimately concerned
about specifically phenomenological appeals to a realm of experience before and more
basic than the experience of transcendent reality. Phenomenology is supposed to be
confined methodologically to the description of things and events that we have some
manner of experiential access to. But we “mature” subjects, as Husserl likes speak, are
not faced with a pre-world. We are always in contact with a world, with transcendent
reality, and we have no memory of an experience of a pre-world, just as we have no
memory of our own birth (transcendental or otherwise).
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Indeed, not all phenomenologists are comfortable with phenomenological forays
into these depths that necessarily demand a break with actual experience and develop
instead constructions or, better, reconstructions. James Hart (1998) has been one
prominent voice against such a procedure, especially regarding the instincts, arguing that
it fundamentally breaks with phenomenological method and is, strictly speaking, not
phenomenology. Construction, for him, is a legitimate philosophical enterprise, but no
longer a genuinely phenomenological one. Hart maintains that reconstruction has a
distinct method from that of the phenomenological reduction insofar as it lacks “eidetic
and/or apodictic transcendental necessity” (108).
While Hart is correct to stress the significant difference that exists between the
classic Cartesian way of formulating the reduction and the way phenomenological
construction works, I think there is good reason to question whether it is really so
different as to count as a separate project eschewing the standards of eidetic analysis and
experiential evidence. In one manuscript Husserl is especially clear about the need for
the reduction and transcendental phenomenology to include an interpretation of events
like birth and death. The somewhat lengthy passage is worth quoting in full:
The transcendental “interpretation” of my natural world includes the
transcendental interpretation of this whole generative nexus, the whole
interpersonal nexus and its form of unity, human history. The transcendental
interpretation of birth and death belong here. All questions and answers relate
to the world of natural experience, of natural human existence [Dasein], [and]
therefore all sciences related to this world are also subject to transcendental
interpretation, the reduction to their transcendental sense. (Hua XXXIV 199)20
20

Cf. Hua XV, 583: “But if I now say that the whole of apperception with all ontic validities in
which there is an existent for me, in which a world exists for me in streaming change with everything
existing for me, is a pure object [Sache] of my subjective apperceptive life and my being as ego of this life,
if I say that even my human being [Sein] is an apperceptive formation [Gebilde] of mine included therein,
with all stages of childhood development up to maturity and in the broad periods [Stadien] of my mature
human existence [Daseins] then that forces me into the transcendental/phenomenological attitude and
method. In that attitude my mental immanence changes into transcendental [immanence], that is, my
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What Husserl is emphasizing here is that the reduction has to be followed through to the
most concrete and complex experiences, however enigmatic they are. The Cartesian way
brings the world to our attention “in one stroke” as a product of transcendental
subjectivity, but this claim has to be redeemed, the “horizon” it reveals has to be carefully
and systematically “disclosed” (Hua XXXIV 198).
Even if he never completely elaborates a method for dealing with the pre-world,
Husserl does demand that it have “evidence” (Evidenz), and he does claim that “we
should… gain essential insights, a priori conclusions concerning the eidetic possibilities
for the primal institution of the apperception of the world” (Hua XXXIX 492), even
suggesting that such possibilities may have apodictic necessity (Hua XXXIX 493). I will
briefly try to suggest how phenomenological construction falls in line with the eidetic and
evidential constraints of the phenomenological reduction. While Husserl makes use of
eidetic analysis and claims of experiential evidence in his constructions, it should by no
means be assumed that these are used in exactly the same way in all forms of the
reduction.
It is clear that Husserl understood the need to relax the requirement of apodicticity
in certain versions of the reduction,21 which was a consequence of important shifts in his
understanding of the nature of evidence beginning in the 1920s.22 Husserl even
mentions, in the Cartesian Meditations, that there are “modes of apodicticity,” hinting at
the complexity of the topic of evidence (Hua I 178/152). Thus Husserl does not abandon
mentally immanent streaming present [changes into] my absolute, transcendental [present]. Likewise, for
my internal mental development: My transcendental past and all levels of my transcendental 'childhood'
being with my particular correlatively constituted 'world' is implied in my transcendental present."
21

Cf. Sebastian Luft (2004), 209-211.

22

Cf. Donn Welton (2000), 278-283; Stefano Micali (2008), 83-86.
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the requirement of apodicticity. He refines it, limits it, and explores the variety of
experiential evidence at work in conscious life. A reflection on the phenomenological
reduction will bear this out.

 ǡ ǡǦ
I want to consider now the relation of genetic phenomenology, and that component
thereof dealing with the genesis of the world-horizon in particular, and the
phenomenological practice of reduction. Despite Husserl’s occasional loose references to
“the” reduction, performing the reduction actually refers to numerous interrelated
techniques. I want to pause and delve into these intricacies with the aim of determining
the place of the genetic analysis of the world-horizon within the whole of
phenomenological technique. This will clarify in general terms both the methodology
that it requires and the status of its results in relation to those of other results attained in
phenomenology. Following this line of thought will reveal the particular way that the
reduction(s) leads us into genetic phenomenology as a deepening of the transcendental
stance, wherein the problem of the pre-world is of central significance.

 
From the very early introduction of the technique of reduction in Ideas I, Husserl
maintains that there is not just one reduction. In that text he explains that
phenomenological practice is to be carried out in numerous reductions which together
form a “systematic doctrine of all the phenomenological reductions” (Hua III 115/139).
Despite the plurality of reductions, some undertaken and some merely projected, there are
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certain general characteristics of proper phenomenological technique that give the
practice of multiple reductions a kind organization and systematic coherence while at the
same time legitimating phenomenology’s transcendental stance.
The first trait is universality. Carrying out reductions has a universal aim. That
means they must cover the whole of mental life, all possible forms of consciousness.
This is achieved by making the radical and in principle distinction between the immanent
and the transcendent, or what belongs to consciousness and what belongs to the world.
This universal distinction is a hallmark of all forms of the reduction. It means not just
that there are two kinds of things that exist, which would be an unremarkable assertion.
It means that the two stand in a particular relation, an “a priori of correlation.” This
correlation is a constitutive correlation: Consciousness constitutes, the world is
constituted. Thus formulated, the validity of this distinction implies the validity of the
transcendental stance, since consciousness has to perform constitutive accomplishments
in order for the world to be given, to have any sense or meaning to it. Any blurring of the
consciousness/world distinction – like the psychologistic theories of logic or the
naturalistic accounts of the mind that so vexed Husserl – would amount to a compromise
of the transcendental stance.
The second trait of the reductions is that they disclose how this mental life
functions constitutively, providing precise details about how in each instance something
can be “given” to consciousness by virtue of certain lived-experiences. All manner of
constitutive functions are uncovered in this way, e.g., those having to do with perception,
interpersonal experience (“empathy”), and judgments about what exists, what is valuable,
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what is practical. These functions can form a system to the extent that one is sensitive to
the dependence (or “founding”) relations that hold among them.
Proceeding in this way is essential because it supports the pretention of
universality, allowing one to proceed from the simplest kinds of experience that depend
on no others (i.e., original time-consciousness) up to the most complex (perhaps the
“higher-order personalities” of social institutions), (ideally) leaving nothing out along the
way. The generic distinction between constituting consciousness and the world is made
in vain if it is not accompanied by analyses that show how the world is actually
constituted by consciousness.
To the extent that one carries out each reduction under the guidance of these
principles, one can justly speak in general of the various operations undertaken as the
practice of “the” reduction. There is, however, another sense in which there are multiple
reductions. As Husserl begins to show less than a decade after the publication of Ideas I,
one can do “the” reduction in more than one way. That is, the principles just described
are really somewhat loose parameters within which one can operate in various ways.
The way Husserl initially proposed (famously (more or less) repeated in the
Cartesian Meditations) comes to be called the “Cartesian way.” This way of doing the
reduction is supposed to be of singular pedagogical value because it allows one to
achieve the aim of universality in “one stroke” (Hua VI 154). It rests on a Cartesian
inference drawn from the observation that consciousness is essentially different from
things in the world (whatever sort of entities these may be). Things in the world are
always given in a piecemeal fashion. They are “adumbrated.” I see an object by
observing it from various sides. I secure a mathematical truth through a demonstration
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that requires multiple steps. Because such entities are necessarily adumbrated, their
givenness in consciousness is fallible. It is in principle true that further steps could reveal
error in previous steps. The same is not true of consciousness. What is adumbrated can
turn out to be otherwise, but not the adumbrations themselves. That I had such and such
a perceptual experience or reasoned in such and such a way will remain true even if the
experience turns out not to be veridical or the argument fallacious.
This move is universal in that it guarantees in advance the nature of any livedexperience or form of consciousness. Consciousness is absolutely (wholly, without
remainder) given. It is not given in adumbrations. No further investigation is necessary
to clarify the essential nature of consciousness. Universality is achieved at once, but at
the expense of gaining insight into the shapes constitution can take. The work left to do
therefore consists of a series of further reductions that fill in the details by exploring
determinate forms of consciousness, explaining their constitutive characteristics above all
(i.e., the details of just how they adumbrate things that are experienced).
Husserl never gives up on this way of doing the reduction. That is manifest from
its very late repetition in the Cartesian Meditations (1929), a text, moreover, intended for
mass consumption. Nevertheless, Husserl discusses other ways to carry out the
reduction. These alternate ways of performing the reduction differ from the Cartesian
reduction in being epistemologically (relatively) lax. As Robert Sokolowski (2010 1621) has argued, this is possible because Husserl distinguishes two kinds of evidence:
adequate and apodictic. The Cartesian reduction provides both forms, revealing
consciousness without remainder (adequacy) and beyond the shadow of a doubt
(apodicticity). The other reductions become possible when Husserl holds them to the
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standard of apodicticity without adequacy. They must compel one to the transcendental
stance, but not with the pretention of total transparency and exhaustive clarity.
Among these alternatives, Husserl proposes a psychological reduction in the
Crisis.23 Where the Cartesian reduction begins by achieving universality in one simple
step followed by an infinite series of steps that explicate the constitutive functions of
consciousness, the psychological reduction runs in the opposite direction. It begins with
a focus on the details of constitution, since intentionality is what is characteristic of the
mind, examining the variety of shapes conscious experience can assume. This focus,
consistently maintained, is transformed into a universal project to clarify all constitution.
Psychology – in the sense idiosyncratic to Husserl of the methodical description of
intentional experience from the vantage point of first person reflection24 – has
consciousness for its subject matter. Thus, the exhaustive consideration of its subject
matter is tantamount to the reduction. The shift from a compartmentalized, specialist
attitude to a thoroughgoing commitment to analyze consciousness as such in all its forms
– without either “taking a position” on the conscious subject matter or attempting to
naturalistically explain away its intentionality – achieves the profound shift from an
empirical stance to a transcendental stance (Hua VI 244-257, Hua XXXIV 107-109). The
psychologist who takes this turn, therefore, “has taken leave of the ground of the world”
(Hua VI 258), since consciousness is no longer just one entity in the world among others,
but the universal guarantor for there being any sense to the world at all. Even if its

23

See also Hua VIII, §§44-48. Cf. Bernet, Kern, and Marbach (1993), 72-75 and Welton (2000),

158-160.
24

See, for instance, the Amsterdamer Vorträge (in Hua IX) on phenomenological psychology, §3
(“The method of pure psychology (intuition and reflection). Intentionality as the basic characteristic of the
psychical.”).
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laboriousness presents a pedagogical challenge, this approach is attractive because it is
epistemologically more relaxed and puts concrete constitutive analysis at the forefront.
The same is true of another kind of reduction also proposed by Husserl in the
Crisis, namely, the “way into phenomenology… from the pregiven life-world,”25 also
called the ontological reduction.26 This reduction is formed under a Kantian influence,
and begins with the structures of the world and attempts to reveal the constitutive
operations of consciousness as the condition for the sense of such structures, similar to
the way Kant, in the Prolegomena, points to certain domains of knowledge (i.e.,
mathematics, the natural sciences) and argues that the contribution of consciousness (its a
priori “forms” and rules or concepts) are necessary preconditions for such knowledge.
But, Husserl argues, the transcendental perspective must reveal the contribution of
consciousness to the life-world (i.e., the world as directly experienced, with a “human
face”) more generally and not merely the world as viewed by the natural sciences in an
idealized way in order to be truly universal and, hence, transcendental (Hua VI 118-121
and 123-135).
This reduction, like the psychological reduction, is accomplished gradually. But
where the psychological reduction begins with constitution and runs with that theme, the
ontological reduction arrives at constitution indirectly by its reflection of the sense of the
ontological structures of the world, and runs with this until (in principle) all ontological
structures of the world have been constitutively accounted for.27 Then it lands, after its

25

This is the title of section A of Part III of the Crisis (Hua VI).

26

Cf. Bernet, Kern, and Marbach (1993), 69-72, Steinbock (1995), 79-85, and Welton (2000), 160-

164.
27

Cf. Hua VI, 171 (§50): “Although these headings [i.e., ego – cogitatio – cogitata] are inseparable
from one another, one must pursue them one at a time and in an order opposite to that suggested by the
Cartesian approach. First comes the straightforwardly given life-world, taken initially as it is given
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even more elaborate journey, at the same destination as the psychological reduction and
the starting point of the Cartesian reduction.

ǲ ǳ 

All of these forms of reduction are ways into the transcendental attitude. Yet none
of them have any obvious special light to shed on the issue of genetic constitution. In
fact, two of them are especially ill suited for that. The Cartesian and the ontological
reduction are carried out with a special kind of interest that especially precludes them
from getting into the genetic problematic. To see why, it is first necessary to state a
general truth about genetic phenomenology. Genetic phenomenology is interested in the
genesis not of things in the world, but the genesis of consciousness, of various structures
of experience. This forces a distinction within constitution.
There is, on the one hand, the constitution that makes possible various forms of
experience of the world. When one examines this kind of constitution, one is interested
in consciousness insofar as it constitutes the world. On the other hand, genetic
constitution is consciousness’ self-constitution, consisting of the transformations it
undergoes in acquiring new forms for experiencing the world. These transformations
also take place by means of certain conscious interactions with the world. Yet, to be
concerned with such constitution is to be primarily occupied with developments within
perceptually… When the new direction of interest is established, and thus also its strict epochƝ, the lifeworld becomes a first intentional heading, an index or guideline for inquiring back into the multiplicities of
manners of appearing and their intentional structures.”
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consciousness, which shed light on consciousness more than on the world, even if the
world is a part of the equation. Genetic constitution is thus primarily an intraconsciousness affair. It is due to this fact that the “ways to the reduction” tend to obscure
the problem of genetic constitution.
The Cartesian reduction misses the realm of genetic constitution because of its
epistemological pretensions. The motivation for this reduction is not just to lead to the
transcendental attitude, but to highlight the epistemological superiority of consciousness
over things in the world. Consciousness is known adequately, and things in the world are
known inadequately or fallibly. Due to this epistemological bent, the Cartesian reduction
has a one-sided view of constitution. Consciousness is defined exclusively by contrast to
things in the world. If this path is taken, one will learn much about the correlation
between consciousness and the world, but one will miss out on the constitutive relations
within consciousness. In other words, one will miss out on the whole of genetic
constitution. Indeed, the very idea that consciousness is itself constituted is anathema to
this reduction, since it only understands constitution as giveness through adumbration.
Saying consciousness is constituted would then be the same as saying it is like any other
thing in the world. The genetic constitution of consciousness, as we will see, is not
adumbration, but it is constitution all the same.
The ontological reduction suffers from essentially the same one-sidedness. It
begins from ontology, from the structures of the world, and discovers from there how
consciousness necessarily gives the world its sense. The motivation for this reduction is
to make sense of the constitution of the world. The work of this reduction is over when
one has considered all ontological structures of the world and found the correlative
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constitutive functions of consciousness. All that matters to inaugurate this reduction is to
transform the world into a phenomenon, to demonstrate that consciousness is needed to
constitute the world. That means it will not have anything to say about genesis, because
its sole aim is to make a claim about consciousness’ relation to the world. Intraconsciousness matters are unnecessary details that do not connect with the driving motive
of the ontological reduction.
One might suppose that psychology would include an account of psychological
development, so that the psychological reduction would make good on the deficiencies of
the others and become the methodological stance needed for undertaking genetic
analysis. And, of course, outside of the present context it is primarily within the field of
actual psychology that development is of interest. The psychologist cannot avoid the
empirical fact of that development: Children are born lacking the ability to exercise many
cognitive feats that adults perform as a matter of course. Gradually, they come to acquire
these abilities. Since each one of us began in the same way, the problem is a universal
one. Indeed, before Husserl himself ever took development to be a phenomenological
problem, he was familiar with it as an empirical issue for a “genetic psychology.”28 One
will not be surprised, then, that in his to-do list for phenomenological or descriptive
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Hua XXXVIII, 204: “It could be that at the beginning of psychical development sensations form a
chaos, [or] we [could] say better, form a loose unity in which, as concerns the intimacy of the connection,
no connection would be preferred over the others, and only in the course of “experience” <Erfahrung>, the
process, would [a connection] develop into an apprehension, [and then,] by means of the unity of
apprehension, fusion of the sensation into particular unities would occur in such a way that ultimately the
sensation has unity that is induced by the apprehension or through the process by means of which the
apprehension developed, but [which] does not simply consist of it. These two questions however belong to
genetic psychology. But it seems that the first question must be affirmed.”
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psychology, Husserl gestures at29 and explicitly includes30 the problem of development
and, hence, genesis.
Nevertheless, the psychological reduction does also exhibit the same one-sidedness
of the other two kinds of reduction. It is, after all, only interested in consciousness in
order to show that consciousness is a realm distinct from the world it constitutes. The
pattern that has emerged with the other kinds of reduction continues with this one as well.
This time the problem is not that it has some epistemological bias, as with the Cartesian
reduction, or that it has a subject matter that makes it entirely unnecessary to get into
intra-consciousness matters, like the ontological reduction. The problem has to do with
the fact that this reduction is a “way into phenomenology,” which has completed its task
as a reduction when it reveals the world as a phenomenon.31 Thus one cannot say
without qualification that the psychological reduction – or any of the others – puts us
straightaway in a position to study genetic constitution.

29

Hua VI, 239 (translation modified): “Here we construe the concept of a descriptive psychology
just as broadly as that of the other descriptive sciences, which after all are not bound only to the data of
direct intuition, but make their inferences to those things which cannot be made present as actually existing
through any actually experiencing intuition but which must be capable of representation through analogous
variations of intuition.”
30

Hua VI, 246 (translation modified): “Thus it appears obvious that a necessary universal reduction
has in advance the significance of a resolve henceforth to reduce all of men’s ways of behaving, one by
one, so as to describe scientifically… the psychic sphere of acts according to its empirical types… Will
anyone become somehow doubtful if we remark here that the notion of ‘ways of behavior’ must ultimately
include… all associations and also the variations of acts which can indeed be followed descriptively in their
obscured forms, sedimentations – and even all instincts and drives, not to mention the ‘horizons’?” See
also Hua IX, §§42-43.
31

Hua VI, 253-254: “The psychologist will naturally have to carry out the epochƝ and reduction
from his own vantage point…; he must begin with his original self-experience and his own original worldconsciousness… [H]e has original consciousness of all this, consciousness which, as reduced, is primary;
and it includes his world-consciousness in its flowing particularity and its historicity, with everything that
he attributes to the world and by way of spatiotemporality and content through his acts of meaning.
Through this reduction, this world… becomes a mere phenomenon for him.” Equivalently, Hua VI, 258
has it that: “But if the universal epochƝ, which encompasses all having-consciousness-of-the-world, is
necessary, then the psychologist loses, during this epochƝ, the ground of the objective world. Thus pure
psychology in itself is identical with transcendental philosophy as the science of transcendental
subjectivity.” See also Hua IX, 461.
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   Ǧ
The way to genetic phenomenology is indirect, and is at least one step removed
from the familiar “ways to the reduction.” What needs clarification, then, is the nature of
this remove. While the Cartesian reduction is an absolute dead end, insofar as it insists
on adequate evidence, either of the other two ways to the reduction may serve as a
springboard into genetic phenomenology.32 The ontological reduction, on the one hand,
leads indirectly to genetic constitution through a consistent “regressive inquiry”
(Rückfrage), and the psychological reduction finds its way their through its depth analysis
of consciousness as concrete personality. This indirectness is not at all a characteristic
unique to the project of genetic phenomenology, since Husserl often speaks of a need to
advance beyond the work of the initial reductions. They are means for taking up the
transcendental stance in the first place and not its consummation.
To give two other examples, the phenomenology of intersubjectivity (Hua I 124130/92-98; Hua VI 182-186, 259; Hua VIII 173-181; and Hua XXXV 103-110) and the
phenomenology of phenomenological practice itself (a meta-phenomenology) (Hua VI
186-189 208-210 and Hua XXXIV Beilage XII) only come about as the result of
secondary methodological maneuvers. Husserl will sometimes refer to these as more
refined ways of doing the reduction or epochƝ, rather than particular domains of
constitutive research. This ascription is entirely justified – one can justly speak of an
“intersubjective reduction,” for instance – and is likewise justified in the present case,
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I thus cannot entirely agree with Lee that it is the psychological reduction in particular that leads
to the genetic analysis of the instincts. For this view, see Lee (1993), 65. By the same token, I cannot
agree with Steinbock either, when he suggests that it is the ontological reduction in particular that leads to
genetic phenomenology. For his presentation of that view, see Steinbock (1995), 79-85.
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because a certain naïveté (analogous to the naïveté of the natural attitude that the different
ways to the reduction expose) requires shedding, leading one to view the whole of
constitution in a different light.
Husserl holds even in his earliest formulations of the nature of genetic
phenomenology that it has the potential to deepen our understanding of the whole of
conscious life, a potential that is implied in its task of explaining the “[l]awful regularities
that regulate the formation of apperceptions” (Hua XI 336/624), which amounts to
nothing less than a “‘history’ of consciousness” (Hua XI 339/627; Husserl 1969
278/316). Later, in the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl boldly claims that genetic
constitution reveals “universal laws of genesis” that “produce a unity of universal genesis
of the ego” (Hua I 109/75). Given this universality, it would be appropriate to say that a
genetic epochƝ – a dramatic change of attitude resting on critical considerations – follows
from the psychological or ontological reduction. It is equally fair to call this turn a kind
of reduction, since its entire aim is to redeem the claim of the ways into the reduction to
explain constitution.
It is not necessary to show that there are two separate ways of turning to genetic
constitution, one from the starting point of the ontological reduction and another from the
starting point of the psychological reduction. Indeed, the two are not so different. One
might even say that they are really the same, only with different emphases. It is not
surprising, then, to find that in certain early formulations Husserl lays out his
psychological reduction within the context of a reflection of the whole of ontology.
Husserl makes this move, for instance, in a manuscript from 1923 (Hua VIII 219-228),
which he titles “[The] way into transcendental phenomenology as absolute and universal
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ontology through positive ontologies.” The procedure in this case is to first begin with an
ontology of the world, highlighting, first of all, material nature and its essence. A second
step is to critique the evidence for this ontology, which amounts, naturally, to a critique
of “external perception.” The second step reveals that even an adequate reflection on
ontological concepts like “material thing” necessarily lead us to reflect on the nature of
subjectivity.
Husserl’s own summary of this “way into the reduction” is perspicuous:
[It is,] namely, the [following] way: [beginning from the] given world; the
universal ontology of the world with all particular ontologies leads to a universal
intuition of the world as an eidetic reflection on the world [Weltbetrachtung]…
In this way, nature leads to corporeality, to the psychical, to mental operations of
subjectivity [die geistig leistende Subjektivität], to the insight that subjectivity is
world-constituting, transcendentally absolute. (Hua VIII 225)

The ontological reduction only succeeds if it takes the “psychical” into account. One
reflects on ontological concepts, then, in critiquing these concepts, finds oneself in the
narrower project of an intentional psychology that, fully carried out, ultimately takes one
into the transcendental stance. In short, the only difference between the ontological and
the psychological reduction is that, whereas the descriptive psychologist is interested
from the start in intentional consciousness, when one theorizes about other ontological
regions one first has to discover their “insufficiency” (Hua VIII 223-224). Only then is
one referred necessarily to the subject matter of the descriptive psychologist and
subsequently carried over into the transcendental stance.
However one proceeds, the focus on constitution is essential. To get to genetic
constitution is then a matter of making a distinction within constitution. There are
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multiple possible motives for making such a distinction.33 One such motive (a rather
specific one, limited to a particular problem) was provided in Chapter 3. A more general
motive would be simply the need to draw out the implications of the fact that conscious
life evidently develops and reconcile that with the transcendental standpoint. This
development of consciousness has to be recast from its modest empirical beginnings in
the simple observations of the descriptive psychologist about individuals within the world
into a theory of how consciousness comes to constitute a world in the first place and of
the major transformations in which particular constitutive abilities arise. Genetic
phenomenology is really a matter of revealing the transcendental significance of events
commonly recognized in descriptive psychology (Hua Mat VIII 155).34 It lets us move
from asking about the general constitutive conditions for experiencing reality to asking
about the constitutive conditions of those very conditions, i.e., about how they can
possibly come into being.
33

For instance, Husserl introduces genetic phenomenology in texts like Hua XI and Formal and
Transcendental Logic in order to clarify the nature of evidence within the theory of judgment (e.g., Husserl
(1969), Appendix II, §§1-4). In other instances, Husserl will often engage in discussions of genesis without
considering the motive for doing so. This is typical of the texts collected in the C-Manuskripte (Hua Mat
VIII) and some of the texts in Hua XXXIX, where Husserl has a simpler, more elegant approach to the
static/genetic constitution distinction, but one lacking in motivation. In those texts Husserl speaks of two
broad steps of performing the reduction. First, one does an “Abbau-Reduktion” (Hua Mat VIII, No. 23,
394, Hua XXXIX, Nos. 26, 40). This is strikingly similar to the regressive procedure of the ontological
reduction, but with more systematic overtones. One takes the regional categories and gradually analyzes
these categories one at a time, beginning with the most complex and going back to the constitutively
simplest components, the hyletic data in the primal present. Then one is in a position to turn around and
ascend that same path in an Aufbau (Hua Mat VIII, Nos. 16, 17, 49, 74). This theme not only lacks
motivation, but also lacks concreteness, since it leaves out of consideration problems of
normality/abnormality and operates as if it is describing “consciousness in general.” Understanding the
Abbau/Aufbau analyses in this way, which seems the most natural, I have to disagree with Georgy
Chernavin’s view that the Abbau reduction itself is already a procedure of genetic reconstruction. It
certainly sets the stage for the latter, but surely one has not truly entered the field of genetic analysis until
one analyzes, in the Aufbau, the temporal linkages of the different strata first disclosed in the Abbau
reduction. See Chernavin (2011), especially 34-40.
34

I am taking a somewhat narrow perspective on genetic phenomenology due to the problems that
are presently of interest. Genesis is not just a matter of individual development. It is also about society,
whether it be the society of scientists, of practical agents, of ethical agents, of political agents, etc. This is
clear from texts like the Kaizo articles, the Crisis, and the “Origin of Geometry.”
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The attempt at such a reconciliation is signaled by Husserl’s frequent claim that
genetic phenomenology gives us a more concrete understanding of subjectivity, an
understanding that has to follow an initial, more abstract understanding carried out in
“static” terms. In one later manuscript, Husserl has problems of genetic constitution as
the final of four phases of carrying out the reduction (Hua XXXIX No. 13, especially 118120). The first is the initial “bracketing” of the world, drawing the great contrast between
the world as constituted and consciousness as constituting. A second step consists of a
critique of the (relative) apodicticity of various forms of consciousness. A third step
embraces the analysis of the correlation of consciousness and world, categorizing such
structures and clarifying the manners of givenness that comprise these forms of
constitution. These analyses are characteristically eidetic, and would encompass both a
comprehensive ontology and descriptive psychology. Lastly, in the fourth step one
tackles issues of genesis. This step is final because the others are its “presupposition”: “I
must first have the a priori of the static correlation in order to be able to inquire about the
‘genesis of this a priori” (Hua XXXIX 120).
The analytical blockage that keeps one from making this step consists of a special
naïveté. When one initially performs the reduction and takes up the transcendental
stance, there is a natural tendency to model that stance (i.e., the kinds of constitution one
takes into account) in the light of a certain picture of normal conscious life, of which one
is oneself, presumably, an exemplar. This picture, Husserl states, is one’s self-conception
as a “mature, normal, rational, scientific person [Menschen]” (Hua XXXIX 485; Hua Mat
VII 107-108).35 Even if the characteristic constitutive abilities embodied in this normal

35

At Hua XXXIX, 466, Husserl summarizes: “The initial path of the explication of the world as
world of experience abstractly reveals only one level. Experience as self-giving has in a necessary way the
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form of consciousness have some sort of privilege (i.e., as rational), it would be a serious
oversight to ignore other “abnormal” forms of subjectivity, such as infants and young
children, the mentally ill, animals, “primitives,” etc. Lacking an examination of such
forms of consciousness, not only is “the phenomenon ‘world’ not explicated in its full
concreteness” (certain “regional structures” belonging to the “psychical” are missing)
(Hua XXXIX 485), but the full transcendental community has not been accounted for
(Hua XV 612).36
Now, introducing the problematic of abnormality does not immediately lead to the
problem of genesis. The study of animals, “primitives,” and those who suffer severe
mental illness,37 for instance, does not necessitate that shift. The problematic of
abnormality is first a more general topic that can be approached statically (Hua I 108/74
and Hua XXXIX 478). Of course, it is only with infants and young children that the
developmental problem really shows up, although Husserl flirts in one manuscript with
the idea, perhaps only of metaphorical significance for Husserl, of a Leibnizian theory of
“involution and evolution,” of human consciousness emerging from animal
consciousness (Hua Mat VIII 169). The reflection on the “abnormal” periods of infancy
and early childhood open up a uniquely systematic inquiry when one takes note of the

significance of normality, at first the “normal person” [Menschen]. But horizonal [types such as that] of the
horizon of ‘abnormal’ people, the [horizon of] children, [and] finally [that of] animals also belong to the
ontic sense [Seinssinn] of the world. The inclusion of this as ‘intentional modification’ reveals [a] second
level.”
36

Hua Mat VIII, 395 is also to the point: “[T]he constitutive significance of animals is not to be
forgotten. As intentional modifications of world-constituting people in the first level of normality
[Normalstufe], they co-function in the further constitution of the world.”
37

Mental illness and other forms of abnormal experience do usually presuppose a preceding
condition of normality, so inquiring about such cases may lead to genetic considerations, but not
necessarily in the encompassing and systematic manner that taking infancy and early childhood into
account does. See Hua IV, 276/288. The psychology of personality in general can also lead to a less
systematic genetic inquiry (Hua IV, 270-276/282-289).
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obvious but curious fact that they are the predecessors of normality, that in conscious life
first there is abnormality, then normality.
That observation makes possible a special kind of static investigation within the
problematic of abnormality that expressly prepares the way for the analysis of genetic
constitution. This investigation concerns the “compossibility” of different forms of
consciousness (Hua I 107-108/73-75). The normality epochƝ within the reduction shows
that normal constitution is but one way of constituting a world. Analyzing normality and
its abnormal variants can then be considered in their compatibility. A single subject
cannot be both normal (i.e., rational) and abnormal (e.g., an infant, a non-human animal)
at the same time. These ways of constituting the world are mutually exclusive, since the
abnormal cases are missing (partially or altogether) something essential to normal
constitution, namely, full possession of their rational abilities. (That means not just
logical reasoning, but also, perhaps, practical and ethical reasoning.)
Likewise, normal consciousness inevitably lacks something present in abnormal
constitution. Non-human animals, for instance, have their own forms of inter-animal
relations and are guided by their own species-specific instincts (Hua Mat VIII 172). It is
more than likely that there are positive features to the conscious life of children and
abnormal adults, as well, that elude normality.38 Husserl at least recognizes that certain
individuals can be marked by a “facticity, in itself beyond our comprehension,” thanks to
which they see the world in a different way (e.g., “This child takes an original joy in
sounds, that child does not. One is inclined toward temper, the other toward patience.”
(Hua IV 275-276/288, translation modified)).
38

This is a point emphasized by Merleau-Ponty (2010) in his discussion of development (131-132),
and the idea also features in current empirical work on development. See, for instance, Alessandro Minelli
(2011).
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But, more interestingly, one can ask not only about compatibility at a given
moment, but also about compatibility over time, sequentially. In the span of one
conscious life, the consciousness of a non-human animal cannot give way to that of a
mature human, but that of an infant or young child can, and that of a mature human can
give way to that of any of a range of abnormalities peculiar to humans. Summing up the
principle behind this observation, Husserl states that “in a unitarily possible ego not all
singly possible types are compossible, and not all compossible ones are compossible in
just any order, at no matter what loci in that ego’s own temporality” (Hua I 108/174).
The turn to sequential compossibility is necessary because the various states of human
normality and abnormality are essentially phases, moments, periods within a life. Some
abnormal states have the sense of being periods of a life leading up to normal conscious
life, while others have the sense of being exceptional cases stemming from a prior normal
state. In short, childhood makes no sense without reference to “normal” adulthood, and
mental illness makes no sense without reference to normal or “healthy” mental life. The
eidetically derived concepts themselves point the way to the genetic investigation.
It allows one to arrange the shapes of abnormal consciousness into a series of
states that are not simultaneously compatible, but are sequentially compatible, yielding an
ontogenetic index for investigations into the genetic links and transformations from phase
to phase. This index will remain ambiguous for two reasons (Hua XI 339, Hua XV 608609). First, because we are only interested in general structures, like those implicated in
the abilities to perceive, remember, expect, evaluate, understand other people, intervene
practically in the world, etc. The index, for our purposes, will only include these sorts of
broad conscious abilities and leave out the myriad other details of what goes on in any
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factual process of cognitive development. The index will not reflect all the refinements
of these abilities or the development of other abilities not essentially connected with
these, let alone any individually idiosyncratic traits. Second, for that same reason the
index does not aim to track and reflect the actual timing of the development as an event
in the world. The only time that will count here is “immanent time,” which simply refers
to the general kinds of dynamic processes leading from phase to phase in consciousness
without any reference to the measurement of chronological time.
The turn to sequential compossibility finally brings us fully into the realm of
genetic constitution. Indeed, one of Husserl’s earliest and most important manuscripts on
static/genetic constitution puts great stress on how we get to genetic constitution when we
shift our interest to the concrete unity of conscious life (Hua XIV 34-42, appearing in the
English translation of Hua XI, 635-645). The task is to understand the general laws of
sequential compossibility, which just are the laws of genesis, the forms of genetic
constitution (Hua I 109/175). Now we can consider what is peculiar about genetic
constitution. Instead of being about the givenness of the world, genetic constitution is
about the relations between successive conscious experiences.39 And it concerns not
principally the dynamics of how particular experiences relate to one another over time,
but the dynamics at work in the emergence of types of experience, of whole structures of
conscious life (Hua XI 338-339/627). The relations or laws that govern such occurrences
are motivational laws. Relating this back to the problematic of normality, we can analyze
the sequential compossibility of these different states by discerning the possible relations

39

Hua XIV, 41, in the English translation of Hua XI, 644: “But attending to constitution [i.e.,
cognitive engagement with the world] is not attending to genesis, which is precisely the genesis of
constitution.”
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of motivation between them, “the relation of conditionality obtaining between the
motivating and the motivated” (Hua XIV 41/644).
Motivations are of essentially two types, namely, passive and active. Beginning
with the latter, which will not concern us further, Husserl gives some simple examples to
illustrate the nature of motivation in active genesis: “in collecting, the collection [is
constituted]; in counting, the number; in dividing, the part; … in inferring, the inference”
(Hua I 111/77; Hua XI Hua XXXI and Experience and Judgment).40 In all these cases,
one’s actions engender new constitutive possibilities. Laying out a series of wellunderstood premises motivates the inference of a certain conclusion. In a much different
context, there are certain motives within one’s life (the way one conducts oneself) that
might motivate an act of “ethical renewal” and self-transformation (Hua XXVII 29-33,
Hua XXXVII 244-258, 339-341). Or, again, there are particular practical endeavors (e.g.,
in architectural practices) that motivate the enterprise of geometry (“The Origin of
Geometry” in Hua VI 365-386/353-378). These are all characteristically active forms of
motivation because they are deliberate acts carried out with insight into the norms that
lead from the motivating terms to the motivated term(s).
Passive forms of motivation, by contrast, lack this deliberateness and insight into
norms. They are forms of indication embodied in associative experience, which we will
consider extensively in the following chapter (Hua I 113-114/80-81, Husserl 1973 7276). As an example, we can consider how the experience of one thing recalls another, or
perhaps points ahead to some anticipated experience. Motivations of this sort from one
experience to another are associative in that the similarity (primarily) or contiguity of the
40

The theory of purely cognitive motivation and genesis is developed more thoroughly in Hua XI
and Husserl (1973).
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former with the latter awakens one’s interest to include the latter or perhaps turn to it as
an exclusive theme. Associative motivation not only governs these small-scale events,
but also the large-scale ones whereby the faculty for memory or expectation, to keep with
the preceding examples, are first instituted by means of associative motivations stemming
from the perceptual present. The same is true, Husserl claims, for all passive forms of
intentionality (Hua XI 339/627, Hua XIV 38/640).
With both the various forms of human normality/abnormality as an ontogenetic
index and the general principles of motivation, one can conduct a systematic
investigation that will track the development of conscious life from infancy to maturity,
and perhaps developments of other abnormalities as well. All of this is carried out
eidetically and within the transcendental stance. In fact, what Husserl does in turning to
this problematic, as we have seen, is a necessary refinement and advance of the
reduction. Further, the problems that most occupy his attention within this new field of
eidetic and transcendental analysis are precisely the problems of the pre-world and the
decisive shift from consciousness that lacks the world-horizon to consciousness in
possession of the world-horizon.
Thus, in the brief, programmatic treatment of genetic themes in the Cartesian
Meditations, Husserl puts front and center questions about the sequential compatibility of
the consciousness of early childhood and that of maturity (Hua I 108/74), the problem of
“ultimate genesis” as answering to the traditional problems of the “psychological origin
of the ‘idea of space,’ … the ‘idea of a physical thing,’ and so forth” (110/76),
development in “early infancy” (112/79), the primal institution of the experience of “an
environment of ‘objects” (113/79-80), and the “realm of the ‘innate’ a priori, without
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which an ego as such is unthinkable” (114/81). These very same problems are also taken
as paradigmatic in the early manuscripts on static/genetic phenomenology (Hua XI
338/626, 345/634 and Hua XIV 38-39/640-641). They clearly form a central area of
concern within genetic phenomenology and transcendental phenomenology more
generally.

   
While the previous section showed that the problem of the pre-world within genetic
phenomenology fits squarely within the methodological rubric of the reduction and is
both eidetic and transcendental, the problem of the pre-world has not been adequately
dealt with until the specific phenomenological techniques needed for genetic
reconstruction are clarified. To begin those considerations, I want to show how the way
for phenomenological reconstruction is prepared in experience itself. For Husserl, the
phenomenological method of construction or reconstruction is grounded in the
reconstructive nature of experience itself. Access to our conscious life prior to our ability
to recall it is not inaugurated by the phenomenologist. Rather, the phenomenologist takes
experience as a starting point that already exhibits the tendencies that the
phenomenologist has to follow subsequently in more rigorous investigations disclosing
those tendencies.
Consciousness already has ways of dealing with domains apparently cut off from
and in principle inaccessible in their originality to it prior to the development of special
phenomenological techniques for accessing them. This is already manifest in the case of
intersubjectivity, in the experience of empathy in which I somehow understand that there
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is a being besides myself who is a subject of experience, although I cannot directly or
originally be conscious of this fact about him or her.41 I experience the another animate
being or person as a subject without experiencing the other’s subjectity per se, without
viewing it from within. Doing so is impossible since I always view others from my own
vantage point, one necessarily distinct from others’.
Despite that insuperable inaccessibility, we nevertheless come to understand other
people as subjects. Something in our conscious life motivates this way of understanding
our world without requiring us to reflect on it or make inferences about it. I believe that
the case of transcendental “birth,” early childhood, and the realm of the pre-world
generally are in basically the same position and allow basically the same sort of solution
that Husserl gives in the case of empathy, although with a temporal depth that is not
essential for understanding intersubjectivity in the first place.
We have to think of the experiential access to the pre-world similarly to how
Husserl describes our access to the other as an experiencing subject, namely, in terms of
apperception and appresentation.42 This is exactly how Husserl proceeds in one of his
more sustained treatments of the topic in the C-Manuskripte (Hua Mat VIII No. 96).
These terms refer to an experience involving elements that are directly given, but only in
connection with other elements that are not directly given. This is how things appear to
us as three dimensional objects, for instance. Only the side facing me of such an object

41

Husserl famously deals with this in the fifth meditation in his Cartesian Meditations. I am
omitting many important details in mentioning Husserl’s theory of empathy. I only want to draw attention
to the way the inaccessibility of the other’s subjectivity is resolved within experience, and not by the
phenomenologist, although the phenomenologist is the only one who understands this experience of
another subject in its transcendental significance.
42

Husserl presents these notions clearly in the Cartesian Meditations (Hua I, §50), in his discussion
of empathy. See also Hua XXXIX, text No. 40. Chapter 2 of Lanei Rodemeyer (2010) gives a lengthy
treatment of these concepts.

142

directly appears. Nevertheless, the experience is not of the side, but of the whole thing,
in a sense. The experience is of the whole thing because the sides not given are
appresented along with what is given. This appresentation consist of a tacit awareness of
the possible givenness of the other sides. Husserl believes that the case of events within
the pre-world like birth and early childhood has its own unique apperceptive structure of
givenness connected with non-givenness. Yet, as is also the case with empathy, the nongivenness involved in this apperception cannot be given originally.
The task, then, is to understand how what cannot be given is nevertheless motivated
and appresented in an apperceptive experience. What is unique about the pre-world and
the events taking place therein is its temporal depth. The familiar cases of the perception
of three-dimensional objects and the experience of empathy both occur within the present
and appresent something that is present. The pre-world, on the other hand, is an
extension of my past beyond what I can remember and an appresentation of that. To
appresent a past I have no memory of as my own means that the experience of the
phenomenal past is something that is open to modification.
Husserl both holds that the past has a fixed quality and that it has a certain
flexibility. It is fixed insofar as the particular events I can remember, provided I can still
remember them clearly, remain the same. Their content does not change (Hua XI 114116). Further, their place among the rest of the particular events I can clearly remember
and in relation to the present itself is also fixed (Hua X 53/55, 68/70-71). The past is also
flexible, in the sense that the further course of experience can change the sense of the
past. Husserl maintains there is a way that a present experience can alter the past without
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touching its contents. His discussion of modalization in the lectures on passive synthesis
provides some examples.
The modes of negation and doubt both involve an alteration of the sense of past
experience due to an event in the present. In the mode of negation, I have a certain
expectation of how my experience will go, but that expectation is disappointed (Hua XI
25-27/63-66). Something other than expected comes about. This present experience
gives rise to a “retroactive crossing out” of the retained experience of certainty leading up
to the disappointment. Afterwards, I do not remember (first of all, in the sense of
retention) these as certain, but as misguided (Hua XI 30-33/69-72). This is what we
might call a “noetic” modalization. The content and order of the experience are not
changed, but the character of certainty is modified.
The mode of doubt is similar. In doubt, I first experience something with certainty,
and a subsequent experience calls that certainty into question, but without outright
disappointment. Instead of presenting something new and different than expected with
certainty, my present experience only leads me to question whether I really accurately
understood the previous experience. I realize now that what I just experienced could be
understood in multiple ways, and I am not sure which is correct (i.e., whether I just saw a
mannequin or a person) (Hua XI 33-36/72-75). Here certainty is lost and the content is
modified in a sense. The ultimate content (the sensory appearances) remains the same,
but what the content is supposed to present comes into question, and it can even change if
I take notice of a more enticing possibility that differs from my prior understanding of
what I was seeing (Hua XI 42-43/81-82).43 The content is fixed in the sense that the

43

I think it would be accurate to call this a “noematic” modification of the past. Although Husserl,
especially in his early work, seems to suggest that the ego of itself is able to interpret sensory data, it is
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appearances do not change, only what they are supposed to be appearances of changes,
which is decided not simply by appealing to the character of the past appearances, but by
their relation to subsequent appearances.
Something like that must be the case with the apperception bringing the pre-world
in contact with my experience within the world-horizon. A present experience must
occur that motivates a modification of the past. This experience can occur in the form of
my parents or others informing me about things I did or how I behaved as an infant or
very young child. Besides this, Husserl states that “the external observation of others, of
adults, then of children, infants, etc., can give indications” (Hua XXXIX 476-477, 480).
What other people tell me about myself and I naturally assume about myself based on
observing others together make up the primary motivation for the modification of my
past to include a pre-world, a transcendental “birth,” and very early childhood.
The way this modifies the past is very different than the modes of negation and
doubt. The modification has two moments. First, “new content” is added to my past. I
now include in my past the events that others tell me took place, regarding things I did or
ways I behaved (Hua Mat VIII 439-441). I also include whatever I come to learn about
the typical behavior of fetuses and young children, inhabitants of the pre-world. This is a
process in which, Husserl says, “I remember myself in others,” in which I “quasiremember myself ‘in’ their memories, and in a mode of ontic validity that permits
demonstration precisely as a mode of presentifying experience” (Hua XXXIX 501). In
other words, this information I gather about myself from others has all the validity of any
clear from his later work that the meaning of sensory data is not exclusively or necessarily imposed by the
subject, but is something that can arise from the associative interplay between an affectively attuned subject
and sensory data. So, for instance, I might not resolve the doubt myself about how to interpret the sensory
data, e.g., as a mannequin or a person, but the context will motivate me to one interpretation over another,
e.g., if I am looking into a clothing store after hours.
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statement another expresses to me in good faith, having its certainty mediated by
another’s credibility. But because I “presentify” what I hear as my own experience, it is
not like just any piece of information. It is supposed to stand in the unity of my life
(which, importantly, imposes certain broad constraints on such information)44 as
involving behavior ascribed specifically to me. Husserl refers to this unique experience
as memory “as if” (Hua XXXIX 501, Hua Mat VIII 167).
Second, this addition of new content has the consequence of modifying the sense of
the experience of the past that I can clearly recall. Everything I can clearly remember
now has the sense of an experience that follows and is consistent with the newly acquired
stock of past experience.45 Husserl’s example of the apperception of a deer track is
perhaps helpful for illustrating this modification of sense (Hua XXXIX 411). The
difference between my past without the pre-world and my past with the pre-world is like
the difference between my experience of a deer track when I am totally ignorant of the
existence of deer and how animals leave tracks and, on the other hand, my experience of
a deer track with that knowledge. The distant past informs our understanding of the more
recent past and the present, and the latter have a very different meaning without the
former.

44

This seems to be the upshot of Hua XXXIX, 479. There Husserl argues that whatever I discover in
a construction will still be within the constraints of what I can conceivably be like, i.e., within the limits of
an eidetic variation of myself as “the transcendental ego of a world that is my environing world.”
Incidentally, this passage is also important because it suggests that phenomenological constructions are also
in line with transcendental phenomenology in being eidetic disciplines.
45

This seems the be the meaning of the following remarks about the accessibility of a past that
cannot be remembered from Hua Mat VIII, 440-441: “But even if I appresentatively take over the past of
another and of everything that I gain through it in worldly terms [weltlich], [I] gain, I possess [habe] in a
normal manner the unity of harmoniousness [Einstimmigkeit] and [I possess] what [is included] in the
ability to have a conviction again, the ability to verify or even to correct.”
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What this shows, I believe, is how construction or reconstruction begins in
experience before one takes any special analytical interest in one’s immemorial past and
that this tendency within experience is a precondition and basis for subsequent
phenomenological investigations. Earlier in this chapter, I suggested that the finitude of
the subject’s past cannot be determined from the perspective of the individual subject
alone, but requires motivation stemming from intersubjectivity. What we have just
considered shows how that motivation arises.
While this reconstructive experience in one sense takes us beyond the realm of our
“original” experience, it does so by broadening what can be included in our experience,
just as in the case of empathy. What the phenomenologist is then able to do is take this
experience and elaborate it more fully, and draw consequences that are implicit in it, as is
done, for instance, by careful psychological observations of infant and even fetal
behavior that shed more light on the sorts of experiences they must be undergoing.

ǲǳ  
There is also a certain motivation “from within” that necessarily supplements these
external observations (Hua XXXIX 476). (We briefly encountered this already in Section
3.2.) I observe, for instance, that I have various cultivated abilities, but I have no
recollection of how they arose. For example, my ability to speak, to use my body to get
around, etc., are all abilities whose formation lies in my obscure, inaccessible past. But
these abilities apparently have the character of products. Given that abilities are just a
certain form of horizonal consciousness of practical possibilities, we already know from
Chapter 3 that such possibilities are essentially products of intentional acts.
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Since I do not have direct access to the experiences that produced them, I
“analogizingly” interpret these abilities along the lines of other habits or patterns of
behavior that I do remember consciously cultivating in myself. Ultimately, there is good
reason to think that all or most of these habits and abilities have their roots in instincts, in
“innate” abilities. I even have access to some such instincts “from within.” The
development of sexual behavior, the sudden appearance of tendencies toward sexual
behaviors that I did not bring about in myself, during puberty is a good example. While
the way we conduct ourselves with regard to these instinctive origins is guided in
advance by societal norms, having the urge itself that takes on that social mediation is a
paradigmatic instinctive happening of significance for conscious life.
I can even perform eidetic analyses of experiences like instinct, affection and
association in this way that contribute to the phenomenology of the pre-world. Husserl
suggests how we might do this by exposing a kind of naïveté in eidetic method. Eidetic
method is usually performed under the assumption that it will reveal the essence of an
experience of the form ego-cogito-cogitatum, i.e., of an experience that belongs to an
ego, has its own immanent content and presents a transcendent entity. But, Husserl asks
rhetorically, “Can I not proceed differently, so that this commitment indeed forms the
beginning, but is later overturned?” (Hua Mat VIII 353) Indeed, he thinks we can, and
that failing to do so is the result of a peculiar kind of “prejudice” (Hua XXXIX 492).
The commitment is overturned when we discover experiences, cogitationes, that
appear without presenting objects or involving the ego. Husserl names, in particular, the
experience of affection and the experience of a certain sort of “background,” a horizon
that factors in experience with a minimum of affective force, as what is furthest removed

148

from one’s attention. This radical variation discloses the various elements of the preworld as mere possibilities. It is the job of genetic phenomenology to take the analysis a
step further by showing their sequential interrelations, and what follows in experience
starting from these most basic components.
Although all of our actual experience is “worldly” (i.e., it puts us in contact with
transcendent reality within the world-horizon), in phantasy we can strip away the
specifically worldly character of experience and discover experiential possibilities, like
those limit cases of an experience with no affective allure for the ego or an affective
lived-experience that does not relate to transcendent reality. Such possibilities are not
empty ones, they are not pure fictions. They are possibilities “that must be drawn from
transcendental factuality [Tatsächlichkeit] and its possibilities,” i.e., that they “refer to
actual facts of the same apperceptive type,” even if we have no determinate recollection
of the actual facts (Hua XXXIX 492-493). These insights are, in fact, the results of
Husserl’s method of destructuring (Abbau) consistently carried out.46
As James Mensch (2010 224) notes, what forces Husserl to these considerations is
the fact, which gains increasing importance for his work, that conscious experience is
necessarily “embodied” experience, as we now put it. If the life of consciousness is
shaped in important ways by its embodiment, this should set the phenomenologist’s
agenda. Then the phenomenologist has to determine the peculiar ways that bodily events
inform experience, and give careful descriptions of these experiential domains. And one
of the primary ways the body shapes experience, Husserl recognizes, is through drives or
instincts and our affective life generally, which to an extent we can explore from within.

46

Cf. Roberto Walton (2010a), 135-136.
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This approach is insufficient, we have seen (Section 3.2), insofar as it sheds no
definitive light on our finitude. It is in relation to others that one learns about one’s own
development and begins to reflect on it. What the approach “from within” does provide
is a rich, concrete experiential domain to explore in its own right and to use as a clue and
guide for working out the essential life-history of consciousness from out of the preworld revealed in generative intersubjectivity. Here, the evidence is even apodictic, as
Alice Pugliese has argued,47 and the eidetic constraints within which the construction
must work are revealed can be worked out as clearly as anywhere else (Hua XXXIX 475).
The two motivations must function together for an adequate account of the preworld.48 It may be from within intersubjectivity that one first gains a sense of genetic
problems as such, but each one must ultimately be ratified from within (Hua XIV 335336). It would make no sense if I was told my mind was once constituted in a way that I
can have no insight into at present, or if I were to draw inferences about my past life on
the basis of the radically unintelligible behavior of others. At any rate, those would be
phenomenological dead ends. The analysis “from within,” from the individual subject’s
standpoint, follows through the task given it “from without.” It must exhibit all the
possibilities suggested from without as one’s very own possibilities viewed from within.
Attempted constructions or reconstructions along these lines faces two imposing
constraints that keep one’s analyses within the transcendental and eidetic confines of
phenomenology proper.

47

Anna Pugliese (2009), 148-149.

48

See, for instance, Hua Mat VIII, 169-170, where Husserl also approaches this problematic
conjointly “from without” and “from within.”
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CHAPTER 5
From Pre-World to World

 
Chapters 3 and 4 have now sufficiently prepared the way for a genetic analysis of
the world-horizon by showing that such a genesis is necessary and how, in very general
terms, it is phenomenologically feasible to dig deeper than the world-horizon. The task
now is to consider how the passive experience of association plays a role in the genesis of
the experience of transcendent reality, the genesis of the world. Although the entirety of
the pre-world is the necessary experiential presupposition for the experience of the world,
we only need to examine the aspects of the pre-world directly feeding into the production
of the world-horizon. We will therefore not plumb all the depths of the passive
experience of association. For instance, Husserl maintains that something must be said
about the unity of the various sensory modalities (Hua XI 137-138/184-185, 145148/193-195). While that unity is certainly a necessary presupposition for my account, I
will leave it to the side in order to deal thoroughly with matters more intimately related to
the genesis of the world-horizon.
The genetic account of the world-horizon begins with Husserl’s theory of affection
and association. These are Husserl’s initial theoretical tools for tackling problems of
passive genesis. With them we gain greater insight into how consciousness can begin
with the simplest experiences of “advertence” to some present sensory excitation and
subsequently pass to more complex forms of experience like memory and expectation.
The many successive transitions and complications, especially within Husserl’s genetic
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analysis of memory, correspond to the development of the subject’s constitutive abilities,
which increasingly come to resemble those required to initiate intentional acts within
horizons.
The crucial theoretical breakthrough that will allow us to grasp the nature of the
transition from the pre-world to the world-horizon is Husserl’s reworking of his theory of
affection and association into a theory of instincts. It is the instincts, especially our
instinctive curiosity and bodily instincts, that are the real driving force bringing about the
transformation of the passive experience of the pre-world into active experience engaged
in the world. As a result of the work of the instincts, the body becomes an instrument of
perception, a system of abilities that constitute a world-horizon and that issue in
intentional acts that present transcendent reality.

  
We cannot begin the analysis of associative experience without first introducing the
notion of affection, which is the motor of all associative genesis. Affection is the passive
phenomenon par excellence. It is the paradigmatic instance of an experience one
undergoes rather than deliberately sets in motion. At this level, affection cannot be
understood as a sensation caused by a transcendent object or even a sensation of
something happening within the body, objectively conceived. Surely, it gets that
interpretation in higher levels of conscious life, but affective experience completely lacks
that sense at the level of pure passivity, where it is an “immanent” lived experience.1 As
“immanent,” we must conceive of the function of affection prior to the experience of
1

For a discussion of the higher-level intentional acts pertaining to the feelings (Gemüt), see Thomas
Vongehr (2011), 343-354; Ullrich Melle (2012), 58-62; and Nam-In Lee (1998), 108-111.
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transcendent reality. Husserl holds that affection is a sort of feeling, and that “feeling
is… egoic,” meaning it is not attributed to objects or even attributed as a property of
sensory data (Hua Mat VIII 351).
Affection is the immanent passive phenomenon of the subject being stimulated or
excited by phenomena – originally, “hyletic” or sensory data – so that it takes notice of
them (Hua XI 148/196). Affection is what originally motivates the one’s attention toward
sensory data. The affection exerted by the sensory data has, Husserl says, a valence, as
either a pleasure or a pain (Hua Mat VIII 318). Thus, affection not only motivates one’s
“advertence” (Zuwendung) and attraction, but also one’s repulsion from certain sensory
data. In either case, even in repulsion, the sensory data catch one’s attention (Hua Mat
VIII 341).
In developed conscious life, these experiences can give way immediately to
intentional acts, but there are more basic functions affection can have than that. Prior to
the initiation of an intentional act, the subject is not completely inert, but responds to its
affective experience after a manner (Hua Mat VIII 341-342, 350). The key difference
between the two kinds of response (i.e., active and passive), as mentioned in Chapter 4, is
whether there are well-defined norms (epistemic, practical or ethical) governing the
fulfillment of an intentional act in play or not.2 The “passive” response to the sensory
data lacks these norms informing its response. At the most basic level of pure passivity,
the response merely consists in the sensory data catching one’s attention, motivating one
to take the sensory data in view (Hua XI 84-85/127-128, Husserl 1973 103-106).

2

In one manuscript (Hua XV, 348) Husserl makes the general claim that “Every self-giving [i.e.,
fulfillment of an intentional act] is norm-giving [Rechtgebung].”
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There are important qualifications that must be added regarding how the sensory
data exert this affection on the subject. Husserl makes a distinction between the way we
sometimes think, or at least the way he sometimes does, about how feelings take place
and the way affection occurs. Often we think of feelings occurring subsequent to the
presentation of an object. For instance, I see photograph and then have a nostalgic
feeling about the photograph. Husserl argues that this is not how affection works. It is
not as though the sensory data are first presented to one and later on engender an
affection. The affection is what first motivates the subject to interact with the sensory
data (Hua Mat VIII 319). According to Husserl, “one cannot say: The hyletic datum
exists prior to the turning toward and has a pleasant characteristic by virtue of which it
[subsequently] awakens my curiosity” (Hua Mat VIII 324).3
Rather, he maintains that “the ego is affectively present with [bei… ist das Ich
fühlendes] every content in the nexus of content and with the entire nexus of content”
(Hua Mat VIII 352). Affection precedes engagement with what excites it because it is the
very condition for the subject taking notice of something. It is impossible to imagine
sensory data appearing and then affecting it because only what interests the subject, what
has some sort of affective impact, appears to it in the first place.4 Husserl captures the

3

He goes on to say: “The datum is present for me before that [vordem] [i.e., before the subject’s
curiosity is awakened] precisely as affecting.”
4

Husserl wavers on this point. This is evident both in Hua XI (§§32-35) and in Hua Mat VIII (188189), where he is explicit about having considered both options. But, as James Mensch (2010, 216-219)
has argued in the case of Hua XI, Husserl ultimately prefers the view that nothing is constituted prior to
affection. Anthony Steinbock, the translator of the English version of Hua XI, seems to concur. See
Steinbock, “Translator’s Introduction” to Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, xlvii-xlix, and
Steinbock (1995), 153-155. See also Victor Biceaga (2010), 38-41. In Hua Mat III, he parenthetically says
he had held the opposite view (“We would have said there [that] not every prominence is affective”) at the
time he was writing the Bernau manuscripts, but can no longer hold to it (all of “[s]treaming life… is
subject to… primal association as ‘passive’ temporalization”, or, shortly before this parenthetical remark,
“affection is not externally superposed [aufgelagert] on the particular preont[ic] experiencing [Erleben],
but [occurs] as its egoic mode” (189)). Husserl is perhaps referring to his remarks in the Bernau
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intimacy and ubiquity of the experience of affection when we describes it as “an affective
presence [fühlendes Dabei-Sein] of the ego with” what interests it (Hua Mat VIII 351).5
Furthermore, affection is not first of all the isolation of some particular sensory
datum or group of sensory data. The subject is affectively related to the whole field of
sensory data. Affection is just as much a condition for particular things that attract one’s
attention to appear as much as it is a condition for what fails to catch one’s attention to
appear in a way, as remaining in the background or at the margins of experience. That
observation requires us to differentiate the affection pertaining to the whole field of
sensory data and the affection of the particular sensory datum and groups of sensory data.
At the genetic limit, we can conceive of a “primal affection” (Uraffektion), as Husserl
calls it, an experience of the field of sensory data in which nothing stands out and the
subject “still has no ‘interests’” (Hua XXXIX 483).6 (Husserl sometimes uses the
example of dreamless sleep to illustrate what he has in mind here.) In that case, the one
is affectively related to an undifferentiated whole of sensory data that do not manage to
provoke one in any way.7 Such an affection has a “null of alluring force [Reizkraft],” one
that does not urge one to any kind of response (Hua Mat VIII 191).
Out of this limit experience, particular affections emerge, to which one pays heed.
This occurs when a “prominence” (Abhebung) arises in the sensory data and stands out
affectively from the other data. The prominent sensory formation exerts a more powerful
manuscripts in Hua XXXIII, text No. 15. For a clear statement of the alternate reading of Hua XI, an
admittedly very complex and meandering reflection, see Joseph Kockelmans (1996), 76-77.
5

Cf. Hua Mat VIII, 273, where Husserl speaks in passing of the subject’s relation to the sensory
field as “the unity of a conscious possessing with feeling [gefühlsmässigen Bewusstshabens].”
6

Cf. Hua XXXIX, 422: “We therefore have to distinguish between the ego prior to any apperception
(a limit-idea), the ego that stands at the beginning of genesis, and the ego of apperception of various
levels.” Among these apperceptions he includes even the simplest case of “turning toward” (Zuwendung).
7

Cf. Roberto Walton (2010a), 137-138.
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affective allure that actually catches the subject’s notice due to its contrast in relation to
other sensory data. Husserl illustrates this by referring to cases of a sudden flash (e.g.,
lightning) or a loud noise (e.g., thunder) (Hua XI 150/197). In both cases a certain
prominence in the visual or acoustic field immediately attracts one’s attention.
It is important to note that it is not the mere “material” features of the data that
cause the affection, since, as we just observed, we are always related to data through
affection and affection is never simply added to material that is already there. Neither the
flash nor the boom inherently requires one to pay heed to it. It is on the basis of a change
of affection and the affective interrelations of these prominent sensory formations with
the other sensory data that the affection is motivated. It is the flash in an otherwise dark
sky or the boom in an otherwise quiet night that engenders a truly compelling affection.
The dark sky has little allure in itself. As Husserl says, “the single datum is dependent
upon the others for its affective force” (Hua XI 150/197). The sound of rain at night also
gives little to attend to, and tends to be experienced as ambient noise. On the other hand,
the new occurrences, against those backgrounds and their “background affection” (Hua
Mat VIII 340, Hua XXXIX 42), have the greatest motivational force.8
There are two important distinctions operative in these observations about
affection.9 First, there is a distinction between actual affection and the tendency toward
affection (Hua XI 148-149/196).10 One prominent sensory formation actually catches my
attention and affects me in the strict sense, while I ignore other sensory data. They,
8

Cf. Hua Mat VIII, 351: “[T]he particular content as part of the whole hyletic-imminent (the
constituted) sphere is also a part in terms of feeling [gefühlsmässig]. The part is prominent and [is
prominent] as the component part of a fusion and a particular configuration therein. If the configuration is
different, then the same part also has a different part-characteristic, relation-characteristic.”
9

Husserl had already arrived at these distinctions by the time of his lectures of perception and
attention in 1904/1905. See Hua XXXVIII, 115-116.
10

At Hua XI, 162/210, Husserl maps this distinction onto that of givenness and pregivenness.
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however, still have an affective force, only a weaker one. Once the boom of the thunder
has passed, I become occupied with less alluring sensory data present in the field. Thus,
they are tendencies to affect, simply waiting for the appropriate conditions in which they
would affectively stand out the most.
Second, within affective tendencies, we have to distinguish various gradations of
affection. It is not the case that affection breaks down into that which catches my
attention and an undifferentiated background. The background itself is a mass of sensory
data with varying degrees of affective force, which leads Husserl to attribute to it “a
relativism of affective tendencies” (Hua XI 150/197). In the case of lightning in the night
sky, the sky consists of appearances of very different affective value, ranging from the
extreme of the lightning flash, to the moon, the stars, the passing clouds, the black sky
itself, etc.
Even these examples are still quite abstract. When we take time-consciousness into
consideration, matters immediately become more complex. The above examples of the
boom and the flash are confined to the immediate present. Indeed, this is the proper place
to begin because “[t]he primordial source of all affection lies and can only lie in the
primordial impression” or the immediate present (Hua XI 168/217; 173/222). In other
words, what occupies us above all is our immediately present experience. It takes a
strong motivation to pull our attention out of the present and direct it to the future or the
past, and Husserl argues, as we will see, that this motivation arises out of the present,
which “transfers” its affective efficacy in the direction of the past or future. Straightaway
when something has “passed” from the immediate present it loses its affective force, and
the further something is removed from the present, the less affective allure it has (Hua XI
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167-168/216). This continues to the limit of the “empty retention” that does not stand out
at all (Hua XI 170/218).
Already at this level, by simply taking note of the intricacies of affection, we have
something like proto-objects and proto-horizons. What affects in the strict sense, what
becomes prominent, is an “objectlike formation” (as Steinbock has usefully rendered
Husserl’s Gegenständlichkeit in his translation of Hua XI). It is far from being a proper
object, but it has the primitive beginnings of an object, it is a unitary formation that is
“alien to the ego” (ichfremde) (Hua Mat VIII 183).11 Similarly, the affective tendencies
that fall by the wayside are horizon-like. Although they do not rouse one’s interest, they
are “not nothing” (Hua XI 164/213) because they count as possible prominent sensory
formations of which one is tacitly aware but does not presently have enough interest to
attend to in their own right. Husserl also hints at this connection when he identifies mere
affective tendencies as “pregiven” and, in another place, as something conscious as
“implicit” (Hua XI 174/223), which are characteristics closely associated for Husserl to
horizonal consciousness (Hua XI 162/210).

  
Fully emphasizing the distinct form of intentionality of affection will now help to
see how the regress of worldly intentionality will ultimately be resolved. Affection can
be reduced to neither horizonal intentionality that makes up our general schemata for
engaging with reality, both on the side of its typical structures and the corresponding
11

In the cited text Husserl says “Every ‘lived-experience’, taken concretely, is two sided, [having
an] ego-side and [a] side of what is alien to the ego [des Ichfremden], [a] stratum of the allure of the whereto [Woraufhin] (form) and [a] stratum of the ‘content’, that on which the allure or goal is exerted here: the
unity.” This is repeated nearly verbatim at Hua Mat VIII, 189.
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typical ways that we engage with it, nor the active intentionality (of what I have been
calling intentional acts) that is how we meet the world in particular, deliberate
interventions focally aimed at particular objects, goals or events. (Of course, it has to be
remembered that even though horizons and intentional acts are distinguishable, they are
not separable, as Chapter 3 explains.) It is a distinct kind of intentionality12 that is
integrated with these other kinds.
Horizons and intentional acts work together as the temporally extended structure of
intention (horizon) and fulfillment (intentional act). The structure of affective
intentionality parallels this structure. At one extreme, the latent affective character of the
perceptual field, its affective allure, functions analogously to horizonal consciousness, as
the preceding section discussed. The awareness of a given situation includes a certain
“feel” to it. This awareness is horizon-like in that it is a tacit, diffused awareness.
Husserl sometimes refers to this kind of consciousness as mood.
At the other extreme, affective intentionality consists in discrete quasi-acts of
feeling. In such states one is affected by some particular content in the perceptual field.
Their focus and single-mindedness liken them to intentional acts, although it is worth
stressing that the state of being affected is not itself what one is focused on when it takes
place. One is rather directed to what is presented in a concurrent intentional act parallel
to it. Furthermore, there is a kind of directedness from one extreme to the other, from the
feel of a situation to some enjoyment in a particular moment of that whole, just as there is

12

Husserl, as the following will bear out, has a loose concept of intention/intentionality.
Intentionality usually means a mental state that is “about” something, that refers to something. This is even
how Husserl used the term in the Logical Investigations, as evidenced by his view then that every
intentional act has its correlate “intentional content,” the thing itself the act refers to. Husserl’s later,
broadened conception of intentionality includes other forms of meaningful experience besides those
referring to objects. Affection is an exemplary instance of that.
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a directedness from the horizonal awareness of the types of engagement with a situation
to this or that particular act therein.
Thus, when I take a walk through my neighborhood the situation has a certain feel
unique to it. There is a determinate range of affective experiences I can expect to have
there, and various directions of allure (sounds, smells, personal encounters, etc.) latent in
it. There is a peculiar relevance to that particular situation as a whole. Then, at any
given moment there are also the particular parts within that situation that actually catch
my attention and draw me to an encounter with them. This description of affective
intentionality presents a thorough parallel with the unified structure that links together
horizons and intentional acts.
And for the most part, these forms of intentionality do in fact run parallel to one
another. The feel of a situation corresponds to the possibilities I am aware of, and the
particular feeling I have at a given moment relates to something an intentional act has put
me in touch with. Indeed, as the previous section implies, the affective counterpart to the
horizon/intentional act structure does not merely parallel the latter, it motivates and
modulates it. The feel of the situation overlays one’s possible interactions with
preferential weights that channel and guide the direction of intentional acts to their end
and the affective experience foreshadowed in the allure of the situation.
While that is usually the case, it is not exclusively or necessarily so. It is true that
the horizon/intentional act structure requires the corresponding affective counterpart, but
the reverse is not true. The entire affective intentionality can occur without horizons or
intentional acts. This is the upshot of an important distinction that Husserl himself makes
to clarify how the former differ from the latter (Hua XIV 333-334). The distinction refers

160

in the first place to the nature of horizonal predelineation and the feeling of a situation or
mood. One is inclined to call both experiences “empty presentations.” Both refer to
possible experiences of fulfillment with a degree of indeterminacy. A horizon indicates a
range of possible engagements; the feeling of a situation suggests a range of possible
affective directions one’s experience could take as it unfolds.
Despite that similarity, the profound difference remains that one can reflect on a
horizon and consider its possible fulfillments, while the same is not always true of the
affective allure of a situation. In other words, I can always pause and reflect on the
possible goals that my horizonal awareness sets before me, but I do not always have that
option with respect to states of affective allure, and I lack it precisely in those instances
where affection does not require the horizon/intentional act structure. In such cases,
affective allure takes a direction and yet remains radically blind.
Some examples are in order. Husserl considers the example of an itch. This
experience involves a tension that points toward a relaxation. The itch of an emerging
mosquito bite is vaguely felt in an indeterminate region of the body. The affective
tension is spread not only on the surface of the rising bump, but perhaps on the entire
arm. That tension immediately gives way to an attempt at relief (e.g., scratching around
to find the itchy spot). It is only after this process has unfolded in its entirety that one
becomes aware of the goal and can pursue it deliberately. By the time one realizes one
has a bug bite, one has already found it and begun scratching it.
Another example, perhaps more easily generalizable, is that of affective
dispositions or lingering affective states that give rise to moods. Husserl gives numerous
excellent examples of such experiences, like the moods that follow observing a religious
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ritual, hearing a piece of exciting news, taking in a work of art, mourning, etc. (Hua
XXXVIII 175-178). In all of these cases, it can happen that a feeling initially provoked by
a certain object persists when that object is gone and even in contexts starkly contrasting
with or lacking any relevance to that of the initial provocation. After hearing good news,
one’s whole day is brightened, regardless of how it relates to that news. What is
remarkable about this is that the feeling is utterly unpredictable. It is blind in the sense
that at the outset one has no cognizance of how that feeling is coloring one’s situation and
what possible responses that might lead to (e.g., overlooking things that would otherwise
upset one, since the good mood is so strong).13 In these sorts of cases, affection guides
without presenting any kind of goal whatsoever.14
These last examples still have some connection to the horizon/intentional act
structure, since they presuppose an initial event that provokes the feeling that then
spreads into a mood no longer referring to that event. But Husserl is willing to go further
and maintain that affection can arise even without that provocation, wholly severing, at
least in some instances, the occurrence of affection from the horizon/intentional act
structure. This happens, for example, as Husserl describes it all too briefly, “[w]hen we
13

Another example of Husserl’s is illuminating (Hua XXXVIII, 177): “I am angry initially about the
constant obstruction of my train of thought while researching; then I am inclined also to be angry about
something else: about the grey sky, about the children playing on the street, etc. One [feeling] passes over
into another and blends with the other. And ultimately one is angry and knows not about what [one was]
first [angry]. The mood has taken such possession of the mind that an enduring feeling dominates and at
the same time is a disposition reinforced by ‘anything and everything.’”
14

Lotz (2007, 48-49) misconstrues this point about the affective intentionality in the case of the
instincts. He takes the mark of this form intentionality to be the absence of the goal in question, citing
Husserl’s characterization of instinctive affection as involving a felt lack (Hua XV, 329). The significance
of the felt lack cannot be the absence of the goal, pace Lotz’s reading. What Husserl admittedly does not
make entirely clear in that passage is that the significance of the felt absence in instinct is that one only
feels the absence without knowing the path toward satisfying that feeling of unease or what need the unease
even refers to. It is not the goal itself, the object of desire itself, that is absent but the conscious awareness
of the goal and, moreover, the cognizance of one’s abilities to attain it. It would be prima facie implausible
to claim that instinct is unique because its goal is absent. That is just as frequently true of any kind of
desire, even a desire aimed at a well-defined goal with well-defined means for its realization.
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awaken… with an unpleasant feeling that does not leave us, [and] we are sad and we do
not know about what” (Hua XXXVIII 177). This sort of phenomenon is hard to contest,
as it is easy to think of moods one has fallen into without any discernable provocation.
All of these examples illustrate the peculiar directedness of affection from an initial
affective allure in one’s situation to some particular affective experience tied to
something in the perceptual field. Sometimes affection is interwoven with a
horizon/intentional act structure, but it is not necessarily so. This point is valuable not
simply in order to have a clear grasp of the phenomena in question, but because it sheds
light on how affection can initiate intentional life in a way that points to the solution of
the paradox of worldly intentionality set out in Chapter 3. The paradox posed the
problem of how to avoid an infinite regress of horizons and intentional acts, since each
conditions the coming into being of the other in a determinate way. Horizons only come
from prior intentional acts, and intentional acts only work within predelineating horizons.
Husserl resolves this paradox by shedding light on another form of intentionality
that has precisely the characteristics necessary to get the ball rolling. In fact, it is in one
of the earlier manuscripts concerning the genesis of the world-horizon that he pointedly
clarifies the distinction between truly blind affective intentionality and the
horizon/intentional act structure (Hua XIV No. 16, especially 333-335). He does so to
explain the beginnings of intentional life by appealing to a form of intentionality that
needs no antecedent form of intentionality. This is exactly the idea that the examples just
given lead to. While it remains to be seen just how worldly intentionality comes into
being, this examination of affective intentionality shows the possibility of the kind of
beginnings we are after.
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As described up to this point, affection presents us with very little in the way of
intentional content. With the addition of association, that content, given in protointentional acts and their attendant proto-horizons, is significantly enriched. In fact, all
further development and genesis of objectivity is accomplished through association.
Association is a more complex affective experience. It arises because “affections are
constantly at work beyond themselves,” and they engender “affective awakenings, that is,
associations” (Hua XI 157-158/206). In short, association is the dynamic shift of
affection, initially flowing from a present sensory formation to another formation that
may be past, present, or future.15 Husserl speaks interchangeably of association and of
apperception or the apperceptive transference of sense.16 Taking into account
apperception or association is of the utmost significance for our current project if it will
assist us in seeing, as Husserl thinks it will, how the “original genesis of all
apperceptions” runs from the “lowest [level] of sensory time-consciousness up through
the level of spatial-thingliness [Raumdinglichkeit]” (Hua XXXIX 418).

15

Association is therefore a name for “transference of sense”, a phrase Husserl uses frequently in his
later work, which is the generic experiential type that genetic phenomenology is concerned with. Thus, the
moment we start to consider association, we have entered into genetic phenomenology proper. In Husserl’s
words (Hua XI, 405/505), “Synthesis in its different shapes as universal unification of the life of an ego =
association in the broadest sense.” See Bejarano (2006), 153-154.
16

Hua XXXIX, 431: “The language here is unclear. I speak always of apperceptive transference.
The most original apperception is perception linking perceiving to perceiving [perzipierend-adperzipierende Wahrnehmung]. Original genesis has it [i.e., apperception] originally formed in levels.
Already at the bottom level [Unterstufen] association functions in connection with apperceptive
transference… Similar data are passively-associatively united into pluralities…, constituting a unitary
passage.”
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A phenomenological theory of association cannot be undertaken without first
addressing some penetrating criticisms that have been advanced against its standard
forms, criticisms that are especially pertinent since they come from thinkers sympathetic
to the Husserlian and phenomenological outlook. Both Bergson (1991 163-166),
Husserl’s contemporary, and Merleau-Ponty (2002 20-21, 61, 114-115, 164-165),
Husserl’s predecessor, give powerful phenomenological grounds for questioning the
theory of association as it is commonly understood. Typically, the theory has it that two
ideas are associated when they enjoy a relation of similarity or contiguity such that one
idea has a tendency to recall the other. While all parties admit that something like this
does indeed happen, the theory nonetheless faces serious problems.
First, the theory is inadequate because it paints a picture of consciousness that is
jarringly at odds with what conscious life is really like. Consciousness is continuous and
holistic rather than being, as the theory of association seems to imply, a collection of
discrete items in need of assembly. According to the theory of association, consciousness
consists primarily of distinct segments of experience that only secondarily enter into
relations with other segments. Yet, in the course of experience one conscious episode
passes seamlessly into another and lacks any inherent demarcation or border except what
is artificially imposed after the fact. Association is supposed to be an automatic and
elementary process, not one requiring the special analytic exertion that would be required
to transform continuous consciousness into the discrete material needed for association.
The theory of association has to square the continuous/holistic character of consciousness
with the occurrence of elementary connections between disparate moments of this milieu.
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Second, the theory fails to explain the particularity of actual associations.
Similarity and contiguity are not alone sufficient to explain why one idea recalls another,
since the relation is almost never exact (perfectly similar or contiguous), and inexactitude
is even a virtue of the theory of association, allowing looser but more comprehensive
connections. Because any idea, described with enough generality, is similar in some way
to any other idea, and because any idea is relatively contiguous to any other idea, some
additional explanatory principle is necessary to show how particular associative
connections emerge that are not entirely random. In Merleau-Ponty’s (2002 21) terse
assessment, “[a]ssociation… never comes into play as an autonomous force.”
The problems posed by the continuity of consciousness and the particularity of
associative connections are intimately related, and so are their solutions. Association, as
Merleau-Ponty and Bergson argue, cannot be an autonomous process. That is the
common result of the two problems. Association must be integrated with another
principle. Just as Bergson claims that the theory of association must be premised upon
how associated terms relate to the will, the continuous driving force of consciousness, its
“dispositions” and “tensions,” and Merleau-Ponty maintains that it depends on a certain
“attitude” or “power to respond,” Husserl offers a similar solution by basing his theory of
association of the operations of affective intentionality.
This resolves the continuity problem and the particularity problem in one stroke.17
Affection, for Husserl, is the motive force of association, so that every associative
connection is nothing but the “propagation” of affection (Hua XI 162-163/211). The
twofold character of affection as I have already described it makes it possible to respond
17

I am not certain that Husserl ever expressly addressed the Bergsonian critique (the equivalent of
which he could have heard from others as well, like William James) or intended to answer it, but I find that
he does in fact do so.
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to these challenges. We saw above that affection has a moment that is analogous to
horizonal intentionality and a moment that is analogous to intentional acts. The former is
the diffused affective experience, a vague sense of relevance, of situations, environments
and extended events as having a certain affective allure, and the latter is the experience of
being affectively drawn to this or that particular moment therein.
Affection is a constant give-and-take between these extremes. The affective allure
of a situation is a preferential direction, marking out a desired or expected course
terminating in a particular affective satisfaction. The connection with affective allure
answers the continuity problem, and the recurrent, tendentious character affection
answers the particularity problem. But, according to Husserl, we cannot simply make the
blanket statement at the outset that any similar/contiguous idea can recall any other. We
must first methodically trace associative connections from quite meager beginnings and
see where they go from there, keeping track of the way affection conditions them at every
stage. In what follows I will elaborate Husserl’s account of this process, simultaneously
cashing out in greater detail his answer to the continuity and particularity problems to the
theory of association and working out the story of the genesis of the world-horizon

 
In the simplest case, the “impressional” present consisting of all immediately given
sensory data is the source of affection that is transferred into the retentional past. This
indicates the affective primacy of the immediate present and the gradually diminishing
affective allure of the immediate past. One is most immediately affected by what is
happening at present, and secondarily and derivatively affectively interested in anything
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else. Accordingly, Husserl says about the transference of affection to retentional
consciousness that “[t]he motives must lie in the living present” (Hua XI 178/227). But if
we recall that affection is a matter of degrees, then we can easily recognize that, while it
has less affective force, the past still has some hold on us. The task is, therefore, to come
to terms with how this retained past can become prominent and compete with the
affective efficacy of the present. This can occur in a number of ways.
In some cases, the retention does not acquire any new affective force per se, but
“retains” sufficient affective force to hold our attention due to its successive connection
with a prominent formation in the present. Here the retained lived-experience effectively
functions as part of a temporally extended prominence. Husserl’s example of a sequence
of piano notes beginning with noticeably loud notes and ending in almost unnoticeable
notes (a “transition to pianissimo”) illustrates this well (Hua XI 153/200). The sounding
of a large bell or cymbal also works. The initial sound in these cases remains prominent
because of its connection to the present, because it forms an integral part of the whole,
which is evident from the fact that the ending sound by itself would likely go completely
unnoticed were it not for the retention of the elapsed phases of the sound, and, likewise,
the retained sound would no longer be of interest were it not continued in a diminished
form into the present. With the inclusion of this kind of experience, the one’s quasiintentional abilities are enriched by giving one an experiential grip on temporally
extended proto-objects.
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A different kind of affective transference or propagation is at work when what is
affectively awakened from the retained past has lost its prominence and lacks a
temporally continuous or successive connection with the present as in the previous case.18
Whereas succession is the key ingredient to the previous association, the genuine
awakening of affection in the retained past requires similarity (Hua XI 180/229).19 The
present awakens a similar past and transfers affective force to it. But the awakening in its
most original form is of a peculiar sort. It is not a “recollection” (Wiedererinnerung)
proper. Recollection cannot occur where experiences do not yet have the characteristic of
being repeatable (Hua Mat VIII 283, Hua XXXIX 419).20,21 Repeatability arises in
experiences of recognizing (Wiedererkennen) proto-objects as familiar, thus making
subsequent recollections possible.

18

Husserl highlights this difference at Hua XI, 178-179/228. He actually uses a different example to
illustrate “awakening” of retentions in immediate or near immediate successive proximity to the present.
He describes a series of hammer blows and how each successive hammer blow keeps alive the sequence of
previous hammer blows (Hua XI, 176/225). There is however more involved in this case than Husserl
realizes. There is already a consciousness of repeatability which has to be clarified first for that example to
make sense.
19

In Husserl’s words from the cited text: “The first synthesis, which is made possible through the
affective communication gained by the transference of affective force, is of course precisely the synthesis
of the similarity that has become currently given to consciousness, a similarity between the awakening and
something presented in an empty manner, the awakened.”
20

In the cited text Husserl says, “One will have to say that repetition as recognizing is what is most
original and recollection [is] already something secondary.” See Hua Mat VIII, 287: “One will have to say
that recognizing is the primal form of awakening, of reawakening of one’s own [eigenen] past and is the
presupposition of all mediate awakenings.” See also Hua XV, 605: “[B]uilding up of an entire perceptual
field in dynamic identification of recognizing, although without developed repetition of memory.”
21

It is difficult to tell whether Husserl had realized this yet in the lectures on passive synthesis (Hua
XI). He does cryptically refer there to a “first synthesis” in which a present experience and a retained
experience function associatively as “recalling one another”, which is very similar to how he speaks of
recognizing or familiarity, which we are about to examine (179-180/229). This is reinforced by his
statement that this first synthesis is one prior to “remembering” (Wiedererinnerung), the ability to actively
isolate and thematically present a past experience (180/230). Later on in the lectures, he clearly catches
sight of this phenomenon, but includes it in the discussion of protention (190). I think it is clear from the
following analysis that no expectation or protention is required to account for recognizing or familiarity.
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Experiences first gain the characteristic of familiarity when a present experience
transfers its affective force to a retained past experience that is then “assimilated”
(Verähnlichung) or experienced in “coincidence” (Deckung) with the present experience
and not experienced separately from it. This happens, for instance, when one recognizes
a piece of foreign currency. Perhaps I have never seen a Chinese bill. Nevertheless,
when I come across one, I immediately recognize what kind of thing it is, even though
the size and color may differ significantly and the faces and inscriptions on it have no
meaning to me. This item still stands out as significant because of a cluster of simpler,
more general features it has that coincide with salient features of items that I know very
well. Chinese currency would not stand out for me except for its relation to the affective
coloration of my retained past. Further, in this apparently ordinary and insignificant
experience, we have the basic form of experiencing something as something. The
features of the unfamiliar bill that coincide with what is familiar constitute a type.
This familiarity, Husserl says, occurs when “the new has taken on the sense of the
old in the coincidence of similarity as assimilation, [as] associative transference” (Hua
Mat VIII 253).22 There is a coincidence with past experience, it overlays the present and
gives it an aura of familiarity without replacing the present experience and drawing one
to a particular memory.23 The present prominent sensory formation is simply
experienced as a repetition, where what is repeated exemplifies a familiar type. This

22

Cf. Hua Mat VIII, 287: “If A is recognized, then the assimilation of the past into the present is a
way in which the former is awakened.” See also Hua Mat VIII, 249251.
23

Cf. Hua Mat VIII, 282: “We do not have to see in this remembering repetition a parallel
remembering activity, only somehow ‘concealed.’” The concealment he speaks of in this quotation is the
concealment of an “ordinary memory”, an intentional act. This is different from the concealment that is
proper to recognizing, mentioned at Hua Mat VIII, 264.
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experience of recognizing is the “repetition of something past, but not itself actually
consciously presentified” (Hua Mat VIII 282).
In this peculiar manner the past gains affection but in such a way that it remains
“concealed.”24 The concealment of the past that is affectively brought to bear on the
present is crucial, and this facet of experience becomes obvious when we consider that in
perception “[i]f I am perceptually directed to something, then this something is familiar,
but I am not directed to its-being-familiar” (Hua Mat VIII 250). That is because what is
experienced as familiar is experienced in that way “not individually, but rather according
to type” (Hua XI 190/241). Even when it is particular individuals that are familiar, they
are only familiar in the strict sense due to their typical traits that remain similar.
The experience of recognizing has significant consequences in the further course of
experience. The most immediate consequence is that it imbues the consciously
accessible past into an affectively differentiated field of proto-objects that are retained as
repeatable. The retained past is a quasi-objective patchwork with great differences in
affective force. What has the greatest affective force is repeatable because of its potential
to enliven present experience according to a shared type. This type is also henceforth
repeatable. Furthermore, subsequent experiences of recognition reinforce the repeated
character of the objectlike formation. As Husserl puts it, “in the repeated ‘re-institution’
[Nachstiftung] of the first primal institution, knowledge ‘deepens’ in the form of an
increase of familiarity” (Hua XXXIX 463). That means both that what is recognized
appears more familiar, and that the retained experiences gain a greater affective force.

24

See Hua Mat VIII, 264: “In recognizing, what is awakened is concealed [verdeckt].”
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These developments are essential preconditions for the experience of the world as a
“horizon of typically familiar possibilities” (Hua Mat VIII 242).
Without the affective differentiation and typification of the retained past, it would
not only be irrelevant but also meaningless. Recognizing this gives one a means for
navigating one’s memory for a particular memory that would presentify a past event.

In

the initial recognizing experiences that alter the past in that way, it is the present that is
attended to and not the past, which stays concealed in those experiences. But
subsequently, “the concealment [is] removed,” the retained experience can regain its
affective force and to such a degree that it issues in an “advertence” (Zuwendung) (Hua
Mat VIII 265). The retained, tacitly remembered experience becomes a recollection
(Wiedererinnerung), a thematic or “explicit” awareness of the past experience in its own
right, which can be “involuntary” or deliberate (Hua XI 174/223).

In other words,

semantic memory precedes and makes possible episodic memory.

  
Association not only works in the present and its relation to the past, but also in the
relation of present and past to the future. Expectation presupposes that the past is already
populated with temporally extended proto-objects recognizable according to their type
against a background of a meaningful past that can be mined in recollection.25 The most
basic instance of the affective genesis of expectation takes place when something in the
present recalls the beginning phase of a temporally extended experience. This motivates
an expectation for certain phases to follow from the present as they followed in past. For
25

See Hua XI, 187/237: “This associative expectation obviously presupposes association as an
awakening reference-back of ‘memory.’”
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instance, I have heard a certain song many times, it is very familiar. Now when I hear an
incomplete part of the melody, an expectation is engendered that the rest of the melody
will follow. Prior to this process, I had no particular expectation, or, perhaps, a different
expectation. Because the beginning notes are familiar as part of a greater whole, i.e., the
initial part of the type coincides with the present and perhaps an extent of the retained
past, and because “[t]he part demands the whole” (Hua XI 190/240), I not only sense the
incompleteness of the present experience but have the missing parts affectively projected
before me in expectation.26
Expectation is more like recognizing than it is like recollection. What is expected is
not, as expected, given in its full concreteness like a present experience or the
recollection of a past experience. Rather, expectation presents a familiar “style” or
“model” consisting of certain typical traits (Hua XI 186/236). Expectation is also similar
to recognizing insofar as its affective force increases with repetition (Hua XI 188/238,
190/240). The more instances of the temporally extended experience that occur, the
greater the force of the expectation upon the arrival of the first phase in future encounters.
The experience of expectation is thus a higher-level form of experiential harmony,
bringing the present, past and future together to jointly function in the constitution of
proto-objects. This is another essential ingredient of the world-horizon, which resumes
this complex of cooperating functions, but with respect to genuinely transcendent entities.

26

Husserl sums up the matter more formally at Hua XI, 187/237: “If p is connected to q in the order
of succession and p މuniform with p immediately occurs in the sequence, in other words, as a repetition,
then… it recalls the p that is submerged in retention. The latter gets a shot of affective force and is passed
on further to q. In this connection, the q މfollowing the p މthat has just occurred will also be expected.” Cf.
Hua Mat VIII, 322.
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There is one final precondition for objectivity to be mentioned in the context of
association and affection. This is the development of an “in-itself” (Ansich), within
consciousness. This in-itself is a crucial development, perhaps the most important one in
the sphere of pure passivity, because it signals at the same time the existence of a quasitranscendence and the production of something like a set of norms pertaining to the
experience of that quasi-transcendence. What gives rise to this in-itself and the norms
governing the experience of it is the introduction of steps mediating the initiation of the
experience and its fulfillment. With the previously discussed affective and associative
experiences, even in their most complex form, affection gives way to instantaneous or
near-instantaneous fulfillment.
What spurs the development of mediated and elaborated processes leading to
fulfillment is modalization. This occurs both in the direction of the past and of the future.
Modalization, generally, is the disruption of certainty, when it is decreased or disturbed in
any way. In that sense, the past can be modalized when I lose my certainty in it. This
happens, Husserl says, when memories become “a muddle” (Hua XI 193/244, 193194/245). This requires, first of all, the circumstance that the memories in question have
passed to the limit of null affective force, having become “empty retentions.” This
emptiness, Husserl insists, is not a lack of content, but only a lack of affective
prominence, and retention even preserves the order of experience despite this affective
alteration (Hua XI 173-174/222-223).
Memories become muddled when one is motivated to recall some memory, to
presentify it and make it thematic again, and in doing so partially confounds the memory
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with another. This presupposes that the present reminds one of a past experience due to
similarity, but at the same time of another experience that is also similar. The two past
experiences then stand in “competition.” The associative connection is not only one
between the present and both past experiences, but especially between the two past
experiences. They undergo an associative “fusion” due to the similarity of their content
(Hua XI 196/247).
The fusion need not be a fusion of what they have in common with the present
experience that triggered the process. In fact, it is more often when the fusion is of
something not in common with the present that the memory is reproduced as “a combined
image” (Hua XI 198-199/250). This would happen if a certain trait of the present called
up a memory with that trait and erroneously transferred another trait typically
accompanying the former trait to the recalled memory (Hua XI 199/250). This is very
similar to how expectation works, only here something typical and familiar is aimed at
the past which is not open to just any expectation, like the future, but is already rigidly
determined. But because we can recall a memory with a much diminished affective force
(i.e., not all of its features become prominent), remaining obscure even in the
recollection, it is possible to mistakenly project typical traits onto that memory.
Because this transference is in fact mistaken, and because the trait erroneously
attributed covers over some genuine trait which must have some affective force, as all
retained experiences do, a tension exists between the mistaken trait and the genuine trait
that is “suppressed.” The illusion can be revealed for what it is by virtue of this tension,
that is, because the suppressed trait has enough force to compel the subject to realize the
transference as erroneous, the result of the force of habit. The immediate evidence that
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was sufficient in the simpler cases we examined prior to the present discussion of
modalization is not sufficient for the resolution of a confused memory. The
modalization, the tension of the suppressed trait with the projected trait, serves as
motivation for gaining further clarity about the memory. This is the primitive form of
verification or confirmation in which the subject strives to regain certainty by gaining
more secure evidence, e.g., by delving more attentively into the memory and uncovering
the suppressed trait (Hua XI 200/251).
The modalization of the past experience points not only to an enriching of the
subject’s awareness and epistemic abilities with respect to the past, but also to an
enrichment of the experience of the past itself. Husserl highlights this connection when
he says that “[e]very confirmation is a process of bringing something concealed to light, a
process of bringing it to the clarity of self-giving” (Hua XI 201/252). When the subject
begins to experience the past as something that can be presented in degrees of clarity, the
proto-objects that populate it no longer exist in a straightforward manner. They are
henceforth objects that exist in themselves, they have an identical being that transcends
their presentation in empty retention and even their presentation in recollection. This is a
significantly more robust form of “appresentation” – the “givenness” of something in its
absence – than we have encountered so far (Hua XI 201-202/253). We have to properly
navigate the presentations of the same proto-object in their varying degrees of clarity to
get at the “self,” the identical, thoroughly determined nature of the proto-object. Husserl
identifies this as the development of an “inner horizon” belonging to proto-objects
preserved in memory (Hua XI 202/253, 205/257).
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There is an “outer horizon” that arises in memory as well. Through the experience
of modalization, I not only acquire the ability of seeking greater clarity of particular
proto-objects. I also acquire the ability of clarifying these proto-objects in their
connections of simultaneity and succession to other proto-objects. In principle, this can
progress to the limit of clarifying the whole of one’s past, although it is only a limit, an
idea that cannot be achieved but that nevertheless serves to regulate the subject’s
interaction with the “inner world” of its past. Indeed, “[i]n this way, our own entire
past… is given to us in a transcendent manner in the respective present” (Hua XI
204/255).27 Husserl also calls this transcendence “a first, absolutely and necessarily
constituted sphere of the in-itself.” In relation to this first transcendence, the
“transcendence of the spatial world is a transcendence of a second order” that has the
former as its precondition (Hua XI 205/256).

   
The analysis of pure passivity, of affection and association, relying predominantly
on Husserl’s earlier explorations of this realm in the lectures on passive synthesis (which
are more or less recapitulated in Experience and Judgment), has proven capable of
generating many essential preconditions for experiencing transcendent reality. But we
have not seen how this “inner world” that our analysis in the previous section culminated
in could give way to an external world. We have yet to come to grips with how the
27

Cf. Hua XXXIV, 188: “The past, the realm of what has streamed [Verströmten] and still exists as
objective past, is the first objective time, objective in a first and nevertheless not worldly (and commonly
objective) sense, subjective, in-itself [Ansich] constituted from my primally subjective being as living
present, identical, which, once existing, is an existent for all time, identical, identifiable. I myself, the ego
[selbst, ego] am the realm of the ‘once and for all’ as of the in-itself and of this time.” See also Dan Zahavi
(2001), 30-31.
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subject could be motivated to establish contact with transcendent reality within the worldhorizon.
I believe Husserl is unable to adequately deal with this problem because the theory
of affection from the early twenties is still too abstract. Yet Husserl does not simply
leave his theory of affection and association untouched. In later manuscripts, he
significantly reworks the theory of affection by clarifying affection as instinct and at the
same time conceiving affection as a passive experience of desire (Begehren) aimed at
satisfaction and enjoyment with a tendency toward refinement and greater complexity.
Husserl, in the lectures on passive synthesis, already points ahead to this development
when he mentions in passing the possibility of analyzing certain “originally instinctive,
drive related preferences” for responding to sensory data (Hua XI 150/198).28 J. Keeping
(2006) has recently developed a concept of instinct very much akin to this, drawing
partial inspiration from Husserl’s theory of affection from the lectures on passive
synthesis. As he understands it, “it is the instinct itself that determines what shall be a
trigger for it. In other words, the trigger only exists as such because the instinct itself
makes it meaningful as a trigger” (183). In Husserl’s later theory, the affection discussed
in the previous section becomes one sort of instinctive desire among others, among which
Husserl includes instinctive drives related to bodily movement, nourishment, and
sexuality. Nevertheless, Husserl grants a primacy to the affection familiar from the
lectures on passive synthesis, which he comes to call the instinct of “curiosity” (Neugier).

28

An even earlier manuscript, from around the time of Ideas II, sketches parts of a theory of
association in terms of instincts related to sensory data (Hua IV, 336-338/348-349). See Tetsuya
Sakakibara’s commentary on this passage in “The relationship between nature in spirit in Husserl’s
phenomenology revisited,” 258-259. There is still much to be learned about Husserl’s early theory of
instincts, much of which we will gain from the future publication of Husserl’s unfinished book manuscript
Studien zur Strukturen des Bewusstseins.
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All of these additions would be in vain, however, if they did not aid us in
understanding the genesis of the experience of transcendent reality and of the worldhorizon. While Husserl clearly believes that the instincts are what motivate this
genesis,29 he is less than forthcoming about how this is supposed to work. After outlining
the main points of Husserl’s reworked theory of affection, I will try to reconstruct how
Husserl intends to explain this genesis. What he needs to explain, in particular, is the
development of an appresentation (the experience of presence in absence) of a co-present.
More specifically, this would mean that the present is made up not only of what is
directly presented in sensory experience, but also includes a co-present, a surrounding
world that is presented emptily, in a similar fashion to our empty retentional
consciousness of the distant past. This would be tantamount to the experience of a
spatiotemporal present, a proper experience of transcendent reality within the worldhorizon.

  
By framing the discussion of affection in terms of instinct, Husserl implies that they
are the fundamental form or forms of affection. This means both that there is no more
basic way of engaging sensory data and that this form of experience is not acquired.
Husserl thus speaks of them as “inborn” or “innate” (Angeboren).30 The first positive gain

29

Cf., for instance, Hua Mat VIII, 252: “All objective constitution is carried out in the interplay
[Zusammenspiel] of affection and action. Life is always already a life of interest, originally guided by
instinct in its constitutive development.” See also Julio Vargas Bejarano’s (200 understanding of Husserl’s
view in this regard in his Phänomenologie des Willens, 244: “The instincts, in particular, function at this
level of the pre-constitution of the world, on the basis of which the most original reference to ‘nature’ or to
the world occurs.”
30

The non-acquired character of instincts is true from the perspective of the individual subject, but
not from the perspective of generative subjectivity. In the latter point of view, instincts are indeed acquired
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of reworking the theory of affection into a theory of instincts is to concretize it, to give it
a determinate place in the finite life of the subject. To talk about affection as an instinct
is to give it a systematic value, to locate it at the limit of transcendental life,31 whereas the
earlier discussion from the lectures on passive synthesis could just as well be an
abstraction from any point in conscious life and have essentially the same value.
Thus, cashing out the theory of affection in terms of instinct and desire is no merely
incidental development. It is the expression of a systematic intent, and, moreover, it
clarifies an inherent ambiguity and insufficiency in the theory of affection from the
lectures on passive synthesis. In that context, affection is supposed to explain how the
subject is passively related to sensory data quite generally and how it is lead to respond to
the sensory data in certain ways, i.e., mainly by noticing them for themselves in
“advertence” (Zuwendung). While there is a certain obviousness to this conception of
affection, it nevertheless demands more intense scrutiny and questioning. Why does the
subject respond in this way? What exactly is involved in this response of noticing? Is
there only one kind of noticing, or are there many? Are there other kinds of affective
engagement the subject has with sensory data besides noticing? These are some of the
questions that the interpretation of affection as instinct and desire is meant to address.
Just as we did in our first pass with affection, so now we begin by considering
instinctive desire prior to the formation of prominence. At first, “the ego at the primal
level is the ego of instinct with undisclosed [unenthüllten] instinctive goals” (Hua Mat

and handed down. The details are extremely sketchy, but Husserl had started to work out a conceptual
apparatus for handling this problem. See, for example, Hua Mat VIII, 438-439.
31

As will become clear, instincts are not exclusively limit-phenomena. They have a development,
and they carry over into more advanced stages of conscious life, even spanning the whole of conscious life.
Husserl accordingly says in one manuscript (Hua XV, 594) that “[p]rimordiality [i.e., constituting
subjectivity] is a system of drives [Triebsystem].”
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VIII 253). “[O]riginal affection”, Husserl says, is an “instinct, thus a kind of empty
striving still lacking the ‘presentation of a goal’” (Hua Mat VIII 326).32 This means that
one has a desire, but is not conscious of, does not present, any particular satisfaction for
that desire. This may seem to be, however, a considerably strained conception of desire.
Any and every sensory datum is necessarily related to this desire. Desire ordinarily refers
to experiences where we want something and know what we want.
Nevertheless, there are ways to make this kind of desire intelligible without too
much terminological strain. In many respects, instincts function in the same way habits
do. Our habitual responses to situations are blind, and yet they color the way we see and
interact with things, issuing only in certain appropriate responses and behaviors. In
ordinary life, experiences and behaviors “unconsciously” appear desirable or undesirable,
tending to solicit or inhibit responses on our part, due to our habits, without our having to
take special notice.
What further justifies the language of desire is the way Husserl concretizes the
affective relation the subject stands in with the sensory data. He claims that every
sensory datum is present to the subject at the outset either in a feeling of pleasure or one
of displeasure (Lust and Unlust, respectively). And this is not merely a matter of
32

Cf. James Mensch (2010), 231-234. I do not follow Mensch entirely on this point. I think the
objectivating/non-objectivating distinction applied to instincts is more complex than Mensch presents it.
For Mensch, objectivating instinct is a separate instinct from other non-objectivating instincts (or, perhaps,
the one objectivating instinct), and the latter pertain only to complex appresentational experiences. As I see
it, this is not entirely true. Every instinct has both a non-objectivating and an objectivating moment, it
seems. The instinct is blind, but it aims at a fulfillment, a focused “thematizing” consciousness, in which
the instinct actually becomes disclosed for the subject, as Mensch recognizes. Perhaps in a somewhat loose
sense, then, every instinct becomes objectivating once it gives rise to an actual instinct-affection, a focused
experience of enjoyment. In a narrower sense, there is also an objectivating instinct, which I believe, for
Husserl, is the same as the instinct of curiosity. And, while at higher levels this instinct, as we shall see, is
a complex appresentational experience, it begins like all other instincts as blind or non-objectivating and its
first activation is not appresentational, but is, I will show, the immediate “turning-toward” aimed at
immediately present sensory data in the impressional field. Lee (1993, 108) also interprets Husserl’s scant
references to an instinct of objectivation in terms of his equally infrequent references to an instinct of
curiosity.
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individual data and their affective links to the subject. The whole group of sensory data
itself, as a “total” impression, appears to one in a mood (Stimmung), and the particular
sensory data are always affective precisely as parts (i.e., every part is a “gefühlsmässig
Teil”) (Hua Mat VIII 351).33
Just as Husserl distinguishes the affective tendency from the actual affection in
which the turning toward occurs, he makes the same distinction when he separates
“pleasure-allure” from “pleasure-enjoyment” (Hua Mat VIII 319).34 The feeling in which
the sensory data are present functions either to “attract” or to “repel” the subject. In that
sense, the field of sensory data is one of relatively attractive or unattractive sensory data,
and so they are necessarily present as making a claim (however weak) on the subject’s
will, its desire, to issue an appropriate response.
The subject therefore comes to the field of experience with certain general
“preferences”35 (i.e., for pleasure, for avoiding displeasure),36 although it is entirely
unaware of them at first, and that what stands out in this field is only what accords with
these preferences to the greatest degree. Thus Husserl speaks of a “passive preferring”
that occupies itself exclusively with one thing it deems “important” while it “passively
33

Cf. Nam-In Lee (1998), especially 113-116.

34

According to Bernet, Husserl already makes this distinction in his earlier manuscripts on drive
collected in the unpublished Studien Zur Struktur des Bewusstseins (1909-1914). As Bernet (2006, 41-42)
says, “Husserl thereby distinguishes still more precisely between the drive as impetus [Antrieb] and its
realization in a doing [Tun]. The distinction is terminologically fixed by him as the difference of ‘driveimpulse’ and ‘drive-movement’ (or ‘drive-action’).” To this distinction there also corresponds the
distinction between “drive-pleasure” (corresponding to the “movement” or “action”) and “sensationpleasure”, “which encompasses, besides pleasure in sensations, drive-pleasure as well” (45-46). However,
it is not clear whether this is yet a foreground/background distinction, as it clearly is in Husserl’s later
writings on instinct.
35

Cf. Hua XXXIX, 471, where Husserl breaks down “primal affection” of the total impressional
present into a “preferred, overpowering affection” and a “less preferred [affection].” Hua Mat VIII, 253,
where Husserl equates affection with a “subjective preference.”
36

Hua Mat VIII, 340: “Desiring life positively directs itself out… toward pure enjoying […].
Desiring negatively directs itself against all breaking in of what is negatively pleasant [Negativ-Lustigem],
against all decreases, disruptions.”
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runs roughshod over another” (Hua Mat VIII 39). To illustrate this idea, James Mensch
(2010 232) has used the analogy of a lock and key. The subject is only interested in the
sensory data that “fit” (although this is really a matter of degree), and the others are
irrelevant. Such sensory data in their pleasure-allure are relevant to the extent that they
immediately give rise to or suggest the possibility of a focused pleasure-affection, which
is functionally equivalent to the advertence considered above.37

  
We can now take this sketch of how instinctive desiring works as a framework for
examining particular instincts. While there are many instincts that Husserl speaks of,
e.g., having to do with bodily movement, eating, breathing, sex, etc., he does not believe
that the instincts emerge in the life of consciousness in just any order. Each instinct has
its place in the life of consciousness, and they are not simply present all at once, each
affectively coloring the field of experience in its own way and distributing its own
affective values thereupon. A clue for this is the way more familiar instincts unfold in
the course of life. Instincts pertaining to food, breathing, and sexuality each have their
own proper timing, their own “rhythm” or “periodicity”, a systematic organization that I
will bring out in what follows (Hua XXXIX 585, Hua Mat VIII 328). This clue indicates
that there is an orderly and even systematic way in which each of these instincts arises in
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Husserl quickly sketches this whole framework in one manuscript (Hua Mat VIII, 340-341) as
follows: “The being-affected of the willing ego, the desiring, desiring-being-related-to and now being-with
[something] (in feeling) in turning-toward [Hinwendung], appropriately [zuständlich] being-firmly-gripped
by it in pleasure as enjoyed pleasure; a) affection as background-affection that attracts the ego; b) affection
as affection in the mode of being-with, [and,] further, gradation of affection already prior to and up to the
turning toward [Zuwendung].”
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us and brings its preferences to bear in the present while despite having very different
rhythms and compelling us to see the world in light of different preferences.
The very first, most original instinct, according to Husserl, is not one of these
familiar types. It is, instead, the instinct of curiosity. It may sound strange to speak of an
instinct of curiosity at all, let alone to suppose that it has a privileged position in the
ordering of the instincts, but it makes sense in light of the project of a genetic analysis of
the pre-world. Much is presupposed for instincts like those pertaining to food and
sexuality to be able to function at all. In fact, the world, transcendent reality and the
experiential structures bringing us in contact with it, must already be developed. Given
that, it should be no great surprise if the instincts at work prior to the experience of
transcendent reality have a more rudimentary character.
Curiosity is, as I have already mentioned, equivalent to the kind of affection Husserl
elaborates in the lectures on passive synthesis.38 We may sometimes think of curiosity as
an aloofness from the pressing cares of life, as a luxury good to be enjoyed only after
more exigent matters are taken care of. Husserl overturns this way of thinking when it
comes to the instinct of curiosity. Curiosity is far from superfluous. It is the first
desideratum, the first interest we have in the sensory field as a whole and in its details.
We need not go into all the details again of how affection plays out in the form of
curiosity, since we have examined that in detail above. Here it will be enough to
integrate curiosity into the framework of instinctive desiring provided in the previous
section. First, then, we have to be clear about what this instinctive desire aims at.
According to Husserl, this instinct is interested in the “original affection that emanates
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Cf. Lee (1993), 108, where this connection is also made.
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from prominent ‘contents’” (Hua Mat VIII 323).39 The “hyletic what” itself is what
interests the subject. Further, because this affection has to count for the subject as
desirable, Husserl says, “we take ‘curiosity’ to be a feeling of pleasure” (Hua Mat VIII
324).40
This consists, on the one hand, “in being-involved [Dabeisein], so to speak, in the
condition of enjoyment,” which corresponds to the pleasure-affection that Husserl
identifies in this case precisely as turning-toward, the simple experience of attentively
noticing something. But even prior to that, on the other hand, sensory data are already
present as affective, as “appealing to me” as relevant or irrelevant to my interest in the
pleasurable experience of turning toward, as possibly satisfying my curiosity or not (Hua
Mat VIII 324). Although he only comes to speak of an instinctive curiosity relatively
late, Husserl already at the time of the lectures on passive synthesis speaks of an instinct
or “primal tendency” with just these features, features ultimately aimed at “constitution
that is of thematic unities, unities of ‘existing’ objects” (Hua XXXIX 17).41
If any instinct is worthy of the title “instinct”, taken in its systematic connotation, it
is curiosity. Curiosity must be an “inborn” or “innate” instinct. It would be entirely
senseless to conceive of the subject acquiring this instinct like a habit in the course of
experience – and, for Husserl, there is no other way to acquire something of
phenomenological relevance than in an experience of some kind. Curiosity cannot be
acquired in experience because it is the fundamental form of consciousness, the primitive
39

Cf. Hua Mat VIII, 319: “What is the willing-toward and the willing in being ‘attracted’ and
‘repelled’? Is it not in the primal sphere an original being-affected by something that is for itself, desiring
the hyletic, the prominent?”
40

Cf. Hua Mat VIII, 340: “The primal what [Ur-Was], the primally pleasant (and unpleasant), the
hyletic as primal core present everywhere.”
41

Husserl already shows an interest in the topic of curiosity in manuscripts on attention and
perception from around 1893 (Hua XXXVIII, 186-187).
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way in which the subject comes into contact with what is “alien to the ego.” As we have
already seen, for anything to appear to the subject, it must engage it affectively. Curiosity
is just the simplest and most pervasive way this can take place.42 For that reason, Husserl
calls curiosity “the lowest, all-founding interest” (Hua Mat VIII 325).
The fundamental quality of curiosity thus points to its systematic function. Not
only does it mark the beginning, original interest in the pre-world. As “all-founding,” it
continues to play a role throughout the development of conscious life. This is already
apparent from the wealth that we uncovered in outlining affection and association above.
All of that is the consistent following through of the affective desire encapsulated in the
instinct of curiosity, in the preference for the experience of prominent sensory data. That
means curiosity alone provides the subject with an articulated, familiar present, with
some typical expectations pertaining to the future, and, above all, with a rich past filled
with repeatedly experienceable proto-objects and their corresponding gradations of
clarity through which these proto-objects are given as existing “in themselves.” All the
associative mediations that arise are only so many means to the end of experiencing
prominent proto-objects.
It is important to understand exactly why all the apperceptive or associative results
discussed previously follow from the instinct of curiosity. First of all, the tendency to
move from the simple experience of noticing something in the impressional present to an
associative connection in the direction of the past is inherent in instinctive curiosity.
Husserl makes this claim when he says that this “[i]nstinctive drive of objectivation” can
take the form of a “[p]leasure in recognizing [Wiedererkennen] what is the same” (Hua
42

In fact, the relationship between subject and what is “alien to the ego” at this bottommost level is
so close that they are not even separate, but are like two sides of the same thing, two functional aspects of
the same thing. Cf. Hua Mat VIII, 351-351.
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Mat VIII 331).43 Husserl’s claim is that curiosity also covers the experience of
recognizing that we considered above, that lowest form of association. That is the case
because the coincidence of the retained past with features of the present makes those
features of the present stand out more, therefore appealing to the preference for what is
prominent, that is, to instinctive curiosity. Recognizing would not play the fundamental
role it does in conscious life if the subject were not already affectively attuned in this
way.
There is another way of understanding this tendency inherent in instincts to not
simply repeat and function constantly in an identical manner, but to develop, improve,
and take on greater complexity in the course of experience.44 Regarding this tendency,
Husserl goes so far as to say that instincts are “immortal” (Hua Mat VIII 258).45 There is
one component in this process that he introduces that especially contributes to their
developmental character that I have mentioned but not yet explained, namely, the fact
that when a pleasure-allure passes over into a pleasure-affection, a focused enjoyment,
the instinct itself – its goal and the path, if there is a path involved, to the fulfillment of
the goal – is revealed or disclosed.46 With every fulfillment (Erfühlung) of an instinct,
there is a disclosure (Enthüllung) of it as well (Hua Mat VIII 253).47
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See also Hua XXXIX, 17, where Husserl also includes the intentional characteristics of recognizing
in his conception of the “primal tendency” aimed at object-constitution.
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Cf. Lee (1993), 109: “The original instinct of objectivtion forms the driving force [Triebkraft] of
the constant transition of the lower[-level] into the higher[-level] unity of passive synthesis.”
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In the cited text Husserl writes: “Every instinct is immortal, it simply exists in different modes of
actualization.”
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Cf. Alice Pugliese (2009), 148-149.
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In the cited text Husserl writes: “Instinct passes through various modes, it is fulfilled, and now the
goal of attainment exists patently and as attained in its patent sense in a process [Weg] that has [also]
become patent… In the ‘beginning’ [there is an] instinctive striving in the first directions of fulfillment,
whereby it discovers what kinds of goals it has and cultivates goal-directed activity.” See also Hua XXXIX,
317-318.
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The disclosure is the proper basis for the development of an instinct. When the
instinct is disclosed in enjoyment, the goal is experienced as a goal and is prominent as
such. That means it becomes an abiding acquisition both as an individual event and as a
typical event. Before the satisfaction of the instinct, the instinctive desire is blind (Hua
XV 511).48 After some particular satisfaction emerges, the subject has a sharpened,
narrowed desire.49 That immediately makes it possible for the subject to experience other
similar prominences as repetitions of that goal, as typically familiar (Hua Mat VIII
274),50 and subsequently to even expect the particular prominent proto-object in the
future and to intervene to produce it as a “good” (Hua Mat VIII 333). This process
gradually alters the instinctive activity to look more and more like an intentional act,
which is why Husserl says an instinct is an “ability [Vermögen] [that functions] as the
equipment for the cultivation of abilities in the proper sense” (Hua XXXIX 483).
Based on this, we can also understand the sense in which other instincts besides
curiosity are in a sense “founded” in it, why Husserl conceives of curiosity as a “general”
affection or striving in which other “particular” affections or strivings are founded (Hua
Mat VIII 324). According to Husserl, each “particular instinct has its specific direction,
its specific character of enjoyment,” and this differentiation is based on the instinct’s
direction to some “hyletic” datum or some type of sensory data “as the core of quality”
48

In the cited text Husserl writes: “But prior to willing and its goals of willing there are pre-forms of
egoic striving… that we call instinctive.” Again, at Hua XV, 593, Husserl points to the same phenomenon
when he says that “[a] drive can be in the stage of an indeterminate hunger that does not yet carry its object
in itself as its goal [Worauf].”
49

At Hua Mat VIII, 258, Husserl illustrates this with the example of food: “[T]he ego itself gains
experience of the various foods, [and] based on that hunger arises for a [particular] food, a hunger ‘for’ this
or that kind of food.”
50

This is what Husserl seems to mean at Hua Mat VIII, 253: “The interest-unities newly acquired
through constitution are primally instituting by virtue of essential repetition through simultaneous and
successive association on the basis of the ongoing validity [Fortgeltung] that has not disappeared by
‘receding’, together with its means/end sense [Weg-Ziel-Sinn].”
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(Hua Mat VIII 257). If that is the case, then, just as Husserl imagines that desires for
particular foods are specifications of a general drive related to nourishment, so also the
drive for food can be seen as a kind of specification of the instinct of curiosity, where,
indeed, not just any prominent objectivity satisfies.51 The other instincts, therefore,
presuppose the instinct of curiosity and are diverging offshoots from it that preserve its
basic character.

 Ǧ
It is not necessary to discuss all of the instincts that Husserl deals with. For the
purpose of understanding the genesis the world-horizon, however, the instincts pertaining
to the lived-body are of special importance and demand treatment in their own right.
Like the simple experience of turning toward or noticing exemplified we are inclined to
thanks to our instinctive curiosity, the lived-body plays a pervasive role in our
experience, and not occasional or episodic in the way that the instincts pertaining to food,
sex, and the like are. The instincts pertaining to the lived-body have nearly an equal
primacy to that of the instinct of curiosity, and accordingly Husserl gives them
disproportionately great attention in the manuscripts.
The instincts related to the lived-body are not as simple to understand as other
instincts, like the instinct for nourishment. Experience of the lived-body is different in
kind from the experience of proto-objects and objects. Whereas the latter have the sense
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This isn’t meant to completely explain the emergence of particular instincts, but I think it explains
how, once they emerge, for whatever reason, they are able to and necessarily must fit in with the basic
character of instinctively desiring life. Nevertheless, Husserl does assert in particular that the desire for
food is founded in the desire of curiosity: “[T]he original desire for food, desiring the satisfaction of
hunger, is founded in primally experiencing desiring (curiosity)” (Hua Mat VIII, 332).
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of possible or actual prominent formations, the lived-body does not function that way
primarily. The sensations that make up the experience of the lived-body, the kinaestheses
that provide us awareness of bodily movement, do not present the body itself as
prominent. Their purpose is not to stand out in their own right for us to pay attention to.
Rather, kinaestheses work “in the background” in relatively complex experiences in
which something else becomes prominent and does so because of their contribution.
An example will make this clear. When I use my hand to feel the texture of an
object, I discover, for instance, that it has a rough texture. In this discovery I move my
hand and, more specifically, have certain sensations of moving my hand that attend the
movement, guiding the motion through which the texture of the object is revealed. The
kinaesthetic sensations that comprise the lived-body have this essentially peripheral
character. They are not what is of interest. What interests me is the texture. But the
kinaesthetic sensations do participate in this experience. They occur as “circumstances”
whose complex organization guides this experience. There is a typical order and
organization to the kinaesthetic sensations of my hand, arm, and, perhaps, shoulder as I
go through the motion in which I experience the texture.
But if, as we have seen, instincts are desires guided by pleasure and aimed at
enjoyment of something prominent, one justly wonders how the lived-body can fit in this
framework and not be merely an accessory. Given that the kinaesthetic sensations of the
lived-body are only accoutrements for essentially heterogeneous enjoyments, there is not,
strictly speaking, any instinct pertaining to the lived-body. Indeed, Husserl speaks in just
this way when he refers to the original experience of the lived-body as “a unitary goalless ‘doing’” – thereby invoking them as instincts – in which “[t]he waking ego is
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originally directed… to the total, undifferentiated hulƝ in the form of ‘pure’ kinaesthesis”
(Hua Mat VIII 226). In another manuscript, Husserl says almost the same thing, but with
an important difference: “Should I say that this original willing has the form of a totalkinaesthesis being discharged, being discharged in kinaestheses that are still
uncontrolled…, whereby the field-data are varied and sporadically [varied]?” (Hua XV
330)52 Although this quotation is anything but conclusive, it already casts doubt on the
essential subordination of kinaesthesis to heterogeneous experiential elements (like the
“field-data” or the “undifferentiated hulƝ”).
Husserl seems also to employ this model – in which kinaesthetic data only function
peripherally – in his “construction” of the infant’s experience of nursing and the role of
kinaesthetic sensations leading up to nursing (Hua Mat VIII 326). Yet, here the matter is
not so clear. What tends to come to mind when we think of food is certainly the taste,
which is a key motivational factor for eating. But to say that experiencing taste is the
goal of eating is surely not right, or, at least, it is just one part of the story. Eating
involves much more. Chewing, swallowing, and, as Husserl has it, “bodily
complacency” (Hua Mat VIII 327) (we might say, “being full”) are all aspects of
enjoying food. Perhaps, then, the lived-body plays a fundamental role in the instincts
pertaining to eating, and does so as an instinct in the strict sense, the enjoyment of which
consists at least in part of kinaesthetic experiences.
But the lived-body is more than a factor in the experience of eating. Can we say
that it has other more fundamental properly instinctive aspects? I think we can make
headway in this direction by considering Husserl’s appeal to the “kicking-kinaestheses”
52

See also Hua XXXIX, 433: “Kinaesthesis as primal form of act… The kinaesthesis passes,
although not yet egoically to a presented ‘end.’”
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exercised by the infant and the fetus. While we cannot recall our own experiences of this
or take recourse to the testimony of another who can, we can empathetically conceive
roughly what the infant or the fetus undergoes when it flails. Indeed, it is perhaps the
most overt form of a typical trait belonging to instincts, namely, as goalless behaviors.
The fetus or infant does not wave its arms and legs in “wild kinaestheses” in order to do
something apart from executing those very movements (Hua XV 660-661).
But if there is an instinct related to kinaesthetic movement itself, then the execution
of this goalless activity would reveal the goal. This is exactly what Husserl seems to
suggest happens when he speaks of a “‘joy of kicking’, of bodily movement in limb
movement” (Hua Mat VIII 327). The first movements, then, would be utterly
purposeless, but in those first movements the subject would discover a pleasure peculiar
to those movements (Hua Mat VIII 272-273).53 Thereafter, the movement is desirable
and enjoyable in its own right, and it is thereby something to be further explored by the
subject, and, importantly, a force to be harnessed for more refined enjoyment. As
Husserl says, “[t]he kinaesthetic movement… can become ‘thematic’ for itself, the ego
being awake to it and initially having its pleasurable satisfaction in the passage [of the
kinaesthetic movement], it itself being the telos” (Hua Mat VIII 328). We might think of
such experiences along the lines of the satisfying feeling of stretching or cracking one’s
knuckles.
These sorts of inherently enjoyable bodily movements could then be taken to be the
precondition for the experience of the lived-body being subordinated to other instinctive
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In the cited text Husserl writes: “The original and instinctive striving that streams in the
kinaestheses is generally indeterminately [and] immediately directed to such fulfillment (the fact that it
passes through this still further, that is, the fact that it can attain only a relatively final satisfaction is not yet
conscious here, has not yet become sensible [empfindlich] and patent).” See also Hua Mat VIII, 326.
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enjoyments, while remaining wholly consistent with them. Interestingly, although
Husserl does not consider this, it may be that this enjoyment of the lived-body itself is the
same as the enjoyment of curiosity in its first occurrence. This is obscured by the fact
that we tend to focus on visual experience, but earliest experiences of the fetus are not
visual. Given that, it may very well be that the first turning toward, the first noticing the
fetus experiences is of its own movement.

  Ǧ 
The task now is to bring these analyses of the instincts, especially of curiosity and
of bodily movement, to bear on the problem of genuine transcendence, the experience of
an “external world” and the horizontal structure in which transcendent reality is
experienced. We have already seen how affection, now understood as the outworking of
instinctive curiosity, progressively forms a “pre-world” full of proto-objects and forms a
progression of gradually more complex horizons within the impressional present as well
as the retained past and expected future. We even considered how there is a kind of
“transcendence in imminence” of past proto-objects and the whole of one’s past together
with corresponding mediating norms for fulfilling “clear” experience.
What is crucially lacking from this pre-world is a co-present. To be co-present
means to be given in absence in an “empty presentation” or, in Husserl’s technical
vocabulary, to be appresented (Hua XXXIX Supplement IX).54 This is the subject’s
awareness of things as present although they are not given in the impressional present.55
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See also Hua XXXIX, 413, where he defines the co-present as the “unity of a spatiotemporal
present, of a simultaneous perceptual field, of a spatial-objective field of perception.
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On the concept of co-presence, see Dan Zahavi (2001), 46-47.
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Another way of conceiving this deficiency of the pre-world is in specifically spatial
terms. The pre-world is not yet experienced as properly spatial. The only simultaneous
expanse is the impressional present. The impressional present is articulated, but not in a
spatial way. Nevertheless, Husserl does recognize that this is a problem that requires
some kind of genetic resolution. He suggests that there is a “fundamental problem of the
constitution of being-in-itself, initially already in the primordiality of the first genesis of
childhood” (Hua XXXIX 301).56
Before attempting to deal with this problem, we should have before us some
details about what exactly is missing from the pre-world that distinguishes it from the full
experience of transcendent reality as spatial and having a co-present. Husserl, in the
early lecture course published as Thing and Space, describes clearly the kinds of spatial
experiences that, from the genetic perspective developed here, are not yet possible in the
pre-world (Hua XVI 204-216/173-182).
To begin with, it makes no sense, in the pre-world, for a proto-object to pass out of
the impressional present while remaining present. I can retain the past experience and I
can be motivated to expect a repetition of something similar, but I have no reason to think
it is still there once it has left the impressional present. It also makes no sense to
conceive of a proto-object rotating, being covered by another proto-object or having
unseen sides generally. Further, for what is given in the present, one can neither get
closer to or further from it. There is no near/far distinction in the impressional present.
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Unfortunately, Husserl does not get far in his attempt to deal with this, and crosses out the short
passage he wrote to address the problem, the deficiencies of which are obvious. Cf. the editor’s textcritical remarks and the crossed-out text at Hua XXXIX, 823. Husserl also mentions the problem at Hua
XV, 605: “Only much later does the child have space with spatial bodies and the mother as body [Körper]
in its spatial field.” In that quotation, I think Husserl may be underestimating how early a primitive
spatiality can arise.
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What makes all of these experiences possible is the embeddedness of the impressional
present in a spatial surrounding (Umgebung) or “surrounding world” (Umwelt). The
question, then, is how this dimension can arise from out of the pre-world, how “in the
course of genesis every immanent acquisition enters into mundane constitution” (Hua
XXXIX 22; 19).

  Ǧ 
Before getting into what I take to be Husserl’s solution to this problem, let me
exclude one possible response that readily suggests itself. It seems very natural to think
that expectation might explain how we come to think of proto-objects as co-present, as
existing presently when they do not appear in the impressional present, when they have
partially “exceeded” the impressional present, etc.57 There is certainly a connection
between expectation and co-presence in worldly experience. It would be very strange for
me to, for instance, have the expectation of the future event of going to work and
engaging in activities there if I did not have the conviction that my workplace is already
there waiting for me. Or, more simply, when I am about to reach into my pocket to get
my keys, I have an expectation that makes no sense without some appresentative
awareness of the keys before I carry out the action. Many, if not most, of our
expectations pertain to things that are already co-present.
Co-presence cannot be essential to expectation if there are expectations that lack a
reference to identically existing (temporally extended, persisting) objects that are not
presently given. That is precisely the state of the pre-world. We can think, for example,
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Dan Zahavi (2001, especially 46-47) has also argued that co-presence is not reducible to
expectation.
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of the expectation discussed earlier about a temporally extended sound. It is assumed
that I have become familiar with what the sounding of a large cymbal is like (but solely
as an acoustic experience). On that basis, when I hear the initial phase of the cymbal, I
expect the subsequent phases, which I take to be integral to the whole. Here I have an
expectation, but all it refers to is the impressional present, the expectation of subsequent
experience, and the retention of any elapsed phases.
But, one might insist, perhaps appresentative experiences of the present could
emerge on the basis of other sorts of experiences. Visual cases are the most tempting
cases to appeal to. We can think of an instance where there is a recurring appearance at
one margin of the primitive visual field and a subsequent disappearance at another of a
certain identically similar visual datum prominent enough to catch my attention. Or we
could think of a case where a proto-object takes up a considerable portion of the visual
field and moves back and forth at the margin, partially disappearing at the margin.
Would the expectation engendered by such experiences not lead me to hold that these are
not chance repetitions of similar proto-objects, but that the proto-objects somehow
endure, exist identically between their whole or partial disappearance and reappearance at
the margins of the visual field?
Such experiences alone would not lead to an appresented co-present. Expectation
only projects typical expectations that are completely bound by similarity. Whatever is
projected as occurring in the future will resemble the present and past experiences along
with any typical occurrences attending those past experiences (both simultaneously and
successively). Thus, the only basis for a co-present to factor in expectation would be an
already accomplished past experience where the expectation involved such a co-presence.
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But the hypothesis under consideration is precisely that expectation could give rise to an
appresented co-present without having already experienced such a co-present. There is,
then, nothing inherent in expectation alone that would be the genetic wellspring of an
appresented co-present. Admittedly, expectation without a co-present is very difficult to
conceive, but the pre-world is meant to help us understand how our familiar experience
of a transcendent world comes about in the first place without taking it for granted.

  Ǧ 
If expectation alone cannot produce a co-present, we must consider what else is
required to do so. Husserl’s earlier “static” analyses of spatiality give us the guiding clue
we need. In these analyses we learn that the lived-body is a chief factor in the experience
of a co-present. In Ideas II, for instance, he speaks of the rudimentary appresentation of a
co-presence when “I see the front side of the schema [of a spatial object], and much
remains indeterminate in the back. But a back side it certainly does have.” What makes
possible a unitary present experience in which both (in fact, all) sides play their part is the
fact that “[t]he body is a unity of experience, and it lies in the sense of this unity to be an
index for a manifold of possible experiences in which the body can come to givenness in
every new ways” (Hua IV 40/43).58 Even more strongly, Husserl claims that the
kinaesthetic sensations of the lived-body are not only “of significance for the construction
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Cf. Ms. D 3, 10a (1920) (quoted in Bernet, Kern and Marbach (1993, 138): “[I]n order to be able
to have an open horizon of unperceived things existing in themselves for me, I myself myst already exist as
a bodily organism for myself and thus constitute the null-point of null-member of the world and of things,
whichever you like.”
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of the spatial world,” but “are involved, and necessarily so, if representations of the
spatial are to be possible” (Hua IV 57/62; Hua XXXIII 300).59
To see what is behind this assertion, let’s first recall how kinaestheses work.
Kinaestheses, in developed experience,60 are sensations of bodily movement that occur
parallel to accompanying sensations of other sensory modalities (Hua XVI 169-175/143147). More specifically, there are series of kinaesthetic sensations that accompany
specific series of other types of sensations. For instance, the sensations of movement in
my hand and arms unfold in a certain way along with tactile and visual sensations as I
reach my hand behind myself to scratch the back of my head or reach into my pocket to
get my keys. Even when I do not reach to confirm that my back is still there or that my
pocket has my keys, these are co-present. They are appresented as available because I
have the bodily ability to make them available or accessible at any moment. That is the
sense in which the cultivated abilities of the lived-body are a condition or “index” of
spatial co-presence (Hua XVI 223/188).61
Therefore, if it can be genetically demonstrated how the bodily instincts are
transformed into an organized system of bodily abilities, then we finally arrive at the
bridge that takes us from the pre-world to the experience of the world of transcendent
59

See Hua XVI, 160-161/136: “[T]he extensional moment of visual sensation, and also that of tactile
sensation, indeed adumbrates spatiality but yet does not suffice to make possible the constitution of
spatiality… Still new sensations are needed, and we speak here of the sensations of movement which.” In
Ulrich Claesge’s (1964) concise words: “The familiarity of mundane consciousness with the a priori of
spatiotemporality is the familiarity of mundane consciousness with the abilities that befit it as kinaesthetic
consciousness” (142). For a condensed treatment of the necessary connection of the lived-body to spatial
perception, see Dan Zahavi (2001), 42-44.
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This is an important qualification. Husserl is mainly concerned with “normal” kinaesthetic
experience in Ideas II (Hua IV, 58-65/63-70), abnormal experiences being mere aberrations of a cultivated
normal functioning of sensations of bodily movement. The original, instinctive kinaestheses of the preworld are neither normal nor abnormal. They are the precondition for normality.
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In the cited text Husserl writes: “The essence of the beings that endure conjointly with what is
actually perceived includes the possibility of unitary and firmly ordered perceptions which lead over to
them by way of a determinate appurtenance with the directive kinaesthetic sequences.”
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reality. In one late manuscript, Husserl points in this direction, suggesting that the first
instinctive apperceptions are ones related to the experience of the lived-body (Hua
XXXIX 585). I will now try to put together a coherent story about the pivotal role the
lived-body plays in the genesis of co-presence in the handful of Husserl’s late
manuscripts dealing with various aspects of this specifically genetic problem of bodily
lived-experience, which is entirely lacking in the early static analyses, despite their
thoroughness in treating the topic in their own way.
Going back to the instinctive beginning of bodily experience, the lived-body exists
only in bursts of blind, instinctive behavior. As we saw above, it is not even, at the
lowest level, correlated in an organized way with sensations from other sensory
modalities. Movements simply occur initially as goalless spasms. But, as we also saw,
this quickly begins to change its character. There is a pleasure in bodily movement that
becomes prominent or disclosed in the purposeless behavior, and repetition of the
instinctive movement reinforces the affective value, both as allure and as enjoyment, of
this prominence, since each repetition recalls in an experience of recognition
(Wiedererkennens) the previous similar experiences (Hua XV 660-661). Consistent with
what was said previously about association, this can and will, provided there is repetition,
be taken up into expectation as well. When the initial phase of a sequence of kinaesthetic
sensations that is familiar as terminating in or partially involving an experience of
enjoyment takes place, the remaining phases come to be anticipated. Then the instinct is
transformed into a proto-intentional act, aiming for fulfillment in the enjoyment.
That is but one important strand of the development of the lived-body. Along with
that, there is also a development of the coordination of the kinaesthetic sensations with
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the sensations of other sensory modalities. This tends to happen “along with” the other
development because even though the primitive instinctive bodily movements are either
goalless or self-satisfying, they nevertheless occur simultaneously with some sensation(s)
from other sensory modalities. There is a sense in which the “connection between
kinaesthesis and the field [of other sensations] is ‘innate’ [Angeboren]” (Hua Mat VIII
273). For instance, if the goal is to flail limbs, this will still involve at least the tactile
sensations pertaining to whatever the limbs encounter in their movement. And if the
subject has visual experience, the movements will also correspond to changes in the
visual field.
Although the way Husserl talks, one would think that the development of
kinaesthetic coordination takes place when the subject is affected by non-kinaesthetic
proto-objects (Hua XV Supplement XIX, Hua XXXIX 628-632),62 that is not necessarily
the case. The coordination can arise even if what is prominent is the lived-body. In that
case, the bodily movements that become familiar will also have familiar attendant
sensations from other sensory modalities. The familiar experience of enjoyment in
extending a limb a certain way may happen to frequently be accompanied by certain
tactile sensations. These, then, would certainly not become prominent for themselves,
but would be part of the expectation of the kinaesthetic enjoyment. That would be a
primitive form of kinaesthetic coordination.
From that meager beginning, a shift of prominence from the kinaesthetic sensations
to sensations of other sensory modalities becomes possible when the latter arouse the
subject’s curiosity. In that case, the subject is initially engaged in the instinctive exercise
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Hua Mat VIII, text No. 71 is more ambiguous, as we have seen, but ultimately focuses on the case
of kinaesthetic sensations of eye movements, where it is especially true that the kinaestheses are not
themselves prominent.
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of the lived-body, and the sensations from another modality accompanying it, randomly
or in coordination, exert an affective allure more powerful than that present in the
enjoyment of the kinaesthetic sensations. Upon repetition, the subject discovers that this
is a typical occurrence, first in the past-oriented direction of familiarity or recognition,
then in the future-oriented direction of expectation. In this way, the connection between
the kinaesthetic sensations and the other kinds of sensations is “mastered through
practice” (Hua Mat VIII 273; Hua XV 661). Now what guides the coordination is neither
the utterly uncoordinated kinaesthetic enjoyment nor the kinaesthetic enjoyment with the
attendant sensations from other sensory modalities, but precisely the enjoyment of the
sensations from other modalities.63 The kinaestheses are no longer what is prominent,
i.e., what is enjoyed. They function only as an index, as an ordered set of circumstances
in which the enjoyment of, for instance, tactile sensations takes place.
What is truly remarkable about this, however, and what makes this development the
pivotal experience in the transition from pre-worldly to worldly experience is the fact that
the development of kinaesthetic experience, the lived-body, is the development of the
subject’s control over what goes on in experience.64 This is what was lacking in mere
expectation. In expectation, considered by itself, the subject may expect what is about to
happen, but the subject is not involved in making it happen. The case we considered of
an acoustic experience brings that out. As the experience of the lived-body develops, on
the other hand, the subject does not simply undergo the kinaesthetic sensations. That is
how they are experienced in the first instance, in the primitive first instinctive movements
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Cf. Bernet, Kern and Marbach (1993), 134.
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Husserl gives a brief outline of this process at Hua Mat VIII, 341. Cf. Bernet, Kern and Marbach
(1993), 133: “Kinaesthetic freedom consists in actively intervening in the phenomenal world.”
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when the instinct is still entirely blind. But experience cannot remain at that level.
Because of the disclosure of the enjoyment and the means leading up to it, the subject
gradually discovers its control over the kinaesthetic sensations (Hua Mat VIII 328).65, 66

Ǧ ǡ ǡǦ
Because the subject now controls these kinaesthetic sensations, and does so in
experiences that are aimed at the enjoyment of non-kinaesthetic proto-objects, the subject
comes to experience these proto-objects as co-present. Co-presence is, in this way, first
experienced as availability.67 The subject learns in the course of experience not only that
a certain sequence of sensations takes place regularly and in a familiar manner, in such a
way that the proto-object of possible enjoyment always occupies a position within past
experience, the immediate present or expectation. The subject, above and beyond that,
realizes that it can make the experience happen at will.
There is a peculiar indeterminacy to the occurrence of such proto-objects as
arbitrarily producible or repeatable. Husserl makes reference to this when he speaks of
co-present experiences as “open possibilities, always contained in open ranges
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In the cited text Husserl writes: “We must, then, no doubt say that the instinct that works itself out
in the kinaesthesis ultimately aims at [geht auf] the constitution of the controlled system as unity of an
accessibility in one’s power [vermöglichen], arbitrary repeatability of any position.” Husserl also
correlatively calls the apperceptive form of space a “system of access” (Zugangssystem) (Hua XV, 638).
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After the satisfaction and enjoyment of a kinaesthetic movement, the happening is disclosed as
something the subject did, and therefore in repetitions the subject can take charge of the process. The
additional element disclosed is that of the “exertion of force” (Kraftanspannung) that belongs to each
moment and to the whole processes of kinaesthetic experiences (Hua XXXIX, 397-398).
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Husserl points in this direction in Hua Mat VIII 273-274: “Still, all of that has to be clarified and
has to arrive at the constitution of that availability [Verfügbarkeit] and identification or [at] the repeated
recollecting in which a constant perceptual field of abidingly existing and alteringly mobile [beweglich],
spatiotemporal individuals have come into being, and then, further, a world over and above primordiality,
that is quite a long way.” In another place (Hua Mat VIII, 208), Husserl expressly refers to the
spatiotemporal world as “the available surrounding world.”
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[Spielräumen] and only in this way capable of being made intuitive as ‘possible
experience’” (Hua XXXIX 123-124). This is fundamentally different from the experience
of familiarity and expectation.68 The regularity in those experiences, the typical shape of
experience that arises in them, is one imposed on the subject from without. The past is
written in stone, and the present and the future, even when they assume typical forms, are
nevertheless ultimately conditioned by the appearance of proto-objects without the
subject’s intervening involvement.
With the addition of kinaesthetic experience, the subject comes to understand that it
makes the proto-object available in its own time. If we refer to such proto-objects as
available, we should, with Husserl, refer to the kind of activity correlative to them as
“acquiring” (Erwerben), which is the “ability to enjoy something repeatedly (recognizing
it as the same), to retrieve it for oneself here” and “to have it ready as available” (Hua
Mat VIII 274). These two moments taken together make up the basic structure of the
experience of a co-present, so that we can understand why, according to Husserl, “every
spatial object [is] constituted as a ‘good’” whose correlate is “the actual [aktuelle]
experiencing… of a ‘re-enjoying of the good’ or an actualization of the anticipated
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This is worth emphasizing, especially because Husserl himself often presents the notion of the copresent as if it were equivalent with expectation. Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (1996) in her Husserl-inspired
account of early cognitive development takes up Husserl’s ambiguous language and fails to make the
crucial distinction between future-oriented expectation and “anticipation” of what is co-present. Cf. Hua
XXXIX, 414: “Naturally, however, co-present inductions (or apperceptions – which is the same here) come
into question. Ultimately, every apperception of a familiar surrounding… is more than mere recollection.
Initially it naturally includes a product of memories, of very many as a rule, in which one thing or another
may become prominent in the unity of fusing coincidence. But above and beyond that, in every repeated
experience there is the anticipation (induction) that must reveal again as before the particular presented
perceptual field in following the various free directions of orientation of the same constellation of things”;
or Hua XXXIX, 436: “Already before they become thematic, they are indicated; I can direct myself to
them as no longer occurring. Or also: They are anticipated as co-present, as that [which] I indeed do not
actually have presently given in perception, occurring in the perceptual field…, but as inductively
anticipated and to be expected in such circumstances as co-present.” Nevertheless, in other places Husserl
clearly highlights the present-character of the co-present. Cf. Hua XXXIX, 90, 123, 436-437, 496; Hua Mat
VIII, 26, 62-63, 94, 124, 421.
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‘enjoyability’” (Hua Mat VIII 332).69 Now the subject emptily presents or appresents the
proto-object, which is actually no longer a proto-object but a genuinely transcendent
object. It is “over there” or “out there.”
It is not confined to my immediate sensory experience or its preservation and
modification in retention and protention. That is why Husserl says that the kinaesthetic
data organizing the lived-body are not “mere immanent data, but practical abilities.”
They are experiences “in which optima” – enjoyments – “are constituted as practically
available through the corresponding kinaestheses” (Hua XXXIX 12). Paradoxically, a copresent, a transcendent object, comes into being for the subject through its acquired
abilities,70 whereas prior to that development, when it is subject to proto-object occurring
in its time, so to speak, that brute experience of the “alien” is not yet an experience of
something transcendent. This is a very different story than that of the classical
empiricists, like Locke, who tended to think that the simplest “brute” sensory experience
not involving the subject’s participation is the genuine evidence for a transcendent
reality.
This is how the genetic account of spatiality, and therefore transcendent reality,
begins. In the simplest case, it is readily intelligible how proto-objects are transformed
into objects entering into and departing from the field, having an enduring existence in
the present. If I know that I can produce the experience at any time, then I know it is copresent. “Object permanence” corresponds to a “subject permanence,” the permanent
ability to employ one’s body as an instrument of perception for specific ends. Mobilizing
69

At Hua XV, 441, Husserl speaks similarly of this kind of experience as corresponding to “the
primal realm of sensory values, as it were.”
70

See Hua XXXIX, 403: “My perceptual field has its horizon of the co-present, into which I can
actively penetrate in experience”; and Hua XXXIX, 508: “The co-present world, the world exceeding my
perceptual sphere, is something in future coming to be in the present from my ability.”
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my lived-body as a “system of access” (Hua XXXIX 209), I can perform the movements
necessary to bring the object back into the immediately present perceptual field. We can
conceive of the more profound spatial characteristics of depth and proximity and distance
arising in a similar way.
Before the intervention of the lived-body, a coin rotating, for instance, is
experienced as a circular shape gradually becoming elliptical up to the point where it
becomes a thin line, etc., with variations of color throughout the process. But nothing
motivates the subject to understand this as a rotation, which is only comprehensible if the
coin is a transcendent object with parts and features that exist even when they are not
presently given to the subject. When the subject acquires the ability to intervene in this
experience, it likewise acquires the coin as an object with many sides that are always
available to it. Further, the proximity and distance of the coin are experienced by the
subject in terms of what it would take to make the object available for enjoyment.
Without that reference to bodily abilities, there would be no proximity or distance, but
only a proto-object with an oscillating size.
What is given in this way is genuine transcendence, a genuine in-itself. This is so
because “here ‘apperception’ gains a new sense, [that] of a unity of practically available
presentational [darstellenden] appearances-of [something]” (Hua XXXIX 12). We saw
above how a quasi-in-itself or quasi-transcendence arises in memory, because I can
present the same memory in varying degrees of clarity, so that the remembered
experience in a sense transcends particular memories of it. The transcendence of the copresent is similar, but implies a break with “immanent” experience. While past
experience is necessary for the experience of transcendent reality – because it is only
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experienceable in the framework of a typical familiarity – it is not reducible to past
experience.
When it is understood as transcendent, an object is no longer reducible to any
particular experience, past, present or future. The sense of transcendence as availability,
arbitrarily repeatable access and enjoyment of the object, precludes there being one
experience where the object is experienced exhaustively. That is what Husserl means in
the passage just cited where he states that the particular experiences of the object are
appearances-of. The very meaning of the experience of something as available entails
that it is transcendent in this peculiar way, so that every particular experience of it is a
partial one.
Similarly, transcendence does not mean that the object is sometimes given totally in
the immediate present and sometimes steps out of the perceptual field (totally or
partially) and is only co-present then. The experience of enjoyment, the optimum that
availability aims at, is essentially part of a continuum.71 To make available means that I
traverse an experiential sequence of “improvement” in which more or less gradually I
arrive at the optimum and achieve enjoyment, and afterwards, the satiation accompanying
enjoyment gradually lessens again and motivates new enjoyments.72 This brings out the
periodic, recurring character of our desires, beginning in instinctive life and continuing

71

Husserl makes this point specifically with reference to bodily abilities at Hua XV, 329: “The
‘closer’ [of approaching enjoyment] means that a change of data in ascending similarity lets what is lacking
always shine through in the form of similarity, it already likes [gefällt] and assimilates what is missed, it
recalls that and already holds it in itself, as it were, in the similarity, but not yet sufficiently. Every
recurrence is recurrence through assimilation in increase, and if it is present, then the desiring willing
ceases striving.” This is repeated almost verbatim at Hua Mat VIII, 258. See also, Hua Mat VIII, 328:
“[T]he instinctive intention that at the outset unitarily aims at this connection [Ineinander] of intentionality
and its relaxation [Entspannung] is fulfilled, [and] is fulfilled as unitary not in one phase, but in constant
doing.” This basic trait of intentionality is retained at all levels (Hua Mat VIII, 252-253).
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Husserl sketches this process, as a bodily ability, in Hua Mat VIII, text No. 63.
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through all levels, including our desires pertaining to transcendent objects (Hua Mat VIII
327).73
Thus, enjoyment, the optimum, is always, even as present, one aspect of a complex
whole (that is the instantiation of a process that itself tends to be periodically repeated),
the more or less inferior parts of which are also constantly available as means to or as the
affective after-effect of the enjoyment. Every available object has co-present moments
that make up a whole (whether as an interrelation of objects or as other moments of one
object) and that are also available and are necessarily repeatable with the free repetition
of what is actually desired. In other words, when a subject comes to experience an object
as possibly being co-present, it is for that very same reason experienced as necessarily
accompanied by the co-presence of its attendant moments that are not given in the
immediately presented perceptual field.
The genesis of transcendent objects is simultaneously the genesis of the worldhorizon. That the world also comes about in this process becomes evident when we make
explicit all the horizons that are bound up with the emergence of the transcendent object.
To begin with, to be experienced as available at all an object has to appear within a
horizon of familiarity, a consciousness of such an experience as a typical possibility.
This horizon is acquired the moment the subject comes to understand that the object is
available, that the enjoyment is at its disposal. Thus availability means, first, to be able to
reproduce the type, not the identical individual, which is a more sophisticated
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In the cited text Husserl writes: “The kinaesthetic hulƝ is not just a passage, but an instinctive
passage, an egoic [passage], a [passage] continually in ‘intention’ and fulfillment, that is a constantly
intermediary, to the extent that there is immediately fulfilled a new affection, [and that] a new intention is
awakened and lead over into new fulfillment ‘of itself’ without terminating in a particular hyletic totalcondition [Gesamtzustand] of this sphere.”
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development, just as recollection presupposes the more basic ability to recognize (Hua
Mat VIII 212-213, Hua XXXIX 21).
There are, further, the “internal” and “external” horizons of the available object.
The internal horizon corresponds to those moments immediately inseparable from the
enjoyment that have the most intimate functional connection to it. These are, for
instance, the co-present sides of the object. Making a certain side of an object available
for enjoyment has a necessary reference to a determinate variation of the other sides, and
the act of making available and of enjoying will require a horizonal consciousness of
these moments, which are precisely horizonal because they are not the focus of the
experience and are not even all in the perceptual field of the impressional present.
Likewise, there is an external horizon for the available object. This horizon
embraces all those moments involved more mediately or even incidentally in making the
object available and in its enjoyment. First and foremost, this means my lived-body, the
unity of kinaesthetic experience that possesses the ability to engage in activities involving
the object. Second, the horizon of familiarity entails that the experience of a particular
object is one of a range of possible experiences of similar available objects. Even other
prominent proto-objects that are not yet apprehended as objects proper are nevertheless
susceptible to the associative transference of the sense “available,” provided they are
sufficiently similar to that type. Given that the interest guiding this experience is the
instinct of curiosity, the aim of which is simply to enjoy prominent sensory experiences,
every prominent proto-object becomes a competitor vying to be apprehended as
available. The threshold is quite low for other proto-objects to be apperceived as objects
and to thereby take on all the aspects of co-presence that come along with that.
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To be able to have an object at one’s disposal, one must also have a grip on how to
instrumentalize a whole host of lived-experiences related to what typically attends that
object, even if one lacks interested in them for their own sake. Availability requires an
awareness of external horizons consisting not only of a tendency to transfer the sense
“available” to other proto-objects, but, even more basically, the fact that an object only
has “substantiality” in relation to its surroundings, as we saw in Chapter 2. Making an
object available means having a grip on its surroundings, i.e., being able to navigate one’s
perceptual field to the end of enjoying the experience of the object and recognizing the
object’s identity despite alterations it constantly undergoes in relation to its surroundings.
The world-horizon is therefore not a separate horizon putting us in contact with a distinct
layer of reality. It is seamlessly interwoven with any object(s) presented in experience
and their horizons.
The subject is interested first of all in certain prominences that come to be familiar
and, ultimately, these prominences take on the sense of co-present objects. Throughout
that process, the emerging co-present object is indexed to the typical ways it relates to its
circumstances. The subject does not create the world-horizon, the familiar surroundings
that attend what is of interest to it, and it never takes any interest in that per se.
Nevertheless the perceptual field itself comes to be instrumentalized in the service of
attaining certain desirable experiences, so that along with the transcendent object, there
are also transcendent perceptual fields. The moment one becomes practiced in making
objects available for immediate sensory experience, one also gains mastery of the
perceptual field itself, and so with the genesis of the experience of objects the worldhorizon itself comes into being.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion
 
The main chapters of this dissertation presented an interpretation of Husserl’s
genetic phenomenology of the world-horizon, beginning with the nature of the worldhorizon (Chapter 2), the motivation for a theory of the genesis of the world-horizon
(Chapter 3), a methodological reflection on the genesis of the world-horizon (Chapter 4),
and, finally, an account of how Husserl conceives of the world-horizon coming into being
genetically. These investigations necessarily had a very restricted focus, not just a
restriction to Husserl’s work alone, but even a very narrow theme within that work that
many are utterly unfamiliar with. Nevertheless, the themes discussed in this dissertation
are relevant for even the most familiar parts of Husserl’s phenomenology and for
phenomenology beyond Husserl.
There are two intimately related points that the research on Husserl’s
phenomenology presented in the body of this dissertation can shed light on with respect
to Husserl’s concept of world and its reception. One of these is Husserl’s infamous claim
in Ideas I that one can conceive of the annihilation of the world of experience that leaves
the experiencing subject essentially untouched (Hua III 91-93/109-112). This claim has
proven decisive for the reception of Husserl’s phenomenology. Many have not merely
disputed the validity of the argument but taken it as a symptom of a deeper philosophical
ailment, a symptom indicating that Husserl’s philosophy either is moribund as a whole or
at least that some vital organ is in desperate need of replacement.
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To come to the second point, this is where Heidegger, who is to be credited for
being a trend-setting advocate of the aforementioned diagnosis, famously enters with just
the operation needed to rescue phenomenology from its Husserlian affliction. His
solution is to recast subjectivity as essentially world-connected. He renames the subject
Dasein (literally “existence,” but etymologically “being here/there”) and argues that this
subject is but a moment in the infrangible structure “being-in-the-world.”
What we have learned in the preceding chapters about Husserl and his genetic
phenomenology of the world-horizon implies that, with respect to the first point, there
may be good phenomenological grounds for possibility of the “annihilation of the world.”
By implication, the second point, the alleged need to replace Husserl’s “worldless
subject” with a subject inseparable from the world, must also be reconsidered. In
addressing these concerns, the picture of Husserl’s phenomenology painted in this
dissertation amounts to an enormous step in easing the trenchant and pervasive suspicion
that Husserl’s philosophy is incurably “Cartesian.”
We should further broaden our perspective of Husserl’s work by posing some
questions to his account of the genesis of the world-horizon that he himself does not ask.
Because Husserl tended to discuss these matters in relatively short manuscripts written at
diverse times over the span of many years without ever attempting to synthesize his work
into a coherent whole, the interpretive work of making up for that systematic deficiency
naturally raises important questions, questions that point to further work to be done and
to possible connections with the problem of development beyond Husserl.
I will consider two ambiguities that are of central importance. The first concerns
who it is that Husserl’s genetic analysis of the world-horizon is supposed to be
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describing. I argue that there are two tendencies in Husserl’s work, one toward
describing consciousness as such, in the abstract, without any reference to the concrete
details of that subject, and another toward describing specifically human cognitive
development. The interpretive problem of resolving that ambiguity leads to a second
question concerning how Husserl’s genetic account can account for different paths of
cognitive development given his conviction that genesis is necessary genesis. The
problem is especially pertinent in light of the different starting points that development
can have in empirically familiar cases.

ǲǳ
Husserl’s reflection on the possible annihilation of the world in Ideas I was the
precipitation of a train of thought he entertained previously in his 1907 lectures published
as Thing and Space, where he spoke of the world as an “irrational fact,” an experiential
coherence that has no essential necessity, and which we can conceive of dissolving (Hua
XVI 288-291/250-251). (Even earlier, in lectures from 1898, he had entertained in
passing the idea that experience entirely without “apprehension,” without intending
anything or having any object whatsoever, might be a possibility (Hua XXXVIII 204).)
Although he argues that the world, that harmonious, all-encompassing organization of
experience that puts us in touch with transcendent reality, could in principle cease being
constituted and turn into an experiential chaos, he nevertheless distinguishes between that
possibility and the “motivated possibility” contained in our conviction that it will rather
continue much as it always has.

212

This is a very prescient qualification that is lacking in the subsequent Ideas I
account. The admission of the possible annihilation of the world goes hand in hand with
an understanding of the motivation of the world. Let’s take a moment to reflect on the
difference between an empty possibility, an essential possibility, and a motivated
possibility. It is an empty possibility that, to take an example from Wittgenstein, perhaps
my skull is literally empty or contains straw rather than brains. Nothing in my experience
speaks in favor of that, and everything seems to speak against it instead. The possibility
is empty in that sense. An essential possibility is a necessity, an eidetic necessity, like the
necessity that the surface of a material object have a color, whatever the color may be.
By contrast, a motivated possibility is a possibility we can conceive of not being
instantiated, but which experience speaks in favor of nevertheless. A paradigmatic
example is that of the relation between kinaesthetic sensations and exteroceptive sensory
experience (Hua XVI 169-175/143-147). The feeling of turning my head motivates the
ensuing sequence of visual experiences, e.g., I know, or I am motivated to suppose, that
to those feelings of movement there will correspond a change in what I see from the
computer in front of me to the bookshelf next to me. But that is not a necessary
connection. In other circumstances the same feelings will motivate different series of
visual experiences. But the connection is anything but arbitrary. The terms that make up
such a possibility are connected “functionally but not essentially” (Hua XVI 170/143).
The world-horizon itself is just such a motivated possibility. This realization –
which Husserl had in hand even before the discussion of the annihilation of the world – is
the germ for the project of a genetic phenomenology of the world-horizon, which is the
ultimate phenomenological grounding of the possibility of the annihilation of the world-
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horizon. The functional connection that comprises any motivation (of this particular sort,
since necessary connections are after all “motivated” in their own way) is an associative
connection. Such connections are not necessary and are not a priori givens of
experience. They must be acquired. The possible non-existence of the world-horizon,
viewed in this light, is based not on an abstract characterization of consciousness over
against the world, but on a genuinely concrete understanding of the character of the
intentionality of the world-horizon.
This path of inquiry is the one we have followed in this dissertation. The more
Husserl reflected on the matter, the more he was able to discern the need to account for
the genesis of the world-horizon. He not only discovers the paradox of worldly
intentionality that demands a genetic account of the world-horizon, but furthermore
develops a complex set of methodological tools for carrying out this analysis
phenomenologically and attempts to reconstruct the transformation that comprises the
genesis of the world-horizon. All of this makes it possible for Husserl to affirm that one
really can conceive of the subject apart from the world, because that possibility was a
reality for us at one point.
This should not be taken to imply that the discussion of the possible annihilation of
the world in Ideas I can be maintained in all of its detail. As we saw in the discussion of
the reduction in Chapter 4, that argument hinges on the unnecessarily self-imposed
epistemological constraint of adequacy, which Husserl would later realize cannot take
phenomenology very far (Hua I 61-63/22-23). We can, however, preserve the basic
thrust of the argument. The possibility of the annihilation of the world is supposed to
demonstrate the universally constitutive character of consciousness. If I can conceive of
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the world not being there for me, it is because the world requires my constitutive
contribution to be there. Husserl’s later phenomenology, far from overturning that
conception, puts it on firmer ground. It does not rest content with showing that certain
constitutive feats are necessary for the world to be meaningfully present for us. It makes
a crucial advance by showing the precise events that must take place for consciousness to
have a world-horizon.
One will perhaps recall that in Chapter 4 I argued that not having the world-horizon
does not imply one is completely out of contact with reality. From the beginning,
consciousness is engaged with what Husserl describes as “alien to the ego” (ichfremde).
And, as that discussion along with the discussion of affection in Chapter 5 showed, these
are meaningful experiences, the experiences of being in an environment and coming into
contact with a reality that has some significance for one’s needs and desires, even if one
only gets any kind of grip on that significance after the fact. Husserl does not do so, but I
would say his view implies that such experiences qualify as experiences of reality. To
not have a world does not mean one occupies some separate metaphysical realm. It
means one approaches reality in a different way, that it has a different significance for
one. To be more specific, experience that lacks the world-horizon lacks (at least) the
significance of being an experience of a traversable space filled with entities that have
abiding identities despite alteration.
To say that the possible annihilation of the world is compatible with the
preservation of reality might seem to run contrary to the Ideas I account of the possible
annihilation of the world or to defeat its purpose. I maintain that it does not do so. The
purpose of that account is to drive home the point that consciousness constitutes the
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world. To maintain that the world-horizon does not exhaust our experience of reality
leaves untouched the claim that consciousness constitutes the world. What it does is
open up a deeper level of constitution. Doing that requires taking a step beyond the one
taken in Ideas I and discovering a different kind of constitution, the realm of pre-worldly
constitution we considered in Chapter 5. Whatever else this move implies, it does not
imply any violation of the constituted/constituting distinction.
Aside from the matter of constitution, one might say it defeats the purpose to say
that the annihilation of the world is a genuine possibility, but that reality would still be
left over. After all, did Husserl not want to argue that only consciousness is left over
after in the possible event of the annihilation of the world? Saying that reality is still
present to consciousness apparently flies in the face of that. While that is a reasonable
response, the objection is misguided. In an important sense, consciousness is all that is
left even when we reflect on the experience of reality beneath that of the world-horizon.
But first let’s consider more precisely why consciousness seemingly cannot be a
“residuum” left over after the annihilation of the pre-world.
It is true that a very different kind of constitution takes place in the pre-world, and
that, moreover, it is a kind of constitution that is inseparable from conscious life in a way
that is not true of the constitution of the world-horizon. I can conceive of consciousness
without a world-horizon, but the experience that makes up the pre-world is, as Husserl
puts it, the “realm of the ‘innate’ a priori, without which an ego as such is unthinkable”
(Hua I 114/81). To recall what he has in mind here, consider the following statement:
“The ego is always already the ego of abilities, the ego of kinaestheses, but also always
already the ego that has something hyletic that affects it in the manner of ‘affect’
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[Gemüts] in pleasure and pain [Freude und Leid]” (Hua XXXIX 472). However deep and
however far back one goes into conscious life, one will encounter this a priori, the
primitive schemata (i.e., instinctive affective tendencies) for having meaningful
engagements with reality, and they are inconceivable without the reality they put me in
touch with, without “something hyletic.”
While a priori is often loosely defined as “prior to experience,” Husserl’s
unflagging phenomenological commitment to stick to lived-experience implies that, for
him, the a priori is always an a priori within experience, an a priori already at work.
Therefore, if the subject is inconceivable without this innate a priori, then the subject is
likewise inconceivable without some environment or proto-object which that a priori
bears on. The moment the subject awakens to consciousness, its innate a priori begins to
function and determine its interactions with its surroundings in a meaningful manner. It
follows that there can be no possible annihilation of the reality beneath the worldhorizon, and if this is true one cannot affirm that consciousness is a truly independent
realm as Ideas I suggests it is.
To speak of consciousness as independent is vague. To clarify, we should
determine what motivates the separation of consciousness and world. As he argues in the
paragraphs following §49 of Ideas I where he advances the possibility of the annihilation
of the world, there are three errors that Husserl seeks to avoid by labeling consciousness
“independent.”1 One is the idealistic error of absorbing the world into consciousness,
which Husserl takes to be a self-evidently false on phenomenological grounds (e.g.,
objects really do appear to be external to consciousness) (Hua III 106-108/128-130). A

1

Husserl makes all of these points in the span of two pages in the Hua I, §11.
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second is the psychologistic and, more generally, naturalistic error of assimilating
consciousness into the world, which he faults for eroding the basis for the intelligibility
of the world and rationality itself (Hua III 53-54). A third is the idea that there is “sense”
or meaning not due to consciousness or entirely apart from consciousness (Hua III 9091/108-109, 97-102/117-124).
We need not infer from the fact that the possible annihilation of the world supports
Husserl’s stance on these matters, as it does, that the impossibility of annihilating the preworld beyond its innate a priori does the reverse. Saying consciousness is necessarily in
touch with reality in this very minimal sense does not lead to the conclusion that reality is
a part of consciousness, that consciousness is a part of reality or that reality has sense
apart from consciousness’ possible engagement with it. All of these metaphysical
problems are avoided. The pre-world, as ichfremde, is distinct from consciousness, so
neither term (i.e., consciousness, reality) is a part of the other. And the very nature of the
innate a priori is to make possible the constitution of reality, and that is the only way the
two terms come together in Husserl’s story, thus overcoming concern about sense apart
from consciousness.
The only remaining worry is the epistemological one about the relative evidence of
consciousness vis-à-vis reality. The Cartesian way to the reduction quintessentially
expressed in the consideration of the possible annihilation of the world is predicated on
the idea that consciousness is apodictically given and the world is not (Hua III 8585/100-104, Hua I 57-63/17-23). That leads to the insight that they are constituted in
different ways, and that ultimately consciousness alone constitutes and the world is
constituted, as we have already discussed. In saying that consciousness is necessarily
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confronted with reality, that it is unthinkable without it, one does not contradict that
distinction of apodicticity. But one appears to defeat the point at a deeper level.
Consciousness is not what is alone apodictic in the strictest sense, as Husserl surely
wanted to conclude, since reality seems to have the same apodictic dignity.
Two aspects of Husserl’s theory of the innate a priori and its relation to the
experience of reality in the pre-world are worth considering here. First, he claims that at
the limit, when we construct the possible beginnings of experience, “affection precedes
everything,” and adds, moreover, that “everything” includes all “‘prominent’ data,
kinaesthetic [data] and data of sensation” (Hua XXXIX 468, Husserl’s emphasis).
Second, this affection although entirely blind (i.e., one does not know what the
experience accomplishes until after the fact) (Hua XXXIX 316-17 and Hua Mat VIII 252253), is not for that reason “completely indeterminate.” Rather, “it is already instinctaffection” (Hua XXXIX 474) and in a sense “direction-giving” (Hua XXXIX 476).
The first point indicates that the subject’s innate a priori and the reality the subject
encounters in the pre-world are not on equal footing. The former has some sort of
precedence. We know this cannot be temporal. The second point clarifies the nature of
the precedence. Even if there is never a point where it makes sense to say the subject
exists with its innate a priori and yet lacks something to experience, it is still the case that
the innate a priori dictates the terms on which it comes into contact with reality. The
instincts that make up this a priori give the subject certain preferences and interests that
define how it will engage with the world. The innate a priori lays down the conditions to
be met by whatever the subject can possibly encounter.
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That last claim needs some qualification. It should not be taken to mean that the
innate a priori works like a sieve that lets certain items through and keeps others out.
Such a conception is not only prima facie untenable, but is fundamentally
unphenomenological, since there is no possible way to phenomenologically confirm any
claims about something being excluded from consciousness. The affective preference
that defines the innate a priori has no power to determine what contents come to
consciousness. The entirety of its work is to regulate the subject’s interaction, first in
quite general terms with respect to one’s surroundings as a whole, and then more
specifically in particular engagements within those surroundings. Something can show
up in either of these ways for consciousness that fails to meet the subject’s instinctive
interest or preference. The innate a priori defines the subject’s response even in such
circumstances. Instead of guiding the subject to take enjoyment in being presented with
such a reality, it rather prescribes indifference (dismissal rather than lack of feeling),
dissatisfaction or displeasure (Hua Mat VIII Nos. 69 and 75).
With those clarifications, we can now better understand the kind of apodicticity that
belongs to the reality of the pre-world. The foregoing implies that the existence of the
pre-world does not have the same degree of certainty as the subject’s innate a priori.
Yes, reality must exist in some form or another, but one cannot say in precisely what
form. To be more specific, there are drives for food and sex, for instance, and the subject
has an instinctive curiosity, but there is no a priori which, if any, of these will be put to
work and how. The only thing one can speak of with any intelligibility is the nature of
the subject’s innate a priori. Merely saying that reality exists is entirely lacking in
significance apart from the innate a priori that defines the possible meanings that reality
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can have. The conclusion this leads to is that we are apodictically certain of the reality of
the pre-world in a way that is not true of the world-horizon, but that this apodicticity is
entirely dependent upon and derivative from that of the subject’s own innate endowment.

  ǲ ǳ
Implied in the preceding is the Husserlian rejoinder to Heidegger’s critique of
Husserl’s understanding of the subject/world relation. Despite Heidegger’s explicit
praise of Husserl (alongside Max Scheler) in Being and Time for recognizing that “the
unity of the person [requires] a constitution essentially different from that of things of
nature,” he nevertheless constructs a powerful critique of Husserl’s understanding of
subjectivity between the lines of that same text. The major defect of Husserl’s
phenomenology, for Heidegger, is Husserl’s belief that subjectivity can be understood
without reference to the world. While the critique of Cartesian ontology in Being in Time
aims at many of Heidegger’s contemporaries, it is Husserl, the self-styled Cartesian of
Ideas I, who is one of its primary targets
One need not speculate about how Husserl would respond to this charge, since he
embarked on the task himself (Hua XXXIX Supplement XLI). In one manuscript text he
effectively turns the Heideggerian criticism of a “worldless subject” around and claims
that Heidegger’s insistence in Being and Time on Dasein’s being-in-the-world is an “a
priori prejudice” deserving phenomenological critique (Hua XXXIX 489-490).2 He
argues that phenomenology cannot be blinded by “prejudice,” even if it is the seemingly
well-founded prejudice that the subject must always be in a world.
2

In the cited text Husserl writes: “It would be a natural ‘naïveté’ to say: The person [Mensch] is a
being [Seindes] that consciously has all other beings as its ontic horizon or that has [ist] an understanding
of being [Seinsverständnis] of everything in advance, of itself and of all other beings.”
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At back of this claim is Husserl’s concern with the radicalization of genetic
phenomenology (Hua XXXIX 490).3 Even when it comes to the world itself, he says, “the
question of [its] primal institution must be posed” (Hua XXXIX 492). That imposes on us
the task of producing an “eidetic construction of the mere possibility of a genesis of our
factual yet endlessly streaming self-perpetuating style [of experiencing the world].”
Husserl further suggests that we would uncover not only the possibility but “the necessity
of such a genesis” (Hua XXXIX 493). The world-horizon remains an “irrational fact,” in
the sense that one can conceive of consciousness without it and it is thus contingent in
some sense. But at the same time it is elevated to the realm of “transcendental factuality”
(Hua XXXIX 492-493). It is a motivated phenomenon, unfolding in an essential, even
necessary genesis in transcendental life. Conscious life can exist without experiencing a
world (i.e., in the earliest stages of cognitive development), but the moment it shows up it
is necessarily on the way to having that experience.
In Being and Time, Heidegger (1996) misses all of this because of a certain
prejudice, that the subject must have a world, which is implied in the Heideggerian claim
that Dasein or the subject necessarily has an a priori “understanding of being”
(Seinsverständnis) (8/6). To understand being means to be in possession of the “meaning
of being.” This is the text that the phenomenologist has to interpret, so to speak. What
the interpretive work brings out, in the first instance, are the structures of Dasein’s beingin-the-world, and, ultimately, these same structures in their temporal depth. Dasein’s
3

In the cited text Husserl writes: “[I stand] before the question of whether the infinite regress of a
genesis is conceivable in which the implicit ontological essential form is always already included, therefore
has not itself come into being, or whether a beginning is necessary or first of all [als Erstes] the becoming
of a world-apperception as its primal institution and naturally in a primal instituting genesis of determinate
apperceptions of a determinate sequence of levels, concluding with a first-time ‘world’ of determinate
individual content, and only now continuing in the now co-instituted ont[ological] form ‘world’ in
streaming continual production [Fortzeugung], in the change of temporary determinacy.”
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being in the world is its very nature, not an extrinsic addition, because Dasein is its
possibilities for being, all of which are possibilities for engaging with the world
(143/134).
Dasein’s possibilities are not just any form of engagement, but practical
engagements, such as one enjoys in the complex activities that make up one’s daily
routines and occupational tasks (66-72/62-67). They all thus involve pursuing complex
goals through a variety of means and have some relation to other subjects as well (117125/110-118). In addition, Dasein’s possibilities always have an affective tonality, an
intelligibility for Dasein, and the potential for Dasein’s explicit preoccupation with them
(140-161/131-150). The significance of the world for Dasein is wholly derived from
such possibilities.4
For the most part, this is a very attractive way of characterizing the subject. It calls
attention to the importance of many concrete features of subjectivity that are easy to
overlook or neglect due to certain traditional epistemological or metaphysical prejudices,
although thanks to the work of philosophers like Heidegger such prejudices are less
entrenched than they once were. Nevertheless, Husserl’s critique shows that Heidegger is
weighed down with his own prejudice, namely, that the subject must necessarily
experience a world in the way just described.
This is a genuine prejudice because it exclusively privileges normality. As we saw
in Chapter 4, one of the primary reasons that genetic phenomenology in general and the
genetic problem of the pre-world and the genesis of the world-horizon were so difficult to
arrive at in the first place and required so much preparatory work is that one naturally
4

Heidegger (1996) 64/60 (Heidegger’s emphasis): “‘World’ is not ontologically a determination of
those beings which Da-sein is essentially not, but rather a characteristic of Da-sein itself.”
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enters into phenomenology concerned solely with figuring out how consciousness works
normally, for the rational, mature adult human being. Something like that is true of the
Heidegger of Being and Time. In that text he is completely transfixed by a conception of
Dasein created in the image of normal human life or, to use Heidegger’s own words,
“average everydayness.” Heidegger even scorns the idea that there is anything of great
importance to learn from “primitive” subjectivity, since we can learn what is “essential”
from first analyzing Dasein in its average everydayness. If studying other “world
images” uncovers anything, it is something presupposing the common core of everyday
Dasein (50-52/47-48).
Husserl importantly calls our attention to the fact that that there are abnormal forms
of consciousness besides that of rational, adult humans that are incommensurable with
the latter, even “incompossible.” These are not all of equal interest. But the abnormal
states that make up the stages of human ontogeny prior to adulthood are of special
interest because they are the soil from which normality itself emerges. Husserl may have
emphasized the incommensurability in terms of scientific rationality (Hua I 107-108/7374), which would not have impressed Heidegger, since scientific rationality is not
essential to Heidegger’s Dasein, but surely infant, early childhood, and adult
consciousness are incompossible in other respects – above all, with respect to practical
rationality, which is at the heart of Dasein’s being-in-the-world.
Such rationality is not an essential or core feature necessary for experience. It is
something acquired, and there is one being that at one stage lacks it and subsequently
comes to possess it. Consciousness at the earliest stages of human ontogeny does not
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have a world, as either Husserl or Heidegger describe it.5 Whereas Heidegger’s account
would force us to say that whatever it is that comes into being and passes over into
Dasein is not Dasein, Husserl shows us a way of understanding conscious life as unitary
in its development from the pre-world to experience of the world-horizon. This would be
no solution if it meant that the “worldless subject” existing prior to the advent of the
world-horizon inhabited some distinct metaphysical realm, but we have seen that
Husserl’s later genetic phenomenology has the resources to avoid that problem. The
subject does indeed experience reality prior to the world-horizon, but in a very different
way than when it has the world-horizon.

 ǯ
Serious problems arise for Husserl’s account when one presses it on the issue of
the comparative ontogeny of different forms of subjectivity. Husserl’s account of the
genesis of conscious abilities leading up to the world-horizon seems at least plausible
because it reflects the laborious development that actually takes place in human
ontogeny. It takes significant time for human infants to develop their conscious abilities,
e.g., those perceptual abilities that put it in touch with reality by means of the schema of
the world-horizon.6 Much learning is required, and the account given in Chapter 5 tries
to show how that learning has to unfold for the subject on Husserl’s view.

5

This problem has also been raised by Hans Georg Gadamer (2004), 253 and Gail Soffer (1999),

6

See Mark Johnson 2007, 34-36 for a brief summary of human infant ontogeny.

387.
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A cursory familiarity with the ontogeny of non-human animals, however, reveals
the parochial character of Husserl’s account of conscious development.7 A horse, for
instance, is capable of walking moments after birth. In other words, it is unnecessary for
a foal to run the gamut of the gradual cultivation of memory and instinctive formation of
a schema of bodily abilities that are essential ingredients to the Husserlian account of
cognitive development.8 The obvious question this raises is who exactly Husserl’s
account applies to and, given that, how Husserl’s account relates to alternative
developmental possibilities.

 ǯ ǫ
The best and most plausible way of taking Husserl’s account is that he
inconsistently shifts between two different poles in trying to explain genetic phenomena.
On the one hand, some texts give a generic account of conscious development as such.
Two main sets of texts exemplify that approach. First, there are the (relatively) early
discussions of affection and association in Hua XI (the 1920/1924) lectures on passive
synthesis) and Experience and Judgment. In these texts Husserl’s exclusive aim is
clarifying how active (deliberately and rationally motivated) intentionality comes about
from passive forms of intentionality. This emergence is explained without any reference
to the peculiarities of human life and cognitive development. The investigation is
conducted with an eye to what is being constituted rather than who is constituting.

7

This problem occurred to me on the basis of Gallagher (2005), 169.

8

I use the phrase “cognitive development” somewhat restrictedly, since Husserl’s approach does not
consider any subpersonal or prenoetic forms of cognition. Here, the phrase refers only to development that
is in one way or another accessible to consciousness.
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Second, there are the texts that use the dual procedure of Abbau and Aufbau
analysis, many of which appear in Hua XXXIX and Hua Mat VIII. This technique
consists of a first move (the Abbau) gathering all possible ontological types in order to
show how the more complex forms rest constitutively on less complex forms, plumbing
all the way to the most abstract core of experience, the impressional present. In a second
move (the Aufbau) the whole edifice is reconstructed step by step in its genesis. While
the Abbau sometimes touches on uniquely human forms of experience, its purpose is to
dismantle those forms. The result of the Abbau is a dehumanizing of experience (Hua
XXXIX No. 26 and Hua Mat VIII 85-86). Since that lays the groundwork for the Aufbau,
the latter often begins in a dehumanized world, so that at least the rudiments of
consciousness, including the basic processes of associative constitution of the pre-world,
are usually explained without reference to any particularly human cognitive or
developmental characteristics (Hua Mat VIII Nos. 16, 20, 49).
In these two groups of texts Husserl is inquiring about how any conscious state or
conscious ability might have been formed in general, beginning from the absolutely
simplest, most primitive forms of consciousness and building from there. This approach
aims to be comprehensive and exhaustive. Empirical cases that do not match this general
account do not necessarily invalidate it, because it is not supposed to be an account of
any particular empirical form of cognitive development. Furthermore, it means that
Husserl is not necessarily a radical empiricist when it comes to human cognition, a
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position that was prominent in Husserl’s time but which has increasingly come into
question.9
Importantly, it is not necessary for the Aufbau to take on the dehumanized character
of the Abbau. When Husserl does keep the Aufbau abstract, I believe it is for the same
reasons he kept the discussion of passive synthesis in the early twenties relatively
abstract. In many texts tracking the Aufbau, Husserl is just interested in giving the bare
minimum account of how an experience comes about, and he is mainly concerned with
how we come to experience something rather than how we come to experience
something. The shift of emphasis, focusing on the object of constitution with less
concern for full constitutive concreteness, is the cause for abstraction.
But the Aufbau cannot be as abstract as the Abbau, and it need not be as abstract
and dehumanized as Husserl (for good reason) sometimes makes it. A central tactic of
the dismantling Abbau procedure is to abstract from the affective component conscious
life (Hua XXXIX 267). Indeed, Husserl even says that “to every new region there
corresponds a new kind of affection” (Hua Mat VIII 336). Systematically stripping
experience of its affective and motivational character, that is, the ways it appeals to one
and influences constitution, exposes the bare formal structures, allowing one to focus
especially on the founding or dependence relations that hold among them. Once these
have been made available, one can peel off each stratum one by one until the Abbau hits
experiential rock bottom. Motivation, however, is essential to the Aufbau. Genesis
simply would not get off the ground but for some motivation that sparks an interest in
experience, in constitution. And the fundamental form of motivation (in passive
9

See Solomon Diamond (1974), 12-13 for a broader historical survey of the debate. For a critical
commentary on the innate/acquired distinction in recent years, see Patrick Bateson and Matteo Mameli
(2007).
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experience, where the genetic Aufbau begins) is affection. So the very nature of the
Aufbau breaks up its apparent parallelism with the Abbau.10
Thus some of the Aufbau texts fit into Husserl’s other, more concrete approach to
cognitive development (Hua Mat VIII No. 17, 46). These are the investigations,
broadening out from the point of view of adult human normality, that take abnormal
forms of consciousness into view, clues given “from without.” (That is perhaps obvious,
since one has no awareness “from within” alone of one’s early cognitive development.
Perhaps the desire to think the problem through only from within is a contributing factor
to the abstractness of the just-considered approach.) This alternative approach takes a
great deal from the formal account, which is a simple and natural move because the path
of human development is staggered in a way that is similar to the first approach that aims
at an exhaustive, piecemeal account of cognitive development.
The second approach is more concrete in that it allows factors particular to human
development to influence its account. For instance, observations about how development
takes place in relation to the human transition from the prenatal to the postnatal
environment and related observations about infant behavior like suckling (and the
complex activities that relate to it) (Hua XV 605 and Hua Mat VIII 326-327), the “joy of
kicking” (Hua Mat VIII 328), and a feeling of “vital motherly security [mütterlichen
Lebensgeborgenheit]” (Hua XXXIX 474-475) help set the parameters for these genetic
analyses of human cognitive development.

10

See Hua Mat VIII, 394: “The chief principle of all Abbau-reduction holds that Abbau-strata are not
somehow independently [für sich] constituted in the genesis, in a genetic succession that corresponds to the
succession of founding [Fundierungsabfolge]. Indeed, to every stratum there corresponds a stratum in the
genesis; all intentionality through which the pregiven world is constituted is genetically acquired and is
contained in continuous genetic emergence [genetischen Fortwerden]. But all geneses function together in
immanent time, they are coexisting geneses.”
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With this understanding of just who Husserl’s genetic account is supposed to
describe, we can return to the problem that spurred these considerations. Husserl’s
account, both the form that tries to comprehend conscious development as such and the
form that focuses on human conscious development, paints a picture of a gradual
development of cognitive abilities. Further, Husserl will often speak as though these
paths are necessary ones (Hua I 107-111/73-77; Hua XXXIX 445, 468, 475, 491-493).
One is justly puzzled at the claim that development occurs as a staggered process given
the empirical fact that other conscious beings (i.e., certain species of non-human animals)
manifestly possess a world-horizon for engaging transcendent reality almost immediately
upon birth. Not only that, but even for human development it has been persuasively
argued that important components of experience do not need to be acquired.11 The
obstacle Husserl’s account meets here is a variant of the idea that the mind comes
equipped with a more or less elaborate innate endowment.12
I believe this is a problem that Husserl can get around. The real difficulty for
Husserl is not any aversion to innateness. Indeed, the instincts Husserl talks about are
precisely the subject’s innate cognitive endowment. The real difficulty, I suggest, is the
tension in Husserl’s view between accounts that put an inordinate genetic burden on
11

See, for instance, Shaun Gallagher (2005), Chapters 3 and 7, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (1996),
and F. Clément and A. J. Malerstein (1993, 73-74).
12

Husserl also faces a problem at the opposite end of the spectrum. If humans and non-human
animals are the same up to the point of recognitional abilities (see Hua XV, 405, Hua XXXIX, 212, 371 and
Hua Mat VIII, No. 50), as he supposes, then Husserl’s view that the genesis unfolding in human cognitive
development is a necessary one faces the troubling question of why development reaches maturation at one
point for some conscious beings and does so at another point for others. Even if we make up for Husserl’s
inadequate understanding of the cognitive abilities of non-human animals, it is a perplexing to consider
what, viewed “from within,” determines the terminus of cognitive development.
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memory (i.e., everything that follows based solely on a reflection on the possible
affective and associative interplay of the impressional present and the retained past and
the expectations that emerge therefrom) and those that more realistically emphasize
specific bodily instincts (e.g., for movement, eating, sociality, sexuality, self-defense,
self-preservation) and have these processes direct the work of memory.
For Husserl’s account to succeed it must lighten the load carried by memory alone
and emphasize that the instincts are the primary motor for genesis that operate within the
framework of memory, using the latter for cultivation and refinement of the instincts.
Although we never find Husserl comparing the more memory-based account and the
more instinct-based account, the later manuscripts decidedly favor the latter.
What this means as far as the innateness problem and observations about some nonhuman animals’ rapid acquisition of a world-horizon relative to human development is
that if the emphasis is on the role of the instincts, then all accounts of genesis are
consistent when considered in their broadest, most essential contours, and we can say
after all that the Husserlian account produces a truly “necessary genesis” and not one
characteristic only of a hypothetical consciousness as such or of human beings. That is,
in some manner or another, cognitive development and especially the acquisition of a
world-horizon is a matter of exercising bodily abilities, and this can arise either in a very
short time, if the instinctive drives for movement have a high enough degree of
specificity and other cognitive features (e.g., the coordination of various sensory
modalities) that must be integrated into those activities are also instinctively geared for
deployment together with them, or it can come about as a more circuitous process, if
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relatively little is instinctively specified and leave a considerable amount of leeway for
refinement.
In either case, the process, insofar as it is of interest for phenomenology, must take
place for consciousness. Whatever innateness means in this context, it surely does not
mean the possession of innate representations, so that the subject is equipped with the
kind of knowledge that I have, for instance, about how to prepare a meal, which depends
on memories of particular past experiences and the typical expectations engendered by
those experiences so that when I perform that activity, I “know what I’m doing.”
However complex the biological schema may be for instinctive behavior, the conscious
subject is completely unaware of the aims of the actions prescribed by those schemata
until after they have been accomplished.
Thus, an affective intentionality without agency or representation comes first. But,
importantly, this would be a dead end for consciousness if there was no room for
improvement, if the goal never manifested itself, making it possible thereafter for the
subject to recognize with at least a minimal degree of familiarity certain situations as
amenable for satisfying one’s needs and perhaps to actively intervene to satisfy them.
The emergence of agency depends on the work of memory and association. This is
reflected in Clément and Malerstein’s (2003 73) report of some observations made by
Piaget, worth quoting in full:
The psychologists who study the first weeks of the newborn’s life tend to insist on
the importance of the felt qualities, already experienced at an early stage. This
was actually observed by Piaget. For example, when he offered his finger to his
hungry newborn child, … [the child] sucked the finger. Within four days, if the
infant was hungry, he clumsily extruded Piaget’s finger. By one month, the
infant, when hungry, became an expert at extruding the finger.
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There no reason to think that the way the process unfolds for consciousness is any
different in its main contours in the case of the development of non-human animals.
Clarified in this way, Husserl’s account of instinctive intentionality and of association
operating in conjunction with instinct remains illuminating and highly relevant for the
study of cognitive development and fits nicely with the growing literature of
phenomenological and phenomenology-inspired philosophers trying to integrate the
phenomenological perspective into the study of ontogeny and cognitive development.13

13

See Gallagher (2005), Mark Johnson (2007), Sheets-Johnstone (1996), Varela and Depraz (2005),
and Clément and Malerstein (2003). Apart from those studies that overlap thematically with what we have
seen in Husserl, there are also contributions focusing on phenomenology and the development of
interpersonal or intersubjective experience, like Langfur (2012), Zhok (2011), Zahavi (2009), and Steeves
(1998, Chapter 3).
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